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Introduction 
 
Spatial income inequality has received a considerable interest in the empirical 
literature. This stylized fact drives diverse aspects of regional economic growth 
with important consequences in social, geographical and political aspects. 
Moreover, regional disparities affect socio-economic development of individuals 
and extend their effects to the unequal distribution of living standards and 
opportunities across communities. One manifestation of spatial income inequality 
can be observed in the stratification of socioeconomic groups across space by 
linking this fact directly with the provision of local public services. In this sense, 
segregated groups not only reside in isolated communities but also, they live in 
diverse local jurisdictions that can differ in terms of fiscal and administrative 
capacities to provide local public services. Therefore, local governments matter 
because can exacerbate spatial income inequality due to its influence on the spatial 
distribution of local public services. The last element is crucial to understand why 
the quantity or quality of local public services differs across communities by 
affecting mainly to the poorest population, who are the most important target group 
for the application of these public policies. 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters that explore the relationship between spatial 
income inequality and the distribution of local public services. Particularly, the 
three chapters consider the relevant role that local governments play in the 
provision of these services. By doing so, we analyze the case of Chile, one of the 
most unequal countries of the world with a Gini index above 50 percent. This 
country has received a remarkable attention by scholars, researchers, and 
policymakers mainly for two aspects. First, the outstanding economic performance 
of Chile that can be observed on crucial socioeconomic indicators such as the 
poverty rate with a significant reduction from 40 percent in 1987 to 14 percent in 
2014. Second, an important interest has received the high and persistent income 
inequality that the country exhibits where space plays an important role in its 
composition. Paredes, Iturra, and Lufin (2014) showed that 21 percent of income 
inequality can be attributable to differences across communities. Although this 
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aspect is crucial to understand its persistence over time, this new evidence does not 
provide a complete picture of how this spatial income inequality is working. This 
thesis contributes to the better comprehension of this problem by considering the 
provision of local public services as a critical source of spatial income inequality. 
Therefore, differences in terms of financial and administrative capacities of local 
governments can determine the distributional effects of decentralized public 
policies such as education or healthcare which are designed to reduce income 
inequality. Finally, this thesis contributes to improving the association between the 
spatial income inequality manifestations and institutional aspects for a better 
understanding of this aspect which has been relatively less explored by the 
empirical literature.  
 
Chapter 1 studies how the omission of local public policies can affect the results of 
conventional measures of spatial income inequality. This paper offers an interesting 
overview of spatial income inequality and how it is affected by the provision of 
local public services in Chile. In this sense, we recognize that financial and 
institutional restrictions that local government face can explain the unequal 
distribution of local revenues across communities. Main results suggest that local 
public policies have been more effective than cash transfers to reduce income 
inequality. However, the inclusion of local public services managed largely by local 
governments increases spatial income inequality by about 20 percent. In this way, 
this paper highlights the surge of local public governments as a new potential source 
of inequality which cannot be ignored by the literature. This last statement is used 
as starting point for the second chapter to study how disparities in the provision of 
local public services can be observed in the space.  
 
Chapter 2 goes beyond the role of local public services by studying the relationship 
between their spatial distribution and residential segregation. The latter is 
considered as the most important manifestation of spatial income inequality 
because relates the location and characteristics of individuals with social equity 
issues. In this vein, the paper studies how the spatial accessibility to local public 
services is equitably distributed among different social and economic groups across 
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the Metropolitan Area of Santiago (MR), Chile. In this way, we assume the 
residential segregation is not only observed in the clear distinction of economic 
groups across communities, also, it can be reinforced by the unequal distribution of 
local public services across the space. From this analysis, we can observe high 
disparities for accessing to local public services which are affecting more to the 
poorest population. Under this scenario, this crucial target group of public policies 
is affected by a “double-disadvantage” due to its exclusion from urban systems and 
its limited access to services such as education, healthcare or transportation 
(Borsdorf, Hidalgo, & Zunino, 2013) (Li H. , Wang, Shi, Deng, & Wang, 2017). 
Moreover, we found evidence that confirms that Chilean social housing policies 
could be considered as one cause of residential segregation given the resettlement 
of the poorer population to the periphery of the MR which is reinforced by the 
insufficient accessibility levels they must assume.  
 
Finally, Chapter 3 explores other aspects of spatial income inequality issues that 
concern the relationship between the spatial distribution of urban amenities and 
housing prices. Urban amenities have received a great attention by the scientific 
literature because can explain why some cities are more attractive than others. On 
the other hand, a large empirical body recognizes that the spatial distribution of 
amenities matters because they might stimulate regional economic growth, urban 
population, and employment. In this paper, we address this relationship through a 
hedonic pricing modeling and a set of urban amenities that includes local private 
and public services. Moreover, we recognize that capitalization of urban amenities 
into housing prices can be spatially heterogeneous distributed. Main results suggest 
that urban amenities play an important role in the definition of housing prices. 
However, we found important differences between private and local public 
services. Particularly, private services such as schools or hospitals have positive 
capitalizations in housing prices, meanwhile their public versions have negative 
valuations in housing prices. Again, these results can be related to administrative 
and financial restrictions that municipalities face providing local public services. 
Lastly, public policy implications can be redirected to optimize the spatial 
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distribution of local public services by improving the match between residents’ 
demand and their provision.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Effect of Local Public Services on Spatial Income Inequality: An 
Application for Chile 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the important role that disposable incomes play on spatial income 
inequality that still persists in the country, this evidence continuously omits the 
value of relevant public policies designed with the purpose of overcoming this 
problem. Therefore, the omission of local public services such as public schools or 
healthcare services can generate an incomplete and misleading picture about how 
income inequality is working. In this paper, we explore how the omission of local 
public services affects conventional measures of spatial income inequality by using 
information about eight local public services divided between shared and exclusive 
functions given their degree of dependency to the central government, and 
microdata about households’ characteristics from 2009, 2011 and 2013. Main 
results suggest that the inclusion of these policies reduces significantly overall 
income inequality. However, different effects on spatial income inequality for 
services can be found. For instance, shared functions (education and healthcare 
services) financed mainly with conditional transfers, reduce spatial income 
inequality by about 2 percent in comparison with the same component without to 
include these services. Exclusive functions (infrastructure, administration, culture, 
recreational, social and community services) that are largely funded and managed 
by local governments increase spatial income inequality by about 20 percent. These 
results evidence that high variability of expenditures, especially on exclusive 
functions, might increase disparities between communes with important 
consequences on living conditions of residents. Finally, this paper highlights the 
existence of a new potential source of income inequality attributable to the role of 
local governments as providers of public services, which is continuously ignored 
by policymakers. 
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Keywords: Extended income, local public services, Linear Expenditure System, 
spatial income inequality, three stage Theil decomposition. 
 
JEL-CODES: H41, H75, R28 
 
1. Introduction 
For many emerging and developing countries, the Chilean economy is considered 
as a good example due to its successful economic performance. For instance, the 
annual average growth of GDP was 4.1 percent during the period 1991-2005, 
significantly higher than the average world growth. The effects of this economic 
growth can be observed in crucial socioeconomic indicators as the poverty rate 
which has been reduced from 40 percent in 1987 to 14 percent during 2013.1 
However, this optimistic scenario contrasts with the high inequality that still 
persists in the country. According to estimations of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Chile is one of the most unequal countries 
in the world with a Gini index above 50 percent. This situation is not a surprise for 
the Chilean literature: previous estimations performed by Solimano and Torche 
(2008) proved that Gini index has been high and persistent from 1987 (58 percent) 
to 2006 (55 percent). Several reasons have been explored to determine why 
inequality remains high. From the fiscal perspective, some explanations argue that 
low levels of fiscal expenditures due to low tax revenues have not permitted high 
investments in essential public goods as education, which could have been more 
effective to increase the quality of human capital on the lowest income classes 
(López & Miller, 2008). On the other hand, the Chilean economy characterized by 
a high dependency to natural resources promoted larger subsidies to resource-
intensive industries, which resulted in lower incentives to increase the demand of 
high-quality human capital by knowledge-intensive industries. Thus, low 
investments in human capital among the poorest population and the rise of capital-
intensive firms’ concentration increased the resources in few hands (López & 
Miller, 2008). Also, this consequence can be confirmed by the high spatial income 
                                               
1 World Bank Data Set.  
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inequality that Chile exhibits. Paredes, Iturra, and Lufin (2014) showed that 21 
percent of Chilean income inequality can be attributable to differences across 
spatial units. Both results reveal that the role of the spatial dimension might be 
crucial to understanding the behavior of income inequality and its persistence over 
time.   
 
Despite the evidence remarks that concentration of resources is important to 
understand the behavior of spatial income inequality, this still provides an 
incomplete picture of the general problem. For instance, conclusions of both papers 
are focused on the analysis of cash incomes but not on the evaluation of local public 
policies designed to reduce poverty and income inequality. Thus, the results 
obtained are limited and provide a limited picture of resources that also generate 
welfare. In other words, the omission of the value of local public services from the 
conventional ways to measure income inequality can yield an incomplete and 
misleading context about how the distribution of well-being is carrying out (Callan 
& Keane, 2009) (Aaberge, Bhuller, Langorgen, & Mogstad, 2010). Similarly, it can 
underestimate important effects of public policies with redistributing purposes 
which are assigned to the population through transfers managed by local 
governments (Paulus, Sutherland, & Tsakloglou, 2010). Even though high levels of 
centralism of the Chilean state, its constitutional law recognizes the functional and 
decentralized administration of the country by transferring important functions 
related to the socioeconomic development of citizens to municipal levels. 
Moreover, the public policy agenda designed by the central government to increase 
the opportunities of the poorer by improving their access to public services such as 
education and healthcare services is largely supported by municipalities in terms of 
management or resources. This highlights the essential role that local governments 
perform in the provision of public policies with the objective of satisfying 
inhabitants’ needs given their better knowledge about their preferences. Especially, 
this role might be remarkable when municipalities are often viewed as drivers of 
local development with purposes of guarantying territorial convergence (Amstrong 
& Taylor, 2000).  
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For these reasons, the aim of this paper is to explore how the omission of the value 
of local public policies can affect conventional measures of income inequality by 
analyzing the role of eight local public services: education, healthcare, municipal 
activities, administration, community services (infrastructure), culture, recreational 
and social services. In this paper, we compute the extended income; a new 
definition of incomes proposed by Aaberge et Al (2003) which is understood as the 
sum of disposable income and the value of local public services provided by 
municipalities. This methodology involves two steps: valuation and allocation of 
local services. For valuation, the authors propose a linear expenditure system 
(hereafter LES), a useful tool to explain differences in spending that emerge by 
attaining minimum standards of production among local services and 
municipalities. Next, allocation of local public services is based on estimates of 
sector-specific minimum expenditures from LES, which permits the identification 
of individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics to become a potential 
recipient of these local public services.  
 
The original application of this model uses information at the municipal level for 
Norway including a set of eight sectors in one LES, assuming all services are 
provided only by local governments. In other words, this application ignores two 
important situations. First, the provision of local services also depends on 
conditional transfers from central governments. Also, the designing of some public 
policies depends also on central agencies. We believe this dependency can affect 
the behavior of municipalities as providers local public services because some 
crucial public services such as education and healthcare are supporting by 
conditional transfers from central government, and some operational aspects 
depend exclusively on central offices’ arrangements. In both cases, the primary role 
of municipalities is managing resources received from the central government to 
final users which implies a less participation of local governments in funding and 
creation of local public policies. On the other hand, public services such as 
administration, infrastructure or culture are largely supported by municipalities and 
their provision depends on funding sources available into communities and local 
management capacities. Clearly, these municipal expenditures would be affected 
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by a high variability and then, large differences between municipalities might 
emerge. Following these implications, this paper computes LES by recognizing the 
different degrees of dependency for each local public service. In the Chilean case, 
local services can be divided into shared and exclusive functions according to 
different roles that central and local governments must perform. Education and 
healthcare services are shared functions because their provision is joint with the 
central government, which are supported mainly by conditional transfers. On the 
other hand, infrastructure, administration, recreational and cultural services, 
community and social services are recognized as exclusive functions because are 
supported largely by municipal resources and depend solely on local management 
capacities. Thus, LES is computed for both, shared and exclusive functions, 
respectively. In this way, we can observe how municipal budget restrictions or low 
administrative capacities to manage local public services might affect the efficient 
targeting of resources with the aim of reducing inequality and poverty. Our 
hypothesis implies that education and healthcare services might have a significant 
participation in the reduction of spatial income inequality, whereas the role of 
exclusive functions might be limited and dependent on management capacity of 
municipalities which can differ across local governments.  
 
To estimate the extended income, this paper uses information from the National 
System of Municipal Information SINIM (Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional) 
from 2009, 2011 and 2013. This dataset contains information about municipal 
expenditures of eight local public services listed above. Next, the extended income 
is computed by adding the value of local public services to autonomous and 
monetary incomes, respectively, accordingly with the allocation rules used for each 
service. Microdata of incomes and individual characteristics are obtained from the 
National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey CASEN (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social, 2016) from 2009, 2011 and 2013. Finally, these new measures 
of income are decomposed into a spatial and individual component according to the 
methodology proposed by Paredes, Iturra, and Lufin (2014). Based on the ideas of 
Akita (2003), these authors proposed the three-stage decomposition method by 
decomposing the Theil indicator following the Chilean spatial division: regions, 
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provinces, and communes. In this way, this paper explores different spatial sources 
of income inequality by considering the crucial role that local governments perform 
on the between communes’ component due to their participation in the production 
of local public services.  
 
The results highlight that municipalities spend fewer resources on exclusive 
functions than shared functions which mean that there exist important limitations 
in terms of funding sources. Consequently, local services might suffer an important 
variability across municipalities. Other differences between local public services 
can be explained by the political participation of local councils into decisions about 
municipal expenditures which are more relevant for exclusive functions than shared 
functions. This evidence shows the important participation of central government 
in the provision of education and healthcare services in terms of controlling and 
funding. On the other hand, the results indicate the inclusion of the value of shared 
and exclusive functions reduces overall income inequality by 9 percent and 25 
percent, respectively. However, both services have different effects on spatial 
income inequality. We found that shared functions reduce spatial income 
inequality, meanwhile exclusive functions which increase spatial income 
inequality. These local public services are controlled, managed and funded by 
municipalities and then, we can observe how the high variability on municipal 
expenditures might increase disparities between communes. Overall, these findings 
could confirm the existence of a new potential source of income inequality 
attributable to local governments and their performance on the delivery of local 
public services.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents more details about the 
institutional framework where Chilean local governments operate. The third section 
shows the methodology used to study the behavior of Chilean municipalities in the 
provision of local public services, as well as their effects on spatial income 
inequality. The fourth section shows the empirical application of the models 
proposed. The last section concludes.  
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2. Institutional Framework 
Although that Chilean Constitutional Law describes to Chile as a unitary country, 
the administration of State is recognized as functional and decentralized (or 
deconcentrated) territorially. It implies that functions directly related to the socio-
economic development of local communities have been transferred from central 
bodies to regional and municipal administrations. For instance, Chilean 
municipalities have received important functions as result of the decentralization 
process that the central government implemented during 1980. From that period, 
local governments multiply their functions and consequently became the most 
important provider of local public services, receiving from the central government 
the administration of crucial services such as education and healthcare. Because to 
this process, the public version of education and healthcare are provided jointly 
between the central and local government, meanwhile other functions such as 
infrastructure, culture and recreational services, etc., are provided exclusively by 
municipalities and which depend completely on the performance at the local level.   
 
Even if this constitutes an important advance to improve levels of efficiency and 
equity, Chile still maintains a high level of centralism, thus, subnational 
governments should face important fiscal and administrative barriers to provide 
local public services. Specifically, municipalities must face important 
administrative limitations to develop community programs considering local 
community needs. In other words, municipalities are managers of public programs 
designed completely by central offices (ministries) and thus, municipal 
performance is limited their preferences (Vial, 2014). On the other hand, 
municipalities should face important fiscal restrictions to provide local services. For 
instance, several imbalances between functions transferred and the municipal 
disposable incomes available to support municipal activities still persist and then, 
some municipalities do not have sufficient resources to cover all municipal 
activities. Also, Chilean municipalities must get incomes from the same sources 
across the country, independently if these are available or not in the community. 
The consequences of these restrictions have not been clearly identified by the 
scientific literature, however, apparently are determined by the unequal 
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development of local communities due to the greater concentration of local public 
services in communities with more probabilities to obtain resources and high levels 
of local management capacity. Paradoxically, subnational levels are the only 
institutions which are designed with the objective of promoting the development of 
local communities due to their proximity to individual needs.2 
 
This paper puts focus on eight local public services that municipalities provide 
which are subdivided into two classifications given their dependency to the central 
government. For instance, education and healthcare services are shared functions 
because these are provided jointly between the central and local governments. 
Despite that municipalities cannot modify these centralized programs, the costs of 
providing both services depend on conditional transfers from central government 
and municipal resources;  during the last 15 years, conditional transfers from central 
government have represented by average 70 percent and 61 percent of total incomes 
dedicated to the provision of education and healthcare services, respectively.3 For 
both services, the role of municipalities is administrating these resources by 
distributing them in paying salaries to employees and professionals related, 
maintaining schools and general medical centers infrastructures, material 
purchases, etc. On the other hand, expenditures in infrastructure, community 
services, social and cultural services and activities associated with the internal 
administration of municipalities are exclusive functions because these depend on 
the local management capacity of each municipality. In addition, these activities are 
supported mainly for municipal resources which are composed by local taxes 
(housing, commercial, garbage taxes and others), fees (vehicle registration permits, 
traffic penalties, and others),4 and incomes obtained from the Municipal Common 
                                               
2 The Municipal Law (Nº 18.695) defines to municipalities as autonomous entities, with legal 
personality and own heritage. Their objective is to satisfy the needs of local communities to ensure 
their participation on social, economic and cultural progress.  
3 SINIM; Sistema de Información Municipal (2016). 
4 This item represents the municipal permanent incomes because depends on the income sources 
available into each municipality (IPP; Ingresos Propios Permanentes). Municipalities have a full 
control of these incomes. 
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Fund (FCM).5 For these services, municipalities have an active role because they 
are responsible for these services and it affects directly local amenity provision, as 
well as living standards of inhabitants.6 
 
Figure 1 shows the expenditure structure of Chilean Municipalities during the 
period 2009-2013 to visualize some details about the general behavior of 
municipalities. Municipal expenditures mainly are concentrated on education and 
health care services according to the dispositions of the central government. In this 
sense, education and healthcare services correspond to public policies created with 
the aim of ensuring the access of all population with an especial attention on the 
poorest segments. For these reasons, it is possible to expect that municipalities 
concentrate all their efforts on providing both services to support the state-owned 
system. With respect to exclusive functions, municipal expenditures are 
considerably lower in comparison with respect to shared functions. The only 
exception is found for the administration item which includes municipal’s 
expenditures on personnel wages, operational costs and among other expenditures. 
In this case, municipalities support these activities by using own incomes which are 
suffering a high variability given to the availability of funding sources in each 
municipality. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we describe the methodology used to compute the influence of local 
public services on spatial income inequality. In this way, this paper has the aim to 
compute the extended income which is defined as the sum of household disposable 
incomes plus the value of local public services. To accomplish this objective, the 
methodology is subdivided into three parts. The first part corresponds to the 
valuation of local public services by using the model proposed by Aaberge and 
                                               
5 The municipal common fund (FCM; Fondo Común Municipal) is a mechanism of redistribution 
of municipal incomes created with the objective of reducing the spatial concentration of municipal 
incomes. This fund is financed completely by municipalities with incomes derived from local taxes 
and these resources are redistributed between municipalities given poverty and income indicators.  
6 See appendix A for more details about municipal’s functions. 
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Langorgen (2003) to capture the spending behavior of local governments. Then, the 
information obtained from this step is used on the second part which corresponds 
to the allocation of valuation of local public services to different target groups, and 
the extended income is computed. Finally, this extended income is used into the 
analysis of spatial income inequality performing the proposition of Paredes et Al. 
(2014) which decomposes the Theil index into a spatial and individual component. 
These steps are developed in the following subsections.  
 
3.1. The value of local public services 
A new alternative to value local public services has been proposed by Aaberge and 
Langorgen (2003) those who introduce a complete demand system to account by 
the heterogeneity that arises from differences in costs between municipalities to 
produce a given set of public goods. This method is derived from a model of 
spending behavior of local governments, where the spending on different services 
is specified as a function of economic, social, demographic and geographical 
variables (Aaberge, Bhuller, Langorgen, & Mogstad, 2010). In general terms, the 
spending behavior of municipalities is studied following the logic of median voter 
models in which the decision is centered on the individual’s preferences about the 
place they choose to live. Instead, this approach assumes that differences in costs 
of attaining minimum standards are affected by the decisions of local governments, 
and then the provision of local public services are affected by the municipal’s 
capacity to produce a package given a municipal income level.  
 
In particular, the authors use a Linear Expenditure System (hereafter, LES) to 
represent the municipal-specific costs of attaining minimum standards of various 
local public services which permits a simultaneous treatment of services sectors, 
with exogenous variables that are affecting the municipal expenditures. In this 
sense, the system allows the consideration of the intrinsic heterogeneity associated 
with the preferences on service sectors and target groups across local governments. 
According to these ideas, the model is represented by a Stone-Geary utility function 
to characterize the utility of a given local government subject to the total per capita 
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income of a local government.7 By maximizing this utility function with respect to 
the quantity of service that an individual must receive, and subject to the budget 
constraint that local governments must face, it is possible to obtain the municipal’s 
expenditure for an specific service i, 
!" = $" + &"(( − $) + +" ( 1) 
Where !" is the expenditure per capita on service sector i, $" is the minimum 
expenditure required to provide a service i, &" is the marginal budget share for the 
spending in service sector i, and $ = ∑ $"-"./  is the minimum required expenditure 
on all local services. The difference between the total per capita income and the 
minimum required expenditure (( − $) can be interpreted as a discretional income, 
that is the income remaining when the minimum expenditures have been covered 
by local governments. Finally, +" is the stochastic parameter associated to each 
service.  
 
At this stage, this model fails to incorporate information related to the price 
variation for all public services, because data usually does not include direct 
information about prices. Thus, LES must include some restrictions to overcome 
this problem. For instance, some authors have proposed to impose an additional 
restriction by setting one of the minimum expenditure parameters equal to zero. 
However, this practice has not theoretical fundamentals. To solve this problem, the 
model allows for heterogeneity in parameters by imposing a functional form on the 
parameter-heterogeneity (Aaberge, Bhuller, Langorgen, & Mogstad, 2010).  This 
approach is a key fact into the model because it offers an attractive way to model 
the spending behavior across local governments, by identifying the variables that 
can affect differences in costs of obtaining minimum standards on local services, as 
well as preference differences between communities. 
 
                                               
7 See Aaberge and Langorgen (2003), (2006), (2010), for more details about the derivation of the 
model.  
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For instance, some variables can affect the minimum expenditure required to 
provide a service. This idea permits to recognize that costs associated with 
minimum expenditures may vary because of different production technologies or 
differences in factor prices. Also, this minimum requirement may be affected by 
other exogenous impacts as the central government regulations and norms 
developed jointly by municipalities. For these reasons, $" not only depends on 
production technology aspects, also it depends on the cost structure associated to 
each municipality. Let 0/, 02, … , 04 be r variables that are affecting the sector-
specific subsistence expenditures. This set of variables can include observable 
characteristics of local governments such as the distance to urban centers, indicators 
for cities and small municipalities to control the presence of scale economies and 
variations in productivity across municipalities. Also, this matrix includes 
demographic variables that can affect the structure of needs inside a municipality 
as the proportion of people using a specific public service. Then, a more flexible 
identification of the minimum expenditure parameter can be formalized as, 
 $" = $"5 +6$"70747./  
 
( 2) 
Where $"5 is the constant associated with the minimum expenditure system and ∑ $"70747./  is the sum of the coefficient associated with the vector of variables that 
are affecting minimum expenditures by sector. 
 
On the other hand, some variables can affect the preferences of the community in 
the provision of local goods.  In this sense, local tastes affect the allocation of 
discretionary income on some specific sectors and then, local authorities can decide 
about how to use those resources. Let 8/, 82, … , 89 be m variables that are affecting 
the variation in local tastes on the discretionary income. These variables include 
characteristics related with the population composition of municipalities as the 
average education level of individuals or the private disposable income. Then, the 
marginal budget share can be written as, 
 
  24 
&" = &"5 +6&"78797./  
 
( 3) 
Including the conventional adding sum up restrictions on parameters of LES,  
 
6&"797./ = 0 6&"597./ = 1 
( 4) 
 
And by substituting into the equation (1) both, the minimum expenditure 
parameters and marginal budget share formalized in equations (3) and (4), 
respectively, the model is completely identified.  
 
3.2. Allocation Methods of Local Public Services 
Another important step in the analysis of local government expenditures is the 
allocation of the value of local public services to different target groups.8 In general, 
local governments must report information about resources located to different 
public services, however, the allocation of spending by target groups is not 
observed and then, the amount of money that municipalities devoted to each target 
groups cannot be easily identified. A feasible solution to this problem was proposed 
by Aaberge, Bhuller, Langorgen, & Mogstad (2010), which permits to identify the 
relative priority of different target groups into each municipality using information 
captured by minimum expenditures. In other words, the model proposes that 
minimum quantities are determined by the relative size of different target groups. 
Assuming the existence of different target groups j which are identified by 
demographic variables included in the model for each service, expenditures are 
                                               
8A target group is defined as people with identical needs to receive specific local public services. 
Then, the methodology seeks to identify individuals with similar specific characteristics to become 
a potential recipient of a local public service. 
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allocated in the same proportions as the minimum expenditures. Therefore, the 
allocation of spending to different target groups can be specified as,  
 
!"7 = $"7∑ $"7<7./ !=" ( 5) 
 
Where !" is the predicted expenditure of a service i obtained from equation (1),  $"7 
is the minimum expenditure for each sociodemographic variable included into the 
model and  ∑ $"7<7./  is the sum of all minimum expenditures of > target groups for 
each service. For instance, equation (5) is used to allocate the expenditures of public 
education services because it is possible to identify two potential target groups, 
these are the proportion of primary and secondary students enrolled at public 
schools. On the other hand, when target groups are not clearly identified, it is 
assumed that the target group is the population as a whole.  
 
After the identification of expenditures for different target groups, the second step 
is to distribute the value of local public goods according to different needs of 
recipients. In specific, this step requires the identification of individuals with 
similar socioeconomic characteristics of becoming a potential recipient for a 
specific public service. Conventionally, the literature recognizes two different 
approaches to accomplish this objective. The first is the actual consumption 
approach which allocates the value of local public services to individuals that 
actually are using a public good. This approach is usually used to allocate education 
expenditures. The second type is the insurance value approach which computes the 
use of public goods according to the identification of factors that increase (or 
decrease) the probability of using a public service. For instance, this allocation form 
is appropriate for healthcare services, because the amount allocated represents the 
insurance value that an insured person would have to pay to the provider to receive 
the service (Verbist, Föster, & Vaaluvuo, 2012). This approach assumes that central 
government provides the same funding as an insurance policy where the value of 
the premium is the same for all individuals sharing the same characteristics 
(Marical, d'Ercole, Vaalavuo, & Verbist, 2008). Finally, both allocation approaches 
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are used to compute extended income by adding to disposable incomes the value of 
local public services. 
 
3.3. The effect of public local services on the spatial decomposition of 
income inequality 
Since Theil index is additively decomposable and satisfies many of the desirable 
properties as a measure of income inequality,9 Akita (2003) proposed the two-stage 
Theil decomposition which suggests a simple region-province-commune 
decomposition to obtaining three important components of the overall inequality; 
within-provinces, between-provinces, and between-regions. Despite that this 
methodology fails in to explain the dispersion of individual’s incomes within the 
underlying regional unit, it can provide a clearer picture about regional inequalities, 
by recognizing that public policy interventions focused at spatial level might have 
different effects on the distribution of incomes given the concentration of human 
capital and economic activities, as well as the unequal distribution of natural 
resources at the territory (Akita, 2003). Hence, the decomposition of inequality in 
these components becomes relevant when the objective of the study is to make a 
regional inequality measure comparable, which requires respecting the basic 
principles of socio-geographical regionalization of a country (Novotny, 2007). 
Also, this methodology offers an important opportunity to extend this two-stage 
decomposition to other hierarchical structure of the case study, focusing the 
analysis where the spatial income inequality is operating. For instance, this 
opportunity was taken by Paredes et Al (2014) those who following the ideas of 
Akita (2003) proposed the three-stage decomposition method extending the original 
decomposition to a region-province-commune-individual structure. The relevance 
of this decomposition is strongly justified from the public policy perspective 
because it includes an important spatial dimension (commune level) which is 
commonly used in public policy interventions focused on individuals. Also, Chile 
has disaggregated information of these three-spatial scales that policy-makers 
cannot ignore (Paredes, Iturra, & Lufin, 2014) and then, this new decomposition 
                                               
9 These properties are mean Independence, population-size, and the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers. More details in Shorrocks (1982). 
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can provide a strong methodological tool with the purpose of generating territorial 
policies in order to reduce income inequality by providing a complete 
understanding of this phenomena.  
 
Methodologically, the decomposition proposed by Paredes et Al (2014) to compute 
the overall inequality considering the region-province-commune-individual 
structure is proposed as follow, 
 
?" =6666@A4BC"A D"CB4 logHA4BC"/AJ4BC"/JK ( 6) 
 
Where A4BC" is the income of individual L, in commune M in province N in region O; A is the income of all individuals; P4BC" is the individual L in commune M in province N in region O, and J is the total population.  
 
Defining ?"4 with the objective of measuring the between-income inequality for 
region r, 
 
?"4 =666@A4BC"A4 D logH A4BC"/A4J4BC"/J4K"CB  ( 7) 
 
the equation (6) can be decomposed as, 
 ?" =6@A4AD4 ?"4 +6@A4AD4 log @ A4/AJ4/JD	=6@A4AD4 ?"4 + ?RS ( 8) 
Thus, the overall-regional income inequality ?" is the sum of the within-region 
component and the between-region component. Similarly, to measure the within-
commune income inequality for commune M in province N in region O, ?C4 can be 
written as, 
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?4C =6HA4BC"A4BC K logH A4BC"/A4BCJ4BC"/J4BCK"  ( 9) 
 
By substituting equation (9) in equation (7), ?"4 can be decomposed as, 
 ?"4 =6T6HA4BCA4B K ?4C +6HA4BCA4B K log H A4BC/A4BJ4BC/J4BKCC UB 	=6T6HA4BCA4B K ?4C + ?C4C UB 	=66HA4BCA4B KCB ?4C +6@A4BA4 D ?C4B+6@A4BA4 DB logH A4B/A4J4B/J4K66HA4BCA4B KCB ?4C+6@A4BA4 D ?C4 + ?B4B  
 
(10) 
Where ?4C measures the income inequality between communes in region O, and ?B4 
is the measurement of the income inequality between provinces in region O. Finally, ?"4 is substituted in the equation (8) and then, 
 ?" =666HA4BCA4B KCB4 ?4C +66@A4BA4 D ?C4 +6@A4AD4B4 ?B4 + ?RS	= ?VW + ?RW + ?RX + ?RS (11) 
 
Equation (11) represents the three-stage Theil inequality decomposition which each 
value obtained might be attributed to the individual location where the observation 
is located (Paredes, Iturra, & Lufin, 2014). The last equation is used with the 
purpose of computing spatial income inequality using the new information about 
incomes from previous sections.  
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4. Empirical Results 
This paper focuses the analysis on expenditures of eight local public services 
described on the previous sections. Of course, the most important services that 
municipalities provide are education and healthcare services because both are 
designed with the aim of guarantying the accessibility to poorest families. 
Education services are compulsory for all children aged 6-19 those who are divided 
in two levels, primary and secondary with a duration of eight and four years, 
respectively. On the other hand, health care services might be used for all 
inhabitants, however, people registered at government insurance scheme (National 
Health Care System; FONASA) have higher probabilities of using than individuals 
registered at private system. Other services such as municipal activities, 
administration, culture, recreational, social and community services include 
municipal’s expenditures in maintenance of roads, luminary, cleaning services, 
maintenance of public spaces, cultural programs, etc., which are directly affecting 
the life quality of the population. The recipients of these services are the population 
as a whole. Conventionally, the procedure to compute LES is to estimate the model 
simultaneously through Iterative Feasible Generalized Least Square (IFGLS). This 
method offers consistent estimates of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) 
assuming that errors are homogeneous with mean equal to zero and unrestricted 
covariance matrix. We adopted this approach to estimate the model. 
 
This paper uses two sources of information. The first dataset is provided by the 
National System of Municipal Information SINIM (Sistema Nacional de 
Información Municipal), which offers a complete description of the Chilean 
municipalities accountancy from 2009 (277 municipalities), 2011 (281 
municipalities) and 2013 (287 municipalities).10 This dataset is supported for the 
                                               
10 The sample represents for about 90 percent of all representative municipalities statistically. Chile 
has 345 municipalities, however, only 321 municipalities are statistically representative. In addition, 
not all municipalities provide information about their financial statements and then, the dataset 
collected just contains information about those municipalities that provide the eight local public 
services listed above.  
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Sub-secretary of Regional Development SUBDERE (Subsecretaria de Desarrollo 
Regional), which offers an electronic platform where municipalities must report 
their financial statements with the objective of controlling the municipal’s financial 
behavior, as well as, to increase their transparency levels.11 In addition, this dataset 
provides information about socioeconomic characteristics of the population 
collected by other official institutions. From this source, we use expenditure 
information of eight local public services that municipalities provide, which are 
presented on per capita basis in the summary statistics of table 1. These results 
report that municipality’s expenditures are larger for education services, 
administration and health care. For instance, education services expenditures 
increased from 158.007 CLP in 2009 to 198.397 CLP in 2013. The same trend is 
followed by administration’s expenditures which increased from 143.609 CLP in 
2006 to 152.409 CLP, and healthcare which expenditures increased from 48.191 
CLP to 74.755 CLP in 2013. However, the most important feature of these 
expenditures is that all services are characterized by a high variability which means 
that municipalities might face important structural changes that are affecting 
directly their local organization such as the implementation of new public policies 
or the reduction of the number of recipients (e.g. public education) that could 
increase the per capita amount of resources allocated in public services. Another 
important characteristic of municipal expenditures is observed in figure 2, that is, 
the high concentration of expenditures around the center following the spatial 
pattern of population.  
 
The second dataset is provided by the National Socioeconomic Characterization 
Survey CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional) for years 
2009, 2011 and 2013. These datasets contain information about household incomes, 
as well as, other important socioeconomic characteristics of the population that 
cannot be captured by the municipality’s datasets. From this information, we use 
two versions of household incomes available. The first is the autonomous income, 
which is defined as the income derived from a labor contract. The second is the 
                                               
11 This dataset is available at http://www.sinim.gov.cl 
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monetary income which is defined as the autonomous incomes plus cash transfers 
(e.g. subsidies). This income is included in the analysis to control the influence of 
social policies directed to individuals provided by the central government with the 
objective of reducing poverty and inequality. With respect to the spatial 
characteristics of the country, Chile divided into 15 regions which correspond to 
the highest administrative level. Also, the country is divided into provinces which 
is the second administrative level and communes, the third administrative level. The 
table 2 shows a description of the number of households available for each dataset, 
as well as, the number of communes, provinces, and regions covered during the 
period. This paper uses the same number of communes (municipalities) as in the 
local municipal behavior analysis. Finally, the figure 3 shows the spatial behavior 
of the average of autonomous household incomes by communes where it is possible 
to observe the uneven distribution of population and incomes around the center 
where is located the capital of the country (Metropolitan Region). In this sense, 
these maps put in evidence the spatial pattern that characterizes income inequality: 
the high concentration of social and economic activities around the capital of the 
country. 
 
4.1. Heterogeneity in subsistence expenditures and marginal budget shares 
In this section, the results obtained from the estimation of the model defined by 
equations 1 – 6 are reported for years 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively. These 
estimates include a set of demographic variables and other features of 
municipalities that might influence on the minimum expenditures, as well as on the 
marginal budget shares.12 By following the theoretical reasoning of the model, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as partial marginal effects which means that a 
coefficient represents the increment in the minimum quantity when the target group 
is increased by one individual. Given the institutional configuration of the 
distribution of local public services between municipalities and central 
governments and the availability of information, LES is computed for shared 
functions (education and healthcare services), as well as for exclusive functions (the 
remainder of services). Under this setup, LES for shared functions is computed for 
                                               
12 See appendix B. 
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277, 281 and 287 municipalities for 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively. On the other 
hand, LES for exclusive functions is computed for 246, 244 and 261 municipalities 
for 2009, 2011 and 2013. In particular, the dataset for exclusive functions is 
composed by municipalities that are providing all the package of services 
considered into the analysis. These municipalities are cities (more than 5.000 
inhabitants) and urban jurisdictions. The results for both groups of services are 
shown in the following subsections.  
 
4.1.1. Shared Functions 
The results of the computation of LES for shared functions, education and 
healthcare services, respectively, are shown in tables 3 – 5. Target groups for 
education services can be easily identified because local authorities have 
information of the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools 
with the purpose of redistributing conditional transfers received by the central 
government. Thus, the proportion of students using primary and secondary public 
education are included as sociodemographic variables into the model. Both 
variables report the amount of money that municipalities should devote when a 
target group increases in one unit. Results indicate that for the education sector, 
children in schooling age increase education expenditures for all municipalities 
because primary and secondary schools are compulsory for all children aged 6-19 
years. However, minimum expenditures tend to increase more with an additional 
child aged 14-19 years enrolled at secondary schools. This result suggests that 
municipalities and central government spend more resources in this target group 
because these students should face more demanding courses requiring more 
teachers with higher qualifications in comparison with students enrolled at primary 
levels. Also, this result follows the trend of central government subventions which 
are higher for students enrolled at secondary schools. During 2009, the partial 
marginal effect of increasing a target group in one more student was 89.540 CLP 
for children enrolled in primary schools and 146.100 CLP for students enrolled in 
secondary schools. After the implementation of some public policies with the 
purpose of increasing educational quality of public schools, resources increased 
significantly and then, during 2013 the partial marginal effect increased to 128.200 
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CLP for students enrolled at primary schools and 181.900 CLP for students enrolled 
in secondary schools.  
 
In contrast with education services, target groups of healthcare services cannot be 
easily identified and then, we assume that expenditures in this service do not depend 
as a function of sociodemographic variables considering as a target group the 
population as a whole. In this case, health care expenditures are characterized for 
being divided into two parts: the first corresponds to a basic capacity which is 
financed by both, municipalities and central government, respectively. The second 
part is an additional cost which must be supported by families through healthcare 
insurance that every family must hire, which can be public (National Health Care 
System; FONASA) or private.13 As primary health care services must be provided 
to all individuals given the constitutional laws, all inhabitants might use these 
services, however, the poorest population and individuals registered in FONASA 
have a high probability of using them in comparison with individuals registered in 
the private sector. Thus, we do not have strong evidence to assume that local 
government expenditures can vary across the population registered in FONASA 
and then, all inhabitants are considered as potential recipients of primary health care 
services. Therefore, the minimum expenditure for these services is represented by 
the constant associated with its equation. For healthcare services, the partial 
marginal effect of one more individual is found to increase by an additional amount 
of 111.100 CLP during 2009.  However, this marginal effect decreased to 99.540 
CLP for 2013. 
 
                                               
13 In Chile, the health care insurance is compulsory for all workers and pensioners whom must pay 
at least 7 percent of their incomes. In this point, families should choose between public system 
(FONASA) or private system. If individuals decide to register in the private system, they must pay 
an additional amount of money (voluntary) to opt to a health care plan which depends of their 
incomes, medical risk, family medical history, etc. In the case of health care services provide by 
municipalities, both public and private affiliates can use them. However, private affiliates must pay 
a higher amount for the service demanded. 
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Regarding with variables to control economies of scale are shown to be significant 
in both sectors. For instance, dummy variable associated with small municipalities 
has a positive impact on education and healthcare services which implies the 
existence of fixed costs in the operation of local governments. In addition, the 
existence of economies of scale is proved also with dummy variables for cities (with 
equal or more 5.000 inhabitants) and agglomerations (with equal or more 100.000 
inhabitants). Both variables show a negative effect on education and healthcare 
expenditure confirming that small municipalities face higher per capita fixed cost 
in comparison to the biggest ones. On the other hand, variables used to control 
centrality are only negative and significant for healthcare services implying that 
municipalities closer to urban centers face higher expenditures in this case. This 
result is confirmed by population density which shows a positive impact on 
healthcare expenditures evidencing that the incidence of diseases might be higher 
in zones where there exists a high concentration of people who are more susceptible 
to pollution or unhealthy lifestyles. Thus, high levels of urbanization that Chile 
exhibits might confirm this result because it is possible to observe a high 
concentration of people living closer to urban areas and then, healthcare 
expenditures are higher than dispersed settlements due to their urban character.14 In 
contrast with other services, the variable related with the dependency to Municipal 
Common Fund (FCM), included into the analysis to capture the effect of the 
smallest municipalities located in dispersed areas is found to be positive and 
significant only for education services, implying that costs of providing education 
on a decentralized level is higher in sparsely and smaller populated areas due to 
economies of scale. In this sense, small municipalities in dispersed areas spend 
more own resources in education services by confirming that healthcare services 
are activities largely located in urban areas. Finally, variables such as PSU’ 
effectiveness and unemployment rate by commune have a positive impact 
education and healthcare services, respectively, meanwhile, poverty rate exhibits a 
negative effect on health care expenditures.  
 
                                               
14 Following Word Bank’s computations, 90 percent of population was living in urban areas during 
2015 (Word Bank Databank, 2016) 
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With respect to marginal budget share coefficients, note that the average of 
education of individuals 30-59 years of age is found to be positive and significant 
for healthcare services implying that local authorities put more attention to these 
services when the population is more educated because they might demand more 
high-quality services. On the other hand, the average of education is found to be 
negative and significant for education services due to the lower probability of these 
individuals of becoming recipients of them. In addition, average housing rent 
variable shows a positive and significant effect on education expenditures which 
means that communities demand more quality education services because the 
increment of this amenity’s level might increase housing valuation. However, the 
effect of this variable is negative for health care services. This result might be 
related to low-quality levels these services exhibit which would reduce the 
valuation of households. Finally, the effects of other variables such as the average 
income per capita and political participation of councils are not significant for both 
services. This result is relevant in special for political participation of councils 
because it is a proof about the limited participation of local authorities in the 
definition of new strategies in education and health care services which are 
dominated largely by the influence of the central government.  
 
4.1.2. Exclusive Functions 
The results of LES are shown in tables 6 – 8. For all these services such as 
infrastructure, administration, culture, recreation, social, and community services, 
local government expenditures do not depend on sociodemographic variables 
because it is not possible to identify clearly the recipients of these services due to 
the availability of information. Thus, the minimum expenditure for every service is 
represented by the constant associated with every service’s equation and then, the 
target group associated with each service is the population as a whole. With respect 
to variables used for controlling by economies of scale and centrality are shown to 
be significant in largely of services. For instance, inverse population variable is 
positive and significant in all sectors by implying that small municipalities must 
face higher unit costs to provide these local public services. Moreover, this result 
implies the existence of fixed costs in the operation of local governments. As usual, 
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small municipalities have smaller target groups than the largest ones, and therefore 
per-capita fixed costs are higher in comparison with other municipalities. In 
addition, the results show that municipalities geographically dispersed face higher 
expenditures in infrastructure and recreational services than municipalities with 
higher densities and closer to urban centers. In this sense, the distance to urban 
centers used to capture the effects of centrality exhibits a significant positive effect 
for both services. Also, the variable associated to the Municipal Common Fund 
(FCM) dependency included into the analysis to capture the effect of the smaller 
municipalities located in dispersed settlements is found to be negative and 
significant in all services. Municipalities with a high dependency on this funding 
source might spend fewer resources in exclusive functions, apparently, due to the 
lower availability of own resources for their provision. Thus, it is possible these 
municipalities are concentrating more priorities on other important local public 
services such as education and healthcare services than others which could affect 
negatively living standards of communities.  
 
Regarding marginal budget share coefficients, note that variables affecting these 
parameters are more relevant for exclusive functions than shared functions. 
Specifically, political participation of councils and income per capita variables 
become more important into decisions of local governments to provide public 
services according to characteristics of the population. For instance, average 
income per capita has a positive effect on administration, culture and recreational 
services which means that local authorities put more attention to cover this kind of 
services when communities are richer. In particular, this result might determine that 
the richest families are becoming on users in communities where local authorities 
show more attention to provide services that increase living conditions of 
communities. On the other hand, political participation of councils shows 
ambiguous results for administration, culture and social services. For example, 
political participation has a negative effect on cultural services during years 2009 
and 2011 which implies that local authorities devote fewer efforts to provide this 
service, meanwhile, the same variable has a positive effect during 2013. A similar 
pattern can be observed for administration, recreational and community services, 
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where political participation has a negative effect on administration and recreational 
services for 2009, and positive and significant effects for 2011 and 2013, while 
political participation has a positive effect on community services in 2009 and a 
negative effect during 2011 and 2013. These results coincide with changes of local 
authorities during 2011 and then, it is possible that these could affect the objectives 
of municipal councils by generating a different pattern of expenditures between 
periods and municipalities. Finally, the average of housing rent shows a negative 
effect on administration and culture services during 2009-2011, and a negative 
effect for recreational services during 2011. These results indicate that municipal 
expenditures are lower when housing rent of communities are high, which it is an 
opposite result with respect to the expected because an increment of municipal 
efforts to provide better administration, cultural and recreational services might 
increase housing valuation. However, these results are reversed for recreational 
services from 2011 and for cultural services during 2013. On the other hand, the 
average of housing rent has a positive effect on community and social services 
which means that local authorities devote more resources to increase levels of 
infrastructure, maintenance of roads and public space, or subventions to population 
when housing rents are higher because this item corresponds to an important 
funding source of municipalities and then, efforts for increasing these services can 
be translated into more resources from this potential local tax in the future.  
 
4.2. Allocation of local public services  
For the Chilean case, education services are allocated using the actual consumption 
approach given the identification of two target groups that actually are using 
education services. On the other hand, healthcare, social and community services 
are allocated using the insurance value approach. For instance, healthcare services 
are allocated in proportion to the probability of being a recipient of these services. 
To compute this probability, a probit analysis is applied using socioeconomic 
information about whether or not individuals have visited a practitioner in the last 
3 months, age, sex, if individuals are enrolled at the National Health Care Security 
System (hereafter, FONASA) and if individuals are living below the poverty line. 
The probability computed is found to increase with the age of individuals, women, 
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with individuals enrolled at FONASA and with individuals below the poverty line. 
The same strategy is applied for social services and community services and then, 
the probability of households of being recipients of these services is computed. 
From the socio-economic survey CASEN, individuals are asked whether or not 
their family is enrolled in the Chile Solidario program.15 This program is provided 
by central government; however, municipalities commonly act as administrators 
because they are responsible to identifying households that are sharing the 
requirements of being recipients. In this case, the probability of receiving social 
services is found to decrease with the head of household’s age and family’s incomes 
and to increase with female-headed households and with families living below the 
poverty line. Using these probabilities for each individual and each family, 
households receive a share of the value of health care, social and community 
services proportional to the probability of receiving health care services or social 
assistance, respectively. The remainder of services is allocated using the actual use 
approach assuming that the value of these services is distributed uniformly across 
families and each family receives the same allocation of money which only varies 
by municipality. Finally, the extended income is computed adding up the value of 
these services to disposable incomes. 
 
4.3. A new definition of incomes 
To analyze the effect of the value of local public services on spatial income 
inequality, in this paper we consider two different measures of cash incomes that 
usually are used in this type of studies. The first is the autonomous income which 
is defined as the income derived from a labor contract. The second is the monetary 
income which is defined as the autonomous income plus cash transfers or subsidies. 
To compute the extended income, we add the value of local public services to 
autonomous and monetary incomes, respectively. Hereafter, these new incomes are 
referred as extended autonomous incomes and extended monetary incomes, and 
these are used to test the robustness of results. To avoid scale effect problems, the 
                                               
15 This program is a package of different subsidies created with the purpose of helping the poorest 
families. For instance, this package includes water’s subsidy (a discounted copayment in the final 
price), family’s subsidies, program for retention of students in schools and others.  
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four measures of incomes have been divided by the number of inhabitants by 
household. 
 
4.4. Spatial Analysis 
In this section, we show the results of the spatial decomposition of income 
inequality proposed at the previous sections, using information about monetary and 
autonomous incomes provided by socioeconomic surveys, as well as extended 
incomes (extended monetary and extended autonomous incomes, respectively) 
computed according to the proposition of Aaberge et Al (2003). In line with the 
computations performed by Solimano and Torche (2008) and Paredes, Iturra and 
Lufin (2014), Chilean income inequality continues its trend to decrease during the 
last years. Including new information (2011 and 2013, respectively), results 
apparently have the same pattern as estimations obtained by previous works. Figure 
4 shows the evolution of Theil index in the period 2009-2013 for autonomous and 
monetary incomes. Both types of incomes are included in the analysis because it is 
possible to analyze the role of cash transfers on income inequality. As expected, 
income inequality tends to decrease showing a similar pattern between types of 
incomes. An exception has been found in 2011 where Theil index slightly increases, 
however, this change is reversed to its lowest level during 2013. In addition, Theil 
index for monetary incomes is lower than Theil index for autonomous incomes, 
which means that cash transfers directed to individuals have been relevant to reduce 
income inequality, however, these results do not indicate the significance of this 
change. To determine the statistical significance of this reduction, figure 4 also 
includes confidence intervals (at 95 percent of confidence) which were estimated 
via bootstrapping in 100 replications. The logic of this analysis is the following; if 
confidence intervals are overlapping between them it implies that reduction (or 
increment) of income inequality has not been significant for a specific period. 
Results suggest that income inequality’s reduction was significant only for years 
2009 and 2013 because both confidence intervals do not overlap for both periods. 
This finding follows the results obtained by Paredes, Iturra and Lufin (2014) those 
who suggested that cash transfers have been insufficient to reduce income 
inequality, at least for 2011 respectively.  
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To account for the spatial location of households and its effects on income 
inequality, the three-stage nested Theil decomposition proposed in equation 16 is 
computed and shown in figure 5. As results obtained by Novotny (2007) and 
Paredes, Iturra, and Lufin (2014), both autonomous and monetary incomes have 
similar patterns revealing the important role of the space in the Chilean income 
inequality. On average, 19 percent of income inequality can be attributable to the 
spatial location of households which confirms that its spatial dimension is an 
important source of overall income differentiation. In figure 5 two important 
features can be detected. First, it is possible to observe a reduction of income 
inequality within communes which fell from 84 percent in 2009 to 80 percent in 
2013 due to public policies oriented to individuals (Paredes et Al, 2014). However, 
also this evidence reaffirms that there exist other mechanisms operating in a spatial 
scale that might push the increment of income inequality between municipalities. 
This last idea is crucial to understand the potential role that municipalities might 
perform on spatial income inequality through the provision of local public services 
which might be affected by funding sources restrictions or local management 
capacities that suffer an important variability across municipalities. Finally, these 
factors can be relevant to determine how local public services and their spatial 
distribution can affect living conditions of communities, especially when the spatial 
location of individuals might determine their opportunities to access to these 
services.  
 
The following subsections describe the results for the spatial analysis of income 
inequality considering the effect of local public services through the classification 
proposed in the previous sections. We believe that characteristics of local public 
services in terms of dependency to central government funding might influence on 
spatial income inequality, by modifying the behavior of local governments to 
provide these services. In this sense, different roles performed by municipalities to 
provide shared and exclusive functions are influenced to a greater or lesser extent 
by central government preferences. For instance, municipalities must act as 
managers of resources devoted to providing education and healthcare, which are 
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largely financed by central governments. Also, local governments have a limit 
participation on the design of both public policies because it is an important purpose 
performed by central offices (ministries) to ensure the accessibility of these services 
to all population establishing a special focus on the poorest population. In contrast, 
the provision of exclusive functions depends on the management capacity of 
municipalities which differs among local governments. Also, these services receive 
a less control from central government because all the responsibility to provide 
them corresponds to municipalities by law. On the other hand, exclusive functions 
are largely supported by municipal’s incomes which are subjected to a fixed 
structure of funding imposed by central government. Thus, resources devoted to 
finance these local public services are characterized by a high variability between 
municipalities which depend on the availability of funding sources in each 
community. We believe these differences on the provision of local public services 
regarding with funding sources, as well as control and management capacities 
might affect measures of spatial income inequality, contributing to increase 
disparities on living standards across individuals and communes.  
 
4.4.1. Shared Functions 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of Theil index for extended monetary and extended 
autonomous incomes considering education and health care services which are 
provided by municipalities, however, these are largely financed by central 
government. In average, the inclusion of the value of education and healthcare 
services reduces income inequality by about 9 percent in absolute terms. As both 
extended incomes are computed using information about monetary and autonomous 
incomes, their income inequality evolution follows the same pattern and then, 
results do not report relevant conclusions. Thus, to account for effects of shared 
functions on income inequality figure 7 shows the Theil index for extended 
monetary incomes and monetary incomes and their confidence intervals, 
respectively. Bootstrapping suggests that education and healthcare services have 
been more effective to reduce income inequality for all periods. As Aaberge et al 
(2003) proposed, the inclusion of the value of these services might be more 
effective to reduce income inequality than central government individual’s 
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subventions, by guarantying the accessibility of the poorest population to these 
kinds of services, the main purpose of both public policies. Therefore, this result is 
crucial to understand the important role that local governments perform on 
individual’s well-being contributing to equalize the accessibility of these public 
services to all individuals.  
 
In this sense, the spatial location of individuals might be relevant to analyze the 
spatial behavior of income inequality. In other words, the inclusion of the value of 
education and health care services is still relevant to account for the existence of 
other mechanism affecting spatial income inequality due to the greater effectivity 
of these local public services to reduce income inequality. Thus, Theil’s 
decomposition for extended autonomous and extended monetary incomes is shown 
in figures 8 and 9, respectively.16 On average, 18 percent of overall inequality can 
be attributable to the spatial scale, 2 percent less than the proportion of spatial 
inequality computed for monetary and autonomous incomes, respectively. In fact, 
this reduction of spatial income inequality can be related to an increment of income 
inequality within communes (or the individual component of income inequality), 
meanwhile, spatial components of overall income inequality remain stable for all 
the definitions of incomes. These evidences show the important role of education 
and healthcare services increasing opportunities to all population even if the 
increment on the individual level of income. Finally, results imply that shared 
functions are accomplishing central government purposes because apparently, these 
are increasing the accessibility to all individuals to both local public services 
independently of their spatial location.  
 
4.4.2. Exclusive functions 
Figure 10 shows the evolution of Theil index for extended monetary and extended 
autonomous incomes considering only exclusive functions for its computation. The 
provision of these public services is the responsibility of local governments, which 
are supported largely by municipality’s income sources. Applying the same 
                                               
16 Bootstrapping results for spatial components of income inequality in appendix C. 
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empirical strategy for shared functions, the value of exclusive functions reduces 
income inequality by about 25 percent, which means these services have been 
allocated to individuals of the lowest income classes. In addition, bootstrapping 
suggests the value of exclusive functions reduces significantly income inequality 
for all periods. These results reinforce the position of local governments as drivers 
of local development generating local initiatives with the purpose of reducing 
inequality between individuals given their better knowledge of communities’ 
preferences and the potential reduction of transactions costs in the delivering of 
public goods.  
 
To account for the spatial location of individuals, Theil’s decomposition for 
extended autonomous and extended monetary incomes is shown in figures 11 and 
12.17 The inclusion of exclusive function on monetary and autonomous incomes 
increases spatial income inequality in 22 percent which is higher in comparison to 
the same component without to consider the value of local public services. For 
instance, income inequality among individuals decreased from 81 percent to 75 
percent during the period 2009-2013. However, other important feature of income 
inequality can be observed from this analysis: income inequality between 
communes increased from 11 percent in 2009 to 14 percent in 2013, which also it 
is higher to the same component without exclusive functions. This evidence shows 
that a part of income inequality related to the spatial scale might attributable to local 
governments and their performance on the redistribution of exclusive functions at 
the population. In this sense, local governments accomplish an important role 
reducing income inequality between individuals which permits to guide the local 
development of their communities. However, also it is possible to observe a 
potential tradeoff between municipal functions and their local management 
capacities which apparently are not uniformly distributed between municipalities. 
Also, the high variability of municipal expenditures that depends on restrictive 
funding sources might influence the provision of local public services because some 
municipalities do not have sufficient resources to support them. Finally, different 
priorities across municipalities would affect the provision of services; small 
                                               
17 Bootstrapping results for spatial components of income inequality in appendix D. 
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municipalities can prefer to provide education and healthcare services following the 
preferences of central government than culture services because this service 
supposes the use of resources that would not be available. 
 
In summary, this new evidence provides four important characteristics of the 
Chilean income inequality. First, income inequality has decreased, however, it is 
still high in comparison with other countries (Paredes, Iturra, & Lufin, 2014). 
Second, the reduction of inequality during the period studied can be attributable to 
the effect of social policies directed to individuals, because the within inequality 
shows a decreasing trend during the last years. Third, the results suggest the 
inclusion of local public services into the analysis has a significant effect on the 
reduction of income inequality. Therefore, public services provided by local 
governments might be more effective than cash transfers if the purpose of 
policymakers is to increase the accessibility of the poorest households. On the other 
hand, the effect of local public services on spatial inequality can differ due to the 
dependency of these local services to funding sources. For instance, shared 
functions (education and healthcare services) financed largely by central 
government can reduce spatial income inequality accomplishing the main purpose 
of these public policies: to ensure the accessibility of education and health care 
services to all population, in special to the poorest population. However, exclusive 
functions which are financed and managed largely by local governments increase 
spatial income inequality. The results suggest the inclusion of these services 
reduces income inequality among individuals, however, it increases inequality 
across communes. This increment might be due to the role of local governments in 
the provision of public services because apparently, their local capacities are not 
uniformly distributed between communities. 
 
5. Conclusions and further remarks 
This paper has the objective of exploring how the omission of the value of local 
public services can affect conventional measures of income inequality. Using the 
methodology proposed by Aaberge and Langorgen (2003), an extended income is 
computed through a complete linear expenditure system (LES) considering 
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differences in costs to obtain minimum-standards of various local public services 
in a simultaneous treatment. Thus, LES is estimated as a function of economic, 
social, demographic and geographical factors that might affect the municipal 
capacity to produce a local public service package given the preferences of 
municipalities and individuals. This approach is used to explore the behavior of 
Chilean municipalities from 2009, 2011 and 2013 using information of eight public 
services that local governments provide: education, health care, administration, 
infrastructure, culture, recreational, social and community services. In contrast with 
the original application of the model, this approach recognizes the provision of local 
public services also depends on the central government in terms of designing and 
funding sources. We believe this factor can affect the behavior of municipalities 
due to different roles they assume to produce each service. In this sense, this paper 
computes different LES for shared functions (education and health care services), 
which depend largely on the central government in terms of funding sources and 
designing, and exclusive functions (the remain of services) which are largely 
funded by local governments. This model is computed through Iterated Feasible 
Generalized Least Square (IFGLS) which provides consistent estimates of 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). 
 
The results evidence that a common characteristic for shared and exclusive 
functions is economies of scale. For instance, results show that small municipalities 
spend more resources in providing local public services, especially education, 
health care, infrastructure and recreational services. However, municipalities closer 
to urban areas spend more resources in providing health care services than others. 
This result is confirmed by population density which implies that high incidence of 
diseases in places with an important concentration of people may increase 
expenditures due to pollution and unhealthy life. However, important differences 
between municipalities can be found when other variables are considered in the 
analysis. Municipalities with a high dependency on MCF (municipal common fund) 
spend fewer resources in exclusive functions in contrast with education services in 
which it is possible to find a positive effect of this variable. This result might be 
due to these services are financed by municipal funding sources that suffer a high 
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variability across municipalities. Then, municipalities may concentrate high 
priority on education and healthcare services because arrangements of central 
government, meanwhile the provision of exclusive functions might be concentrated 
in places with more probability to access to municipal funding sources.  
 
Other important differences between types of services are related to marginal 
budget share coefficients. Variables such as political participation of local councils 
are more relevant for exclusive functions than shared functions. This result shows 
the limited participation of local governments in the design of education and health 
care policies and reveals the important role of the central government in terms of 
controlling and funding. On the other hand, exclusive functions depend largely on 
local management capacities which are mostly controlled by municipal councils. 
Also, average income per capita of communities is found to have a positive effect 
only on exclusive functions, especially in local public services such as 
administration, cultural and recreational services by determining that local 
authorities put more attention to cover these services when individuals are richer. 
Furthermore, municipal expenditures in healthcare services are higher when the 
population is more educated because they might demand high-quality services. 
However, education expenditures are lower when the population is more educated 
due to their lower probability of using these services. Finally, housing prices could 
increase expenditures in education services because these would raise housing 
valuation but also reduce expenditures in healthcare services because are associated 
with lower housing valuation.  
 
Next, the value of local public services is allocated on the population through 
different target groups and different needs of recipients, following allocation rules 
for each service and then, extended income is computed adding to autonomous and 
monetary incomes the valuation of services. From this step, extended autonomous 
and extended monetary incomes are computed which are used to analyze the effect 
of local public services in spatial income inequality. Using the three-stage 
decomposition method proposed by Paredes, Iturra, and Lufin (2014), new incomes 
are decomposed by following the hierarchical structure of the country: region-
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province-commune-individual. Results indicate that the inclusion of the value of 
shared and exclusive functions reduces income inequality in 9 percent and 25 
percent, respectively, showing the important role of these services on the reduction 
of overall inequality.  However, despite that both services reduce overall income 
inequality; different effects can be found on spatial income inequality. In this sense, 
shared functions (education and health care services) reduce spatial income 
inequality, according to the purpose of both services that ensure the accessibility to 
these services to all population. By contrast, exclusive functions which are 
controlled, managed and financed largely by local governments increase spatial 
income inequality, evidencing the high variability in local management capacities 
and funding sources which depend on a fixed structure imposed by central 
government. Thus, these differences can determine the existence of high disparities 
between communes affecting directly opportunities of accessing to better living 
conditions that apparently are concentrated in places with more probabilities to 
obtain municipal resources and higher levels of local management capacities. 
  
Overall this paper offers a new perspective to analyze income inequality. First, this 
approach includes the important role of local governments as crucial actors in the 
delivery of local public services. Previous analyzes ignore the role of decentralized 
public policies that are designed with the objective of reducing income inequality 
such as education and healthcare services. Therefore, the inclusion of local public 
services can increment the understanding of the behavior of income inequality and 
its persistence over time. These findings highlight the role of local governments as 
drivers of local development which requires redirecting the creation of public 
policies to community scale where also spatial inequality is operating. However, 
policymakers might face potential costs that would emerge from coordination 
problems of public policies operating in different scales. Finally, this paper omits 
some important factors that could affect the results. For instance, this paper does 
not explore spillover effects that emerge from the provision of local public services. 
Also, quality of local public services has not been considered in the analysis and to 
ignore this problem can overestimate the real impact of local public services on 
spatial income inequality. A future research is aimed in this line with the purpose 
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of obtaining a clear picture about how these factors potentially can affect spatial 
income inequality.  
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Figure 1: Municipal Expenditures Structure of Chilean Municipalities 2009-
2013 
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Figure 2. Map of Chile. Administrative division, Gastner-Newman's cartogram 
of population and municipal expenditure percapita 
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Figure 3: Map of Chile. Administrative Division. Gastner-Newman's Cartogram 
of population and average household incomes 
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Figure (3): Map of Chile. Administrative division, Gastner-Newman’s cartogram of 
population and Gastner-Newman’s cartogram of the average of household incomes by 
communes. 
Administrative Division Population Average of Household 
Incomes by Communes 
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Figure 4: Overall Theil Index. Monetary and Autonomous Income From 2009-
2013 
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Figure 5: Three-stage inequality decomposition of Theil index. Autonomous and 
monetary incomes from 2009-2013 
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Figure 6: Overall Theil index. Shared functions. Extended Monetary and 
Extended Autonomous Income from 2009-2013 
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Figure 7: Overall Theil index. Shared functions. Extended Monetary and 
Monetary Income from 2009-2013 
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Figure 8: Three-stage inequality decomposition of Theil index. Shared functions. 
Extended autonomous and autonomous incomes from 2009-2013 
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Figure 9. Three-stage inequality decomposition of Theil index. Shared 
Functions. Extended and Monetary Incomes from 2009-2013 
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Figure 10: Overall Theil index. Exclusive functions. Extended monetary and 
extended autonomous income from 2009-2013 
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Figure 11: Three-stage inequality decomposition of Theil index. Exclusive 
functions. Extended autonomous and autonomous incomes from 2009-2013 
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Figure 12: Three-stage inequality decomposition of Theil index. Exclusive 
functions. Extended Monetary and Monetary Incomes from 2009-2013 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Municipal Public Expenditures Per-capita by 
Sectors from 2009-2013 
Year  2009 2011 2013 
Education Services    
Mean   158,007 172,251 198,397 
Standard Deviation  80,084 91,459 113,226 
Minimum  25,314 11,478 13,650 
Maximum  543,270 689,903 947,749 
Number of Municipalities  277 282 289 
Health Care Services    
Mean   48,191 57,806 74,755 
Standard Deviation  23,254 29,518 37,867 
Minimum  2,404 2,480 3,833 
Maximum  149,581 235,639 309,406 
Number of Municipalities  277 282 289 
Municipal Activities    
Mean   4,178 4,279 5,581 
Standard Deviation  8,474 7,025 9,066 
Minimum   0,001 0,009 0,072 
Maximum  91,892 69,028 84,061 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
Administration    
Mean   143,609 134,090 152,409 
Standard Deviation  138,494 141,860 160,512 
Minimum  25,490 21,875 21,622 
Maximum   1.058,422   1.617,363  1.632,218 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
Culture    
Mean   1,350 1,800 2,305 
Standard Deviation  2,493 3,287 4,856 
Minimum   0,006  0,004 0,001 
Maximum  27,616 34,260 64,629 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
Recreational Services    
Mean   1,089 1,546 1,904 
Standard Deviation  1,811 1,889 2,208 
Minimum   0,002   0,013 0,006 
Maximum  16,662 17,751 1.330,576 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
Social Services    
Mean   7,400 9,953 12,397 
Standard Deviation  7,267 15,639 11,529 
Minimum   0,233     0,007      0,039 
Maximum  61,782 220,136 690,947 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
Community Services    
Mean   39,493 45,491 58,795 
Standard Deviation  34,999 36,177 62,121 
Minimum   0,398 1,650 9,179 
Maximum  320,314 383,173 578,874 
Number of Municipalities  246 245 262 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Monetary and Autonomous Incomes, number of 
households and Spatial Units 
 Exclusive Functions Shared Functions 
Year 2009 2011 2013 2009 2011 2013 
Monetary Incomes       
Number of 
Households  
50.087 44.801 55.872 57.598 51.527 60.184 
Mean  178.247 247.719 237.855 179.051 247.581 235.867 
Standard Deviation  293.144 457.673 352.789 287.792 443.312 348.831 
Minimum  56 342 833 56 342 833 
Maximum  14.900.000 46.100.000 16.400.000 14.900.000 46.100.000 16.400.000 
Autonomous 
Incomes 
      
Number of 
Households  
50.087 44.801 55.872 57.598 51.527 60.184 
Mean  170.376 241.412 229.819 171.263 241.377 227.839 
Standard Deviation  294.763 459.045 354.908 289.451 444.692 350.955 
Minimum  56 170 83 56 114 83 
Maximum  14.900.000 46.100.000 16.400.000 14.900.000 46.100.000 16.400.000 
Spatial Units       
Number of 
Communes  
246 245 262 277 282 289 
Number of 
Provinces  
46 46 46 46 46 46 
Number of Regions  14 14 14 14 14 14 
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Table 3: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum expenditures and 
marginal budget share parameters for 2009. Estimation via Maximum 
Likelihood 
   Education Services  
 Health Care 
Services 
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters   
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)  13.87** 111.1*** 
 (-0.0231) (-0.0001) 
Population share using primary public education services 89.54 ***  
 (0.0000)  
Population share using secondary public education services 146.1***  
 (0.0000)  
Dependency to FCM  -0.72 -23.13 
 (-0.8555) (-0.2146) 
Distance to urban centers   -0.00765** 
   (-0.0213) 
Density  -0.0000182 0.00122 
 (-0.9603) (-0.4823) 
Inverse Population  -0.0748 -0.36 
 (-0.4809) (-0.4731) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  -7.930** -37.14** 
 (-0.0438) (-0.0435) 
Dummy for Small Municipalities  6.597** 33.18*** 
 (-0.0132) (-0.0061) 
Dummy for cities  -11.71*** -45.06*** 
 (-0.0003) (-0.0014) 
Poverty rate   -17.32 
  (-0.3819) 
Psu's effectiveness  8.193***  
 (-0.0001)  
Unemployment rate   128.7* 
  (-0.0724) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters   
Constant  0.396*** 0.0105 
 (-0.0042) (-0.9296) 
Average education level for  individuals 30-59 years  0.0022 0.0503*** 
 (-0.9018) (-0.0023) 
Average income per capita -0.000239 0.0000427 
 (-0.1996) (-0.7782) 
Political participation of councils  0.201 -0.116 
 (-0.1053) (-0.2248) 
Average housing rent  0.00268** -0.00177** 
 (-0.0147) (-0.0436) 
R2 0.94 0.59 
N  277 277 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum expenditures, and 
marginal budget share parameters for 2011. Estimation via Maximum 
Likelihood 
   Education Services  
 Health Care 
Services 
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters   
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)  -6.675 37.55 
 (-0.4024) (-0.2522) 
Population share using primary public education services 109.1***  
 (0.0000)  
Population share using secondary public education services 203.8***  
 (0.0000)  
Dependency to FCM  6.483* 11.43 
 (-0.076) (-0.4167) 
Distance to urban centers   -0.00203 
   (-0.544) 
Density  0.000807 0.00395* 
 (-0.2328) (-0.0534) 
Inverse Population  0.0208 0.16 
 (-0.8815) (-0.7796) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  1.084 5.243 
 (-0.7983) (-0.7513) 
Dummy for Small Municipalities  7.934** 40.16*** 
 (-0.02) (-0.0066) 
Dummy for cities  0.107 -3.289 
 (-0.9834) (-0.881) 
Poverty rate   7.839 
  (-0.751) 
Psu's effectiveness  5.140**  
 (-0.0261)  
Unemployment rate   -63.77 
  (-0.331) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters   
Constant  0.360** 0.491*** 
 (-0.0321) (-0.0039) 
Average education level for  individuals 30-59 years  0.0368* -0.0217 
 (-0.0647) (-0.2888) 
Average income per capita  -0.000545*** 0.000717*** 
 (-0.01) (-0.0027) 
Political participation of councils  0.073 0.0493 
 (-0.1053) (-0.2248) 
Average housing rent  0.00190** -0.00298*** 
 (-0.0219) (-0.0015) 
R2 0.96 0.58 
N 281 281 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum expenditures and 
marginal budget share parameters for 2013. Estimation via Maximum 
Likelihood 
   Education Services  
 Health Care 
Services 
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters   
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)  -0.439 99.54*** 
 (-0.9179) (-0.0003) 
Population share using primary public education services 128.2***  
 (0.0000)  
Population share using secondary public education services 181.9***  
 (0.0000)  
Dependency to FCM  4.196** 8.234 
 (-0.0464) (-0.6603) 
Distance to urban centers   -0.0101** 
   (-0.0406) 
Density  -0.0000263 0.00196 
 (-0.8832) (-0.2722) 
Inverse Population  -0.00234 -0.449 
 (-0.9733) (-0.3668) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  -1.172 -6.493 
 (-0.521) (-0.6557) 
Dummy for Small Municipalities  6.695*** 38.09*** 
 (-0.0019) (-0.0033) 
Dummy for cities  2.216 -5.39 
 (0.4676) (-0.7514) 
Poverty rate   -55.79* 
  (-0.056) 
Psu's effectiveness  3.765*  
 (-0.0735)  
Unemployment rate   96.87 
  (-0.2882) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters   
Constant  1.347*** -0.325* 
 (0.0000) (-0.0899) 
Average education level for  individuals 30-59 years  -0.0948*** 0.0737*** 
 (-0.0002) (-0.0011) 
Average income per capita  0.000873* -0.000704 
 (-0.0979) (-0.1387) 
Political participation of councils  -0.028 0.125 
 (-0.7782) (-0.1722) 
Average housing rent  -0.0000192 0.000207 
 (-0.9644) (-0.5944) 
R2 0.96 0.71 
N  287 287 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minumum expenditures and marginal budget share parameters for 2009. Estimation via 
Maximum Likelihood  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
   Infrastructure   Administration   Culture  
 Recreational 
Services   Social Services  
 Community 
Services  
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters       
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)  2.065 21.87*** 0.434 0.902* 2.313 9.905*** 
 (-0.4385) (-0.0096) (-0.4635) (0.0871) (0.2152) (0.0000) 
Dependency to FCM  -1.497 -37.81*** -0.23 -0.963* 1.018 -9.400*** 
 (-0.6051) (0.0000) (-0.716) (0.0968) (0.6232) (0.0012) 
Distance to urban centers  0.00107  -0.0000884 0.000309 -0.000200  
  (-0.2821)  (-0.6892) (0.1199) (0.7983)  
Density  0.0000128 0.0011 -0.0000251 0.0000782 -0.0000306 0.000426 
 (-0.9668) (-0.232) (-0.6875) (0.1991) (0.8895) (0.1146) 
Inverse Population  0.0929* 1.226*** 0.0293** 0.0207* 0.129*** 0.181*** 
 (-0.0888) (0.0000) (-0.0207) (0.0574) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  -1.399 -0.765 0.282 -0.330 0.909 1.119 
 (-0.5151) (-0.9174) (-0.5436) (0.4342) (0.5320) (0.5500) 
Poverty rate       -2.018 
      (0.7486) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters       
Constant  0.00624 0.669*** 0.0369*** 0.00509 -0.00517 0.230** 
 (-0.8026) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3397) (0.7880) (0.0188) 
Average education level for individuals 30-59 years  0.00514 0.0632*** -0.00225*** 0.000386 0.00321 -0.0320** 
 (-0.1671) (-0.0017) (-0.0092) (0.6270) (0.2612) (0.0289) 
Average income per capita  0.0000177 0.000797*** 0.0000383*** 0.0000267*** -0.000000430 -0.000129 
 (-0.6669) (-0.0003) (-0.0002) (0.0027) (0.9892) (0.4276) 
Political participation of councils  -0.01 -0.454*** -0.0235*** -0.00383 -0.0450** 0.101 
 (-0.6951) (-0.001) (0.0000) (0.4800) (0.0211) (0.3152) 
Average housing rent  -0.00034 -0.00695*** -0.000112** -0.000129*** 0.000137 0.00165* 
 (-0.1282) (0.0000) (-0.0296) (0.0070) (0.4260) (0.0622) 
R2  0.27 0.92 0.58 0.28 0.42 0.34 
N  246 246 246 246 246 246 
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Table 7: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum expenditures and marginal budget share parameters for 2011. Estimation via 
Maximum Likelihood  
   Infrastructure   Administration   Culture  
 Recreational 
Services   Social Services  
 Community 
Services  
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters       
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)  2.360 -0.995 1.161 1.216*** 6.601 10.48*** 
 (0.1405) (0.9138) (0.1053) (0.0067) (0.1260) (0.0000) 
Dependency to FCM  -6.184*** -9.940 -1.375 -1.221** -6.797 -6.131** 
 (0.0006) (0.3083) (0.1009) (0.0187) (0.1755) (0.0248) 
Distance to urban centers  0.00111*  -0.000200 0.000365* -0.00348*  
  (0.0749)  (0.5241) (0.0648) (0.0779)  
Density  -0.00000814 -0.00100 0.0000200 7.68e-08 -0.000236 0.000221 
 (0.9667) (0.4013) (0.8353) (0.9989) (0.6608) (0.3875) 
Inverse Population  0.150*** 1.082*** 0.0352** 0.0255*** 0.274*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0173) (0.0068) (0.0024) (0.0011) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  0.634 20.89** 0.881 0.104 2.464 2.286 
 (0.6236) (0.0138) (0.1415) (0.7751) (0.4825) (0.1754) 
Poverty rate       -7.150 
      (0.2352) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters       
Constant  0.0871*** 0.393*** -0.0454*** -0.00261 0.00212 0.204** 
 (0.0000) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.5735) (0.9618) (0.0162) 
Average education level for individuals 30-59 years  -0.00554*** 0.0157 0.00609*** 0.0000327 0.00312 -0.0144 
 (0.0018) (0.3195) (0.0000) (0.9532) (0.5565) (0.1582) 
Average income per capita  0.0000106 -0.000224* 0.00000893 -0.00000630 -0.000115*** -0.0000418 
 (0.4146) (0.0548) (0.1770) (0.1265) (0.0039) (0.5825) 
Political participation of councils  -0.0645*** 1.222*** -0.0196** 0.00611 -0.0908 -0.360*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0444) (0.3189) (0.1196) (0.0015) 
Average housing rent  0.0000358 -0.000845* -0.0000576** 0.0000409** 0.000636*** 0.00137*** 
 (0.5260) (0.0975) (0.0441) (0.0228) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
R2  0.56 0.91 0.48 0.14 0.21 0.45 
N  245 245 245 245 245 245 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  68 
Table 8: Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum expenditures and marginal budget share parameters for 2013. Estimation via 
Maximum Likelihood 
   Infrastructure   Administration   Culture   Recreational Services  
 Social 
Services   Community Services  
Subsistence Expenditure Parameters       
 Constant (Minimum Expenditure)   3.747* 23.29*** 1.468* 0.530 67.578*** 15.64*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0007) (0.0782) (0.3542) (0.0066) (0.0001) 
Dependency to FCM  -7.391*** -30.56*** -0.633 -0.758 -4.013 -5.062 
 (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.4994) (0.2412) (0.2044) (0.3006) 
Distance to urban centers  0.00143*  0.000365 0.000822*** -0.000492  
 (0.0737)  (0.3389) (0.0018) (0.6993)  
Density  -0.0000196 0.000584 0.00000352 0.00000736 -0.000202 -0.000226 
 (0.9316) (0.3008) (0.9687) (0.9061) (0.5167) (0.5977) 
Inverse Population  0.157*** 0.850*** 0.0123 0.0393*** 0.217*** 0.0999 
 (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.4966) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.2845) 
Dummy for Agglomerations  -0.126 2.112 0.0698 0.604 0.941 1.774 
 (0.9436) (0.7059) (0.9170) (0.1906) (0.6758) (0.6004) 
Poverty rate       -19.25* 
      (0.0734) 
Marginal Budget Share Parameters        
Constant  0.0157 1.382*** 0.0575*** -0.0342*** -0.0983* 0.366 
 (0.6265) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0503) (0.1337) 
Average education level for  individuals 30-59 years  0.00505 -0.108*** -0.00954*** 0.00292** 0.0135** -0.00656 
 (0.1979) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0252) (0.0279) (0.8263) 
Average income per capita  -0.0000875 0.00125*** 0.000144*** -0.0000310 -0.0000653 -0.0000760 
 (0.1234) (0.0048) (0.0000) (0.1013) (0.4617) (0.8607) 
Political participation of councils  -0.0486*** 0.383*** 0.0545*** 0.0220*** -0.0186 -0.175* 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3832) (0.0946) 
Average housing rent  -0.0000538* -0.0000592 0.0000592*** 0.0000268*** 0.0000478 -0.000144 
 (0.0695) (0.7968) (0.0000) (0.0066) (0.3010) (0.5255) 
R2  0.59 0.92 0.68 0.24 0.39 0.50 
N 262 262 262 262 262 262 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A: Description of Municipal Activities 
Activity Definition Target Groups 
Education This function has the objective of providing formal and informal education to population, according with the 
dispositions of the actual political constitution. In Chile, primary and secondary education are mandatory, 
then State must support a free system with the purpose of ensuring the accessibility for all population. For 
this reason, municipalities jointly with education ministry provide the public version of education services. 
In particular, municipalities carry out activities with the administration of the service while education 
ministry designs educational programs and curricular bases. In general, municipality’s expenditures include 
the payment of wages of teachers and personnel related with the provision of public education, payment of 
utility services, facility purchases, teaching materials, building maintenance, etc. 
In Chile education is divided into two levels. The first 
level is the primary which corresponds to the basic 
formation of the student. The duration of this cycle is 
eight years. This level is provided to children aged 6-
13 years. This level is compulsory. The second level is 
secondary which is provided to children aged 13-19 
years. The duration of this cycle is 4 years. As the 
primary level, secondary is compulsory. 
Primary 
Health Care 
This function has the objective of provide primary health care services to all population. However, 
municipalities put focus in to provide these services to poorest population those do not have access to private 
versions of these services. In this sense, municipal responsibilities are related with the administration of 
general medical centers (urban and rural). Then, their expenditures include the payment of personnel’s 
wages, payment of utility services, medical facility purchases, pharmaceutical products or surgical supplies, 
building maintenance, etc.  
All population. Special focus on 
• Poorest population 
• Population enrolled at the national health 
care system (FONASA). 
Community 
Services 
These services are provided with the objective of satisfying the needs of local communities, which are 
directly related with life’s quality of population. For example, these services are: protection to environment, 
maintenance of roads, luminary, cleaning services, maintenance of public spaces, etc.  
All population 
Social 
Services 
This function has the objective of protecting to population and families, promoting the harmonic 
integration of all sectors of population, and to ensure equal opportunities of participation on the society to 
all population. These expenditures are used in order to improve the living conditions of inhabitants and 
their well-being, such as subventions, social assistance, employment programs, etc. 
All population 
Cultural 
Services 
This function promotes the access of population to cultural activities.  All population 
Recreational 
Services 
This function promotes the access of population to recreational activities All population 
Municipal 
Activities 
This service includes expenditures in goods and services with the objective of covering celebrations, 
opening ceremonies, festivities and others. 
All population 
Administration Municipality’s expenditures on administration activities. These expenditures include wages of municipal’s 
workers, transfers to Municipal Common Fund (MCF) and other expenditures used in order to cover the 
operations incorporated to municipal performance.  
All population 
 
  70 
Appendix B: Definition of variables affecting subsistence expenditures and 
discretional incomes 
Variables Affecting Subsistence Expenditures  
Variable Definition Expected Result 
Population share 6-13 years of age 
using public primary education 
services.  
Share of the population 
between 6-13 years of age 
enrolled in municipalities 
schools. 
 (+) Demographic variable that can 
explain important variations in 
subsistence expenditures.  
Population share 14-19 years of 
age using public education 
services. 
Share of the population 
between 14-19 years of age 
enrolled in municipalities 
schools  
(+) Demographic variable that can 
explain important variations in 
subsistence expenditures.  
Dependency to MCF  
Proxy of municipal 
efficiency. The MCF is a 
redistribution instrument of 
municipal incomes. All the 
municipalities give resources 
to this instrument and after, 
central government 
redistributes the resources 
given some requirements 
imposed by law. In general, 
the MCF represents in 
average 30% of municipality 
incomes. However, for the 
smallest or poorest 
municipalities the MCF can 
represent about 90% of their 
incomes 
(+/-) Evidence for economies of scale. 
More dependency, more expenditure in 
services. In general, the smallest 
municipalities with lower opportunities 
for recollecting income from regular 
sources depend more of this instrument 
than other municipalities. However, this 
result depends on the degree of 
dependency to central government 
funding of each service. 
Distance to urban centers  
Distance in KM from 
commune to the main urban 
center 
(+/-) Evidence for economies of scale 
affecting variations on subsistence 
expenditures. More distance to urban 
centers, more subsistence expenditure. 
However, this result can vary among 
services.  
Density Number of inhabitants for KM2 
(+) Evidence for economies of scale. 
High density, higher expenditures on 
services. 
Inverse Population 
This variable assigns the 
population of smallest 
municipality to biggest 
municipalities.  
(+) Evidence for economies of scale, 
unit costs are higher for small 
municipalities. 
Dummy for agglomerations  
Dummy variable that takes 1 
when municipality has more 
100.000 inhabitants. 
(-) Evidence for economies of scale, 
small communes must spend more 
resources in public goods per 
inhabitant. Then, the unit costs are 
higher in comparison with biggest 
municipalities. 
Dummy for small municipalities 
Dummy variable for 
municipalities with less or 
equal 2000 inhabitants. 
(+) Evidence for economies of scale. 
Then, the unit cost is higher for small 
municipalities because they use a large 
share of their resources providing local 
services.  
Poverty rate  
Proportion of population 
living belong poverty line by 
commune. 
(+) Municipalities with more poor 
individuals might to spend more 
resources on services.  
PSU's effectiveness  
Proportion of students that 
performed selection test for 
universities by first time and 
was selected to study at the 
university. Proxy for 
education's quality. 
(+) As the variable might reflect quality 
of education by commune, it means that 
municipalities spend more resources on 
education when it exhibits high rates. 
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Unemployment rate 
Proportion of active 
population without labor but 
actively looking for a job. 
Proxy for poverty 
(+) More unemployees, more efforts of 
municipalities to cover services , in 
special, health care services. 
Variables Affecting Discretional Incomes  
Variable Definition Expected Result 
Average education level for 
individuals 30-59 years  
Variable that can influence in 
local discretional decisions in 
the provision of public 
goods.  
(+/-) Educated individuals increase 
(decrease) the demand for public goods, 
then expenditures might increase. 
Average income per capita Disposable income average by commune. (+/-) 
Political participation of council 
Proportion of municipal 
councilors sharing the same 
political membership as 
mayor. 
(+/-) 
Average housing rent Housing rent by commune. (+/-) 
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Appendix C: Bootstrapping results: Spatial decomposition of Income Inequality. 
Shared functions 
Year Type of income Obs. Std. Err. z P>|z| Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Extended Autonomous Incomes 
2009 Within Communes 0,42062 0,00753 55,84 0,0000 0,40586 0,43538 
 Between Communes 0,04825 0,00343 14,08 0,0000 0,04154 0,05497 
 Between Provinces 0,00828 0,00088 9,37 0,0000 0,00655 0,01002 
 Between Regions 0,02405 0,00170 14,13 0,0000 0,02071 0,02738 
2011 Within Communes 0,45122 0,01459 30,92 0,0000 0,42262 0,47983 
 Between Communes 0,06136 0,00304 20,17 0,0000 0,05540 0,06732 
 Between Provinces 0,01167 0,00100 11,64 0,0000 0,00971 0,01364 
 Between Regions 0,02882 0,00182 15,86 0,0000 0,02526 0,03238 
2013 Within Communes 0,38140 0,00696 54,84 0,0000 0,36777 0,39503 
 Between Communes 0,05862 0,00281 20,88 0,0000 0,05312 0,06413 
 Between Provinces 0,01177 0,00088 13,43 0,0000 0,01005 0,01349 
 Between Regions 0,02717 0,00133 20,49 0,0000 0,02457 0,02977 
Autonomous Incomes 
2009 Within Communes 0,46324 0,00986 46,96 0,0000 0,44391 0,48257 
 Between Communes 0,05319 0,00386 13,80 0,0000 0,04563 0,06074 
 Between Provinces 0,01034 0,00101 10,22 0,0000 0,00836 0,01232 
 Between Regions 0,02845 0,00199 14,26 0,0000 0,02454 0,03236 
2011 Within Communes 0,48376 0,01705 28,38 0,0000 0,45035 0,51718 
 Between Communes 0,06563 0,00362 18,13 0,0000 0,05854 0,07272 
 Between Provinces 0,01329 0,00115 11,58 0,0000 0,01104 0,01554 
 Between Regions 0,03214 0,00170 18,95 0,0000 0,02882 0,03546 
2013 Within Communes 0,41219 0,00672 61,36 0,0000 0,39902 0,42536 
 Between Communes 0,06400 0,00333 19,24 0,0000 0,05748 0,07052 
 Between Provinces 0,01369 0,00094 14,54 0,0000 0,01185 0,01554 
 Between Regions 0,03045 0,00167 18,21 0,0000 0,02717 0,03373 
Extended Monetary Income 
2009 Within Communes 0,38727 0,00863 44,90 0,0000 0,37036 0,40417 
 Between Communes 0,04493 0,00321 14,00 0,0000 0,03864 0,05122 
 Between Provinces 0,00735 0,00074 9,93 0,0000 0,00590 0,00880 
 Between Regions 0,02096 0,00128 16,42 0,0000 0,01846 0,02347 
2011 Within Communes 0,43028 0,01528 28,15 0,0000 0,40033 0,46023 
 Between Communes 0,05833 0,00300 19,45 0,0000 0,05245 0,06421 
 Between Provinces 0,01115 0,00098 11,37 0,0000 0,00923 0,01307 
 Between Regions 0,02715 0,00153 17,71 0,0000 0,02415 0,03016 
2013 Within Communes 0,35343 0,00625 56,58 0,0000 0,34118 0,36567 
 Between Communes 0,05485 0,00291 18,87 0,0000 0,04915 0,06055 
  73 
 Between Provinces 0,01088 0,00079 13,73 0,0000 0,00933 0,01243 
 Between Regions 0,02435 0,00124 19,62 0,0000 0,02192 0,02679 
Monetary Incomes 
2009 Within Communes 0,42825 0,00939 45,60 0,0000 0,40985 0,44666 
 Between Communes 0,04937 0,00311 15,90 0,0000 0,04328 0,05545 
 Between Provinces 0,00920 0,00085 10,77 0,0000 0,00753 0,01088 
 Between Regions 0,02525 0,00161 15,66 0,0000 0,02209 0,02841 
2011 Within Communes 0,46168 0,01342 34,41 0,0000 0,43538 0,48797 
 Between Communes 0,06229 0,00407 15,31 0,0000 0,05431 0,07026 
 Between Provinces 0,01270 0,00106 11,96 0,0000 0,01062 0,01478 
 Between Regions 0,03037 0,00177 17,13 0,0000 0,02690 0,03385 
2013 Within Communes 0,38174 0,00744 51,32 0,0000 0,36716 0,39631 
 Between Communes 0,05968 0,00296 20,19 0,0000 0,05389 0,06547 
 Between Provinces 0,01258 0,00076 16,55 0,0000 0,01109 0,01406 
 Between Regions 0,02742 0,00153 17,90 0,0000 0,02442 0,03042 
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Appendix D: Bootstrapping results. Spatial decomposition of income inequality. 
Exclusive functions 
Year   Type of income   Obs.   Std. Err.   z   P>|z|  Lower 
Bound  
 Upper 
Bound 
Extended Autonomous Incomes 
2009 Within Communes  0,42062           0,00753   55,84 0,0000          0,40586  0,43538 
 
Between 
Communes  
 0,04825   0,00343   14,08   0,0000   0,04154   0,05497                                      
 
Between Provinces   0,00828  0,00088     9,37    0,0000  0,00655  0,01002                       
 
Between Regions   0,02405  0,00170  14,13  0,0000   0,02071     0,02738                
2011 Within Communes  0,45122  0,01459   30,92  0,0000   0,42262   0,47983 
 
Between 
Communes  
 0,06136   0,00304  20,17    0,0000  0,05540   0,06732                       
 
Between Provinces   0,01167    0,00100         11,64  0,0000   0,00971   0,01364                        
 
Between Regions   0,02882  0,00182  15,86  0,0000      0,02526   0,03238                
2013 Within Communes  0,38140   0,00696        54,84  0,0000   0,36777   0,39503 
 
Between 
Communes  
0,05862    0,00281   20,88  0,0000   0,05312  0,06413                                
 
Between Provinces  0,01177     0,00088  13,43    0,0000   0,01005 0,01349               
 
Between Regions   0,02717  0,00133  20,49  0,0000  0,02457      0,02977                 
Autonomous Incomes 
2009  Within 
Communes  
 0,46324 0,00986   46,96  0,0000  0,44391  0,48257 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,05319   0,00386  13,80   0,0000  0,04563    0,06074                               
 
Between Provinces  0,01034  0,00101      10,22   0,0000  0,00836       0,01232          
 
Between Regions   0,02845  0,00199  14,26  0,0000  0,02454      0,03236                 
2011  Within 
Communes  
0,48376  0,01705   28,38  0,0000          0,45035 0,51718 
 
 Between 
Communes  
0,06563   0,00362   18,13   0,0000  0,05854    0,07272                               
 
Between Provinces  0,01329  0,00115      11,58   0,0000  0,01104       0,01554          
 
Between Regions   0,03214   0,00170   18,95   0,0000   0,02882         0,03546  
2013  Within 
Communes  
 0,41219   0,00672   61,36   0,0000   0,39902   0,42536 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,06400   0,00333   19,24    0,0000   0,05748      0,07052                  
 
Between Provinces  0,01369  0,00094      14,54   0,0000   0,01185      0,01554          
 
Between Regions   0,03045   0,00167  18,21  0,0000   0,02717           0,03373          
Extended Monetary Income 
2009  Within 
Communes  
 0,38727 0,00863   44,90  0,0000  0,37036        0,40417                
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,04493   0,00321   14,00   0,0000   0,03864               0,05122                  
 
Between Provinces   0,00735   0,00074   9,93   0,0000   0,00590          0,00880        
 
Between Regions   0,02096   0,00128   16,42   0,0000   0,01846         0,02347  
2011  Within 
Communes  
0,43028  0,01528   28,15   0,0000   0,40033  0,46023 
 
 Between 
Communes  
0,05833    0,00300   19,45   0,0000   0,05245   0,06421                              
 
Between Provinces   0,01115            
0,00098  
 11,37    0,0000   0,00923  0,01307                     
 
Between Regions   0,02715   0,00153  17,71  0,0000      0,02415  0,03016        
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2013  Within 
Communes  
 0,35343   0,00625    56,58  0,0000  0,34118  0,36567 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,05485    0,00291   18,87  0,0000  0,04915        0,06055                  
 
Between Provinces   0,01088   0,00079  13,73  0,0000   0,00933         0,01243          
 
Between Regions   0,02435   0,00124   19,62   0,0000   0,02192  0,02679                 
Monetary Incomes 
2009  Within 
Communes  
 0,42825   0,00939   45,60   0,0000  0,40985     0,44666 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,04937   0,00311   15,90   0,0000   0,04328          0,05545                               
 
Between Provinces   0,00920   0,00085          10,77   0,0000   0,00753          0,01088                        
 
Between Regions   0,02525   0,00161      15,66   0,0000   0,02209              0,02841  
2011  Within 
Communes  
 0,46168  0,01342   34,41   0,0000  0,43538  0,48797 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,06229   0,00407   15,31   0,0000   0,05431   0,07026                              
 
Between Provinces   0,01270    0,00106         11,96   0,0000   0,01062   0,01478                       
 
Between Regions   0,03037   0,00177   17,13   0,0000   0,02690   0,03385                                                        
2013  Within 
Communes  
 0,38174   0,00744   51,32   0,0000   0,36716  0,39631 
 
 Between 
Communes  
 0,05968    0,00296   20,19  0,0000    0,05389   0,06547                             
 
Between Provinces   0,01258    0,00076  16,55             0,0000  0,01109      0,01406 
 
Between Regions   0,02742  0,00153   17,90       0,0000  0,02442               0,03042  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  76 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Spatial accessibility to local public services and residential segregation: 
Evidence for Chile 
 
 
Abstract 
The study of the relationship between the provision of local public services and 
residential segregation takes a relevant significance when the latter is considered as 
the social manifestation of spatial income inequality. In this paper, we address this 
relationship by analyzing how the spatial accessibility to local public services is 
equitably distributed among different social and economic groups in the 
Metropolitan Area of Santiago, Chile (MR). For accomplishing this objective, we 
use accessibility measures to local public services such as transportation, public 
education, healthcare, kindergartens, parks, fire and police stations, and cultural 
infrastructure, information about housing prices and exempted housing units from 
local taxes by block, as well as, quantile regressions and bivariate local indicators 
of spatial association (LISA). Main results confirm the accessibility to local public 
services is unequally distributed among residents, however, it is affecting more to 
low-income groups who are suffering significant deficits on the provision of local 
public services. These groups are geographically located in the periphery of the 
MR, where poor municipalities and social housing projects are concentrated. In this 
scenario, poor residents face a double disadvantage due to their social exclusion 
from urban systems and their limited access to crucial services as education, 
healthcare or transportation. In particular, we found evidence confirming that social 
housing policies could be considered as one cause of residential segregation which 
is reinforced by the insufficient accessibility to local infrastructure that the poorest 
population should assume.  
 
Keywords: Accessibility to local public services, residential segregation, spatial 
income inequality, local governments.  
  77 
 
JEL-CODES: R14, R23, R58. 
 
1. Introduction 
Spatial income inequality – the unequal distribution of incomes across communities 
– has received a remarkable attention from the scientific literature. An important 
characteristic of this stylized fact is its multidimensional character, which 
penetrates several aspects of inequality with social, geographical, and political 
consequences. One of the most important manifestations of the spatial income 
inequality is observed on the rise of residential segregation, a concept that directly 
relates the location and characteristics of individuals with social equity issues. As 
Cheshire (2007) noted, residential segregation is the spatial articulation of income 
inequality at the society by arguing that neighborhoods in cities are more polarized 
if incomes are unequally distributed. However, the stratification of socioeconomic 
groups in the space cannot only be observed on the distinction of economic classes 
across neighborhoods. Also, segregated groups live in different local jurisdictions 
which can differ in fiscal and administrative capacities to provide local public 
services. Consequently, differences between socioeconomic status across 
neighborhoods are reinforced by disparities in the provision of local public services, 
which could differ in terms of quantity or quality against the poorest population. 
 
As Tiebout (1956) argued in his famous sentence “people vote with their feet”, 
individuals with more willingness to pay live in communities that provide high-
quality local public services because these can be capitalized into housing prices. 
At the same time, local governments also can increase their revenues to provide 
better local public services, thereby creating a virtuous circle with more benefits for 
richer local governments due to their capacity to attract high-income individuals. 
Under this logic, residential segregation is view as a natural manifestation induced 
by market responses to local government fragmentations, generating an unequal 
distribution of local public services across communities, and reinforcing therefore, 
the relationship between housing prices and local public services. Then, negative 
social consequences of residential segregation can be only addressed by 
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redistributive policies from higher levels of government (Li H. , Wang, Shi, Deng, 
& Wang, 2015) (Li H. , Wang, Deng, Shi, & Wang, 2017). An important wave of 
criticism that comes from the social stratification-government inequality thesis 
(SSGI) refutes these arguments by highlighting that political incorporation by class 
and status is an important institutional mechanism for creating and perpetuating 
inequalities among residents in communities (Hill, 1974). Particularly, residential 
segregation arises influenced by the maximum control exerted for advanced or 
affluent groups over scarce resources with the purpose of maintaining the 
homogeneity into communities by increasing housing costs. In this way, SSGI 
involves social equity issues by arguing that fragmented jurisdictions and political 
governance could generate and exacerbate disparities in public service accessibility 
given the unequal distribution of income and social status, as well as, an unequal 
system of relationships into the urban housing market with important consequences 
in the accessibility to housing projects, better neighborhoods, and local public 
services. 
 
According to this background, the objective of this paper is to address the 
relationship between the accessibility to local public services and residential 
segregation. In particular, this objective is assessed by analyzing how the 
accessibility to local public facilities is equitably distributed among different social 
and economic groups. This analysis follows the context of territorial justice 
(Davies, 1968), which determines the most appropriate distribution of local public 
services must be according to individuals’ needs, regardless the place where they 
live. In this sense, we use accessibility measures to determine how the distribution 
of local public services is equitable by examining their spatial pattern provision 
considering the relationship between provision and needs. The analysis is 
conducted for the Metropolitan Area of Santiago, Chile (MR), that represents an 
interesting case of residential segregation. According to results found by Rodríguez 
(2001), the capital of MR – Santiago of Chile – is one of the most segregated cities 
around the world. However, the origin of its residential segregation is different in 
comparison to other cases. For instance, many studies of residential segregation in 
the US context are focused on the analysis of endogenous elements such as 
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preferences or characteristics of individuals that potentially cause residential 
segregation. In the Chilean case, it is well documented that the origin of the 
residential segregation into the MR is related to exogenous forces such as social 
housing public policies implemented by the State from the 1970s (Lambiri & 
Vargas, 2012). Despite these instruments accomplished their main objective of 
reducing poverty, new affordable neighborhoods were located far from the city 
center – mainly in the periphery of the MR – in places characterized by low land 
prices. This resettlement generated negative consequences to the poor whose 
suffered a deprivation of the locational advantages obtained in their former 
residences. Thus, new affordable housing faced important differences in terms of 
accessibility to local public services as well as, new social problems due to the 
increment of this spatial segregation. On the other hand, this resettlement also 
permitted to the richest municipalities be more careful about how to spend their tax-
revenues within their communities, excluding public housing projects from their 
boundaries given the pressure exerted by high-income groups (Scarpaci, Infante, & 
Gaete, 1988). According to these evidences, the importance of studying how 
equitable is the accessibility to local public services is reinforced because the latter 
is recognized as the major source of people’s real income, especially for the poorest 
population who must overcome more physical and financial barriers to reach better 
opportunities.  
 
The empirical strategy used in this paper is twofold. First, we compute accessibility 
measures based on blocks to different local public services such as schools, 
transportation, urban parks, kindergartens, hospitals, fire and police stations, and 
cultural infrastructure. In particular, we use the spatial accessibility index proposed 
by H. Li (2015) which is able to reflect the ability of residents to reach a destination 
based on geographic distances by considering the number of local public services 
inside a buffer area. Second, the evaluation of the distribution of accessibility 
measures is carried out by using Quantile Regression Model (QRM) and 
Multivariate Local Indicators of Spatial Association (Multivariate LISA). Quantile 
Regression Model has the advantage to analyze all properties of the conditional 
distribution of a response variable by computing a function based on the conditional 
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mean. In this way, the method permits to examine the influence of determinants on 
the dependent variable at any point of its distribution. In this paper, we use the mean 
of housing prices by block to determine how it can affect the distribution of each 
indicator of accessibility. Even if we do not have information about a complete 
profile of household’s needs, we use property’s housing prices by block as a proxy 
of the social status of residents into communities.  Also, we include other control 
variables such as the number of exempted housing units from local taxes by block 
and housing quality indices to obtain a better representation of households’ 
economic status. Consequently, we can compare the distribution of local public 
services supply across different quantile groups for detecting how much equitable 
is the distribution of these facilities with respect to different income groups. 
Although QRM offers an interesting alternative to analyze the conditional 
distribution of accessibility indicators according to the economic status of residents, 
this method is not sufficient to reflect how the spatial distribution of local public 
services is affected by housing clustering. This element is crucial to analyze how 
residential sorting by housing prices is associated with the spatial distribution of 
local public services. For this reason, we use Bivariate LISA analysis to obtain a 
better representation of this association by complementing previous results with the 
spatial distribution of residents and local service infrastructure.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe 
important elements of the common framework used to relate accessibility to local 
public services, territorial justice, and social equity issues. Section 3 describes the 
case of study. Section 4 describes the data and methodology used. Section 5 shows 
and discusses the main results obtained using the methodology proposed. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Framework 
 
2.1. Provision of local public services, residential segregation and 
fragmentation of local governments.  
The first argument to study the relationship between the provision of local public 
services and residential segregation comes from the public choice theory proposed 
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by Tiebout (1956). In this statement, the author describes that people choose where 
to live due to the match between their preferences for local public services and their 
willingness to pay for these services. For this reason, people “vote with their feet” 
and decisions about their location are based on the selection of the local government 
that best fit with their tastes for local public services and the package of taxes that 
they must pay for. Thereby, local government actions are dedicated to attracting or 
retaining more high-income individuals to live in their communities with the 
purpose of increasing their revenues and compete with other communities to attract 
and retain affluent people and businesses. As a result, a virtuous circle is created in 
favor of richer municipalities because they can offer high-quality services which 
are used to attract more high-income groups. In this way, local governments can 
increase their revenues which are used to offer more and better local public services 
and attract more affluent groups and so on. Under this logic, the manifestation of 
residential segregation is a natural consequence of housing market responses to 
local government differences on the provision of local public services. In other 
words, these local government fragmentations could improve the efficiency in the 
provision of local public services because competition between local governments 
must also improve their fiscal discipline to maximize their budgets to offer service 
packages. Finally, citizens choose their locations by evaluating the financial 
performance of their own local government with respect others excluding the 
inefficient ones (Jimenez, 2014).  
 
An important body of criticism against the arguments about the benefits in 
efficiency that emerge from the fragmentation of local governments given 
residential decisions is provided by the social government-stratification inequality 
thesis (SSGI) (Hill, 1974) (Neiman, 1979). Under this context that concerns more 
equity issues than efficiency, urban problems arise from the differences in access 
of urban residents to scarce economic, social and political resources. In this case, 
political incorporation by class and status plays a relevant role in creating and 
perpetuating inequalities among residents in communities. Thus, residential 
segregation arises from the mismatch between service needs and fiscal capacities 
in local governments, where affluent groups exert a maximum control over scarce 
  82 
resources by imposing exclusionary zoning, building codes and other regulations in 
order to maintain social homogeneity in communities by increasing housing costs 
and excluding low-income groups from their community limits. In this way, 
residential location is an important resource on the urban stratification system 
because decisions about to live in specific communities are not only based on 
citizen’s service preferences. Also, these decisions are related to the desire of 
residents in living into communities with similar incomes or similar socioeconomic 
characteristics. Finally, the poor are isolated in local governments with limited 
fiscal capacities because the segregation by class and socioeconomic status can 
separate fiscal resources from needs.  
 
Regardless of these different perspectives, the impact of residential segregation on 
accessibility to local public services has been relatively less explored by the 
empirical literature, particularly in cases which differ from the context of residential 
segregation in US metropolitan areas. Recently, Sun et Al (2016) showed for 
Chinese cities that disparities in the provision of local public services may emerge 
from the influence of residential market responses on income sorting, generating an 
unequal distribution of local public services across residential locations. For these 
authors, improving the accessibility to local public services is an effective tool to 
increase the opportunities for individuals to reach better job options, 
neighborhoods, education or medical facilities. In addition, individuals could match 
correctly their needs with the actual provision of local public services and 
eventually, reduce residential segregation and spatial income inequality, as well 
(Sun, Fu, & Zheng, 2016). Similarly, H. Li et Al (2015) showed for Shanghai that 
jurisdiction and fiscal autonomy of local governments influence on distributional 
patterns of local public service provision. In contrast to conclusions emerged from 
public choice theory, the results suggest that local governments could play an 
important role in shaping patterns of public service provision and addressing 
negative consequences associated with residential clustering and public service 
inequality. For these authors, fragmentation between local governments does not 
just mean fewer options for accessing to affordable housing. Also, it implies a 
limited accessibility to local public services, or a “double-disadvantage” with a 
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negative impact on well-being of low-income individuals  (Li H. , Wang, Shi, Deng, 
& Wang, 2015).  
 
2.2. Accessibility, territorial justice and social equity 
Accessibility to local services has an important role in the definition of any indicator 
of living standard. This concept – which is understood as the ease with which a 
resident can reach a destination – is crucial to figure out how the spatial proximity 
between residents and facilities can help to satisfy their daily life needs, as well as, 
whether the distribution of local services can potentially match with their needs 
(Talen, 2002). Formally, accessibility is sometimes defined as the quality of 
interacting with a particular good, service or facility, which could or not involve a 
physical distance between residents and facilities. In fact, accessibility definition 
can reflect the travel behavior of individuals in a specific area, or instead, how 
social factors, cultural barriers or an ineffective planning design may be 
determinants to reach locations with better access (Talen & Anselin, 1998) (Talen, 
2002). Even though in the literature does not exist a consensus about an exclusive 
definition of accessibility, it is recognized that this concept involves two important 
elements: the location of local services or facilities and the characteristics of a 
transport network (Vandenbulcke, Steenberghen, & Thomas, 2009). In addition, 
other approaches suggest that accessibility is determined by the spatial distribution 
of potential destinations, the ease of reaching a destination and the quality and 
character of activities that can be found there (Handy & Niemeier, 1997, pág. 1175). 
It implies that travel costs, destination choice, and means of transport can also affect 
patterns of accessibility, as well as, social and economic interactions. For these 
reasons, improving the accessibility to local public services is seen by policymakers 
as an effective tool to increase the opportunities of individuals to access to 
employment alternatives, education and medical facilities or recreational spaces as 
a mechanism of improving their welfare and promote an ideal urban form by 
reducing neighborhood segregation (Lynch, 1984) (Wei, Cabrera-Barona, & 
Blaschke, 2016).  
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The conception and measurement of accessibility to local services and its 
evaluation have a direct relation to the territorial justice concept. This framework 
is considered as a starting point to study how local public services are accessible to 
individuals. According to the proposition of Davies (1968), territorial justice claims 
that the most appropriate distribution of local public services must be according to 
needs of the population regardless their spatial position in a specific area (Boyne & 
Powell, 1991). Thus, this definition emphasizes that needs are the main criteria to 
allocate local public services by reflecting the concept of social equity, which 
highlights that local authorities must respond to potential conflicts by ensuring that 
individuals with similar needs receive similar services regardless where they live 
(Boyne & Powell, 1991). Moreover, social equity also involves the study of factors 
that are determinants in the spatial variation of local services, then accessibility is 
taken as a tool to reflect if these services are equitably distributed or not (Talen & 
Anselin, 1998).   
 
Territorial justice implies equal standards of provision for equal needs and 
consequently, its measurement suggests a high correlation between indices of 
resource use and relative needs. Of course, this element adds more conceptual and 
methodological problems to the analysis. First, territorial justice needs a political 
consensus about the fairness or justice of the distributional effects of a public 
policy. This implies that the distribution of costs and benefits must be considered 
fair by the society which is almost impossible (Truelove, 1993).18 On the other 
hand, territorial justice indicators require empirical measures of needs which also 
face problems because single or composed indices cannot capture their 
multidimensional nature. However, the scientific literature recognizes that 
measures of accessibility are crucial to account for distributional inequities, 
therefore, these indicators are commonly used to evaluate the actual pattern of local 
public service distributions with the purpose of recommending more equitable 
systems. For instance, Talen (1997) analyzed the spatial distribution of parks by 
defining equity in relation to the spatial location of population subgroups and 
                                               
18 Taking in consideration the definition of territorial justice, it is based on the value-judgement 
criteria which determines the allocation of local public services.  
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assuming that urban service distribution may be racially polarized and unjust. This 
approach follows the standard procedures adopted by different studies of spatial 
distribution of facility systems: in general, these are mapped and analyzed 
considering socioeconomic characteristics of population and different methods to 
analyze them (Knox, 1980) (Pacione, 1989) (Truelove, 1993) (Handy & Niemeier, 
1997) (Lotfi & Koohsari, 2009). In most of these cases, accessibility measures are 
based on geographic distances between residents and potential destinations of local 
services, however, the construction and empirical application of these indicators 
depend on the nature of the case to study, reflecting analysis needs of every specific 
situation (Vandenbulcke, Steenberghen, & Thomas, 2009). 
 
Irrespective of this, in the scientific literature is possible to find several empirical 
studies which allow distinguishing between two different waves of accessibility 
measures. First, the most traditional approaches include indicators related with the 
computation of facilities or local services contained within a given spatial unit of 
analysis (container measures), service buffer areas (coverage), minimum distances, 
travel cost or gravity model based-measures. This type of indicators can be found 
in the earliest empirical analyses of accessibility and spatial equity by using 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population at census tracts level and 
geolocations of urban facilities, which are summarized with more details in table 9. 
With the introduction of geographic information systems (GIS) and the availability 
of georeferenced data of individuals, housing or transportation systems, a new wave 
of indicators of accessibility emerged with more sophisticated applications which 
include spatial-temporal constraints, congestion levels of road networks or program 
daily activities of individuals. Table 10 summarizes these alternative approaches 
which are extensively discussed in Vandenbulcke, Steenberghen & Thomas (2009), 
highlighting four basic perspectives of accessibility measures: infrastructure-based 
measures, activity-based measures, person-based measures and utility-based 
measures. The most important constraints found in the implementation of these 
accessibility measures are related to their complexity to interpreting the results 
obtained. For instance, utility-based measures which are commonly used in 
economic studies include several variables such as the attractiveness of 
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destinations, travel impedance, socio-economic characteristics of individuals and 
their tastes and preferences into a maximization utility problem. In this sense, 
researchers must overcome different problems associated with the choice of an 
appropriate utility function; this decision can determine the interpretation of the 
evidence found. Moreover, these approaches are complex and computationally 
demanding and therefore, their operationalization should be evaluated with the 
objective of selecting the most appropriate methodology to study accessibility. This 
detail also constitutes an important challenge for researchers because involves 
finding a correct model able to balance accessibility measures with empirical and 
theoretical frameworks used to study every case. Finally, other aspects related to 
the empirical analysis of accessibility should be addressed and solved. For instance, 
the spatial level of disaggregation of the analysis must be selected with the objective 
of maintaining comparability between studies. Commonly, empirical studies of 
accessibility use census tracts (blocks) as unit of analysis (Talen, 2002). In addition, 
other important issues as the criteria for defining origin and destinations of local 
public services and population, different travel times (walking or car distances) or 
observable characteristics of destinations (used into the analysis as measures of 
attractiveness) should be chosen regardless to the measurement of accessibility.  
 
3. Case of Study 
This analysis is conducted for Metropolitan Area of Santiago, Chile (MR). This 
area is the most populated and densely region of the country with an area of 15.403 
square kilometers and a population projected in 7.399.042 inhabitants (INE; 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas).19 Administratively, this region is divided into 
14 provinces and 52 municipalities and the nation’s capital of Chile is located there. 
In the MR, social and economic activities are highly concentrated: more than 40 
percent of the Chilean population is living there. This remarkable characteristic 
determines the emergence of a high attractiveness power of the MR over other 
regions for living there. For instance, it is possible to identify a spatial concentration 
of high-quality educational institutions in this region. During 2005, 15 of the best 
                                               
19 The density of the Metropolitan Region is estimated in 480,4 inhabitants per square kilometer.  
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universities of Chile were located there. This scenario motivates more talented 
students to move from regions to the MR with the purpose of accessing to 
universities with more prestige and international recognition. Until 2005, 47 percent 
of Chilean students were enrolled in universities of the MR, capturing more than 
35 percent of the highest SAT scores of the country (Paredes, Iturra, & Lufin, 2014). 
On the other hand, the labor Chilean legislation permits to workers accessing to 
different labor systems given the economic sector in which they are employed. For 
example, the mining sector –concentrated in the extreme north of the country – 
permits to employees spend some days working in regions where firms are located 
and similar number of days resting at home. Considering the lack of amenities 
observed in extreme regions, the fly-to-fly-out system allows to many employees 
to work in extreme areas without to sacrifice their accessibility to high-quality 
amenities.20 Thus, these factors contribute to the divergence of human capital 
between the MR and other regions, especially of high-skilled workers who prefer 
to live in places with high levels of recreational and cultural amenities (Aroca & 
Atienza, 2011).  
 
Despite these important differences between MR with respect to the rest of the 
country, which could explain the high concentration of the population around the 
center, it is still possible to find differences in living standards within communes. 
According to the quality life index scores computed by the Center of Urban Studies 
of the Catholic University of Chile (PUC) for Chilean cities, only 8 communes 
located in the MR have indices of quality of life higher than the national average.21 
This means that 20.5 percent of inhabitants are living in communities that provide 
high-quality amenities (Las Condes, Vitacura, Providencia, Ñuñoa, Lo Barnechea, 
La Reina, Santiago, and Macul). In contrast, 12 communes that concentrate 35.9 
percent of the population are living in communes with medium-quality amenities, 
and 20 communes with 43.6 percent of the population are living in communities 
                                               
20 In the literature, this process also is called long-distance commutation. 
21 This index measures the living conditions 93 communes which concentrate 85 percent of the 
Chilean population. Its computation considers indicators related to housing conditions, health and 
environment, sociocultural conditions, economic conditions, and transportation.  
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that offer low-quality amenities. As the same study highlights, the results evidence 
a high inequality in terms of urban life quality, which determine that 64.6 percent 
of the MR’s inhabitants are living in places with low mobility and connectivity, and 
43.6 percent in communities with low housing quality (Instituto de Estudios 
Urbanos y Territoriales, 2016). These arguments reinforce the importance of 
studying how equitable is the accessibility to local public services, not only because 
it is a prominent component of quality of life. Accessibility also can be recognized 
as a major source of people’s real income especially for the poorest population, who 
must receive more benefits from local public services (Knox, 1980). Public policies 
must help to poorer individuals to overcome physical and financial barriers to 
increase their opportunities for accessing to better job options or better 
neighborhoods. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
With the purpose to understand the relationship between residential segregation and 
accessibility to local public services, two important decisions must be considered 
before its implementation. First, we need to identify an indicator to reflect 
residential segregation. According to previous studies, residential segregation is 
analyzed by using housing prices as a proxy for the social and economic status of 
individuals within communities. Even though we do not have a complete profile 
about individual’s needs for local public services by location, housing prices can be 
used to identify sectors with people economically more vulnerable. It implies that 
people living in low-income communities could demand more local public facilities 
such as education or healthcare services because their incomes are not sufficient to 
access to their private version. In this paper, we use information of property prices 
computed by the internal revenue service (SII; Servicio de Impuestos Internos) for 
the first semester of 2017. This price is computed following some criteria such as 
build’s area, materials, age and use. From this dataset, we extract information of 
the mean of housing prices by every block of the MR which is the finer geographical 
scale used in the Chilean case. Figure 13 shows the spatial distribution of housing 
values by blocks using local indicators of spatial association (LISA) in order to 
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identify possible residential clustering.22 We identify two different clusters which 
contain more than 61 percent of all housings in the MR. However, 60 percent of 
housing are clustered in places with lower housing values around lower-priced 
communities, which are located in the north-west and south part of the MR. The 
spatial distribution of housing is relatively segregated and localized in peripheral 
locations of the MR, reflecting in some sense the logic of Chilean housing policies 
implemented from the 1970s. For instance, social housings were built on the fringe 
of urban areas because lower-land prices can be found there, and the State owns 
significant proportions of land. This situation is reflected in the actual distribution 
of social housing in the MR where 80.7 percent of affordable housings are located 
in peripheral municipalities (Borsdorf, Hidalgo, & Zunino, 2013).  
 
On the other hand, the selection of the most appropriate approach to measure 
accessibility constitutes an important challenge that researchers must overcome. In 
this sense, this decision needs to consider the different degrees of 
operationalization, interpretability, and communicability of each approach, as well 
as, their computational costs because also these applications are highly demanding 
in data (Vandenbulcke, Steenberghen, & Thomas, 2009). After to evaluate all these 
constraints, this study uses an accessibility indicator that captures new approaches 
such as activity-based measures, gravity-based measures, as well as, traditional 
ones such as container and distance measures to analyze the access of residents to 
local public services. This indicator is selected because is possible to include key 
elements into the analysis as the range of activities that can be reached by 
individuals in different locations and the degree of attractiveness of local public 
services which can be measured using observable characteristics. In addition, the 
spatial distribution of local public services and access profiles can be represented 
easily using geographical distances. In this paper, we analyze the spatial equity 
distribution of crucial local public services using accessibility measures to schools, 
hospitals, parks, kindergartens, transportation, fire and police stations, and cultural 
                                               
22 Significant positive values represent two possible situations: high housing values around high 
housing values (high housing communities) or low housing values around low housing values (low 
housing communities).  
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equipment. These services constitute a basic package of local public services that 
everyone must receive as fundamental human rights which are commonly managed 
by central government and municipalities. Also, these elements constitute the basic 
elements to compute indicators of quality of life and then, are continuously 
evaluated by citizens and policymakers.23 The information about these local public 
services was collected from different sources which are summarized in table 11.   
 
Index of spatial accessibility to local public services 
Even though it is not possible to find in the literature a consensus about how to 
measure the accessibility to local public services, in this paper we adopt the 
approach proposed by H. Li et Al (2015).  This index has the objective of measuring 
the spatial accessibility to local public services by considering the number of local 
public services and the linear distances between blocks and destinations. This index 
can be computed as: 
 !" =$%&1 − )*+,-.*/0  
 
where 1 is the number of services located in a buffering area; )* is the geographical 
distance from the ith local service to the community; + is the total buffering 
distance which is based on walk-access buffers to local public services, and % is 
defined as a constant to keep 2* stable within a reasonable boundary. This index has 
two important advantages with respect to other indicators. First, this measure 
captures the number of services that a resident can reach into a feasible radius of 
distance. Second, its computation and interpretability are fewer complexes than 
other indicators such as utility-based measures or person-based measures. Thus, 
this accessibility measure reflects correctly how much services are available for 
residents, as well as, how separated are these from residents.  
 
                                               
23 This package of services defined as basic human rights is declared by the Chilean political 
constitution.  
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For example, to compute the spatial accessibility to schools for a block, first, we 
need to identify the schools located in a buffering area	+. In this case, we define + 
as a circle with a center located in a block and a radius of 2 kilometers (Li H. , 
Wang, Shi, Deng, & Wang, 2015). Then, the accessibility of the block to the i-th 
school is computed by 24 = %(1 − )4/+)- and its sum corresponds to the 
accessibility of all the schools in each block. The interpretation of the indicator 
reflects the ease with which residents can access to schools within a given distance: 
high values exist if in a block exists more schools or schools are closer to each 
census block, or both. Table 12 summarizes the criteria used for computing spatial 
accessibility to other local public services, which differ in the buffering areas used 
according to the characteristic of each local service. 
 
Quantile Regression Model (QRM) 
As it is well known, classical linear regression (LR) is generally the standard 
procedure used to measure the average of the relationship between a set of 
covariates with respect to a response variable. In particular, this method computes 
conditional mean functions, however, this does not consider the full conditional 
distributional properties of the outcome variable, and therefore LR only provides a 
partial picture about it.  In other words, this method is limited to explain the mean 
of the dependent variable. An alternative method to consider these important 
properties is the Quantile Regression Model (QRM), which based on the 
minimization of weighted absolute deviation, computes conditional quantile 
functions. This model helps to analyze the full distributional properties of a 
response variable by computing a conditional median function. It means the method 
can be applied to explain the influence of determinant variables at any point of the 
distribution of the dependent variable. In our application, quantile regression can 
help us to analyze how housing prices by block affects in a different way the 
distribution of each indicator of accessibility to local public services. By doing so, 
we study this relationship using as dependent variable the accessibility to every 
local public service considered into the analysis, meanwhile our explanatory 
variable is the mean of housing prices by block to detect how different socio-
economic groups can affect the distribution of local public services. Moreover, we 
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include some control variables such as the share of exempted housing from property 
taxes by block, and a housing quality index computed by the SII which help us to 
characterize socioeconomic conditions of residents.   
 
Similar to the computation mechanism used in LR, Quantile Regression Model 
minimizes the weighted sum of absolute residuals. In this case, consider a sample 
of 8 observations for the computation of the accessibility to local public services 
model. Denote as 9 as a 8 vector of the accessibility index, and : is a vector of 8	;	< matrix with < − 1 explanatory variables (in our case, housing prices, share 
of exempted housing from property taxes and housing quality index). Then, the 
minimization problem of a quantile regression can be expressed as, 
 
=>? = minCD∈ℝG $H9. − ;.=?HI./0 ℎ. 
 
where the nth observation’s weight ℎ. is defined as:  
 ℎ. = 2L 
 
if 9. − ;.=? > 0, and  ℎ. = 2 − 2L 
 
otherwise. For instance, if L = 0.75, the criterion is minimized when 75 percent of 
residuals are negative. Then, quantile regression indicates how the explanatory 
variables such as housing values by block influences on the accessibility measure 
to any local public service at the 75th percentile of the conditional accessibility 
distribution. Standard errors of the coefficient are estimated using bootstrapping 
and as result, standard errors are less sensitive to typical econometric problems such 
as truncation, outliers, heteroscedasticity and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Bi-Variate LISA 
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Although QRM shows how socio-economic conditions of residents can affect the 
distribution of accessibility measures, this method cannot reflect if housing price 
clustering is associated with the provision of local public services. This last element 
is crucial to understand if the spatial distribution of local public services is related 
to residential segregation patterns. The simplest form to identify spatial clustering, 
local indicators of spatial association (LISA) are used to accomplish this objective. 
The LISA is computed for each observation and denotes to what extent similar 
values are clustered around that observation based on the concept of local Moran’s 
I. Usually, this spatial statistic is computed as a univariate indicator, however, its 
measurement also can be extended to study the spatial association of two variables 
as well. In this paper, we introduce the Bi-variate LISA to study the association 
between housing prices and the accessibility to local public services. This statistic 
shows the degree of linear association which can be positive or negative between 
one variable in a given location 4, and the average of another variable in 
neighborhood communities. In our approach, we seek to study the linear association 
between housing prices by block with respect to the average of accessibility to local 
public services. Bi-variable LISA is computed as follow, 
 RST* = U:S* − :VS*WS X$Y*Z.Z/0 U:T* − :VT*WT X 
 
where :S*  represents the housing price in the block 4, and :T*  is the accessibility to 
a local public service in block 4, respectively. Also,  :VS*  and :VT*  are the average 
values of both variables, meanwhile WS and WT are their variances. Finally, Y*Z  is 
the spatial weight matrix defined as a binary matrix where a neighbor set for each 
observation is identified with non-zero elements for neighbors and zero for others.  
 
The interpretation of this indicator establishes that a positive association suggests a 
similar spatial clustering of both variables, and negative relations assumes the 
opposite result. Consequently, this measure provides a clear picture to understand 
how the spatial association between residential segregation and the provision of 
local public services is working by defining four distinctive groups: high housing 
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prices and high accessibility to local public services, low housing prices and low 
accessibility to local public services, high housing prices and low accessibility to 
local public services, and low housing prices and high accessibility to local public 
services.  
 
5. Results and discussion  
In this section, we show the main results of the analysis performed via Quantile 
Regression Method. As usual on these computations, the comparison between OLS 
and Quantile Regression is reported in Tables 14 – 28,24 where the dependent 
variable is represented by the accessibility index computed for every local public 
service considered into the analysis, meanwhile the explanatory variables are 
represented by the mean of housing prices by block as well as, control variables 
about socioeconomic characteristics of housing. Also, figure 2 shows the panels 
that supports the behavior of coefficients computed. The language of the discussion 
concerns the conditional distribution, then, we always refer to the conditional mean 
or certain conditional quantiles. In this way, higher (lower) accessibility indexes by 
block are located at higher (lower) positions in the conditional accessibility index 
distribution, conditioned on the mean of housing prices by block.  
  
As one would expect, on most of local public services their accessibilities are 
increasing when housing prices decrease. However, this behavior differs by every 
local public service. For instance, the effect of housing prices on the accessibility 
to public schools is negative, but it is less negative for the lowest and highest-
income quantile groups. In this sense, a U-shaped coefficient behavior can be found, 
and it is observed in panel 1. It implies that middle-income groups are receiving 
more benefits because they have more access to local public schools in comparison 
with other income groups. Panel 2 shows the same analysis for public schools but 
only considering those with more than 250 points in SIMCE.25 According to the 
                                               
24 Summary statistics are reported in table 13. 
25 SIMCE is a national standardized test used to measure the quality of education across students. 
This system has the purpose of improving the quality and equity of Chilean education by reporting 
information about student performances and their learning environment.   
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analysis, we can observe how high-quality educational public services are 
distributed by income groups. In this way, middle-income and high-income groups 
have better access to high-quality public schools than lower-income groups. In fact, 
this shape is likely to the influence of housing prices on the access to semi-private 
schools observed in panels 3 and 4. Thus, taking into consideration that semi-
private schools have better performances in quality terms than public schools, this 
analysis reveals that high-quality educational services are still concentrated and 
closer to higher-income groups. It implies that poorer individuals are facing more 
disadvantages in access to public schools than richer individuals because the latter 
can compensate their lower access to these schools by increasing their access to 
private schools. This fact can be observed in panels 5 and 6 where a positive 
relationship between housing prices and the accessibility to private schools is 
found. Consequently, private schools are reserved for high-income groups and low-
income groups are excluded from these services. 
 
Panels 7 and 8 show the behavior of the quantile coefficients for the accessibility 
to public transportation: bus and subway stations. In this case, a U-shape is found 
in the accessibility to buses which is following the same pattern as public schools: 
lower and higher income groups are suffering a lack of the accessibility to these 
services. In particular, this shape could be explained by two facts. First, most of 
low-income and high-income households are located in outer areas of the MR and 
both groups could be suffering problems with respect to the insufficient route 
coverage that exists outside the city’s central areas. However, only wealthy families 
have higher probabilities of possessing cars to benefit from highway systems. 
Higher-income groups can switch from public transportation to private vehicles 
overcoming the commuting constraints the poor must handle in order to access to 
central areas. On the other hand, medium-income groups have more access to 
subway stations. From this analysis, we can confirm that housing location is still 
relevant to determine the access to local public services: subway stations are 
designed to connect mainly the central area of the MR, where commercial activities 
are located. Considering that housing prices also response to the location of these 
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kinds of activities at the space, high-access to subway stations is expected due to 
high-housing prices.  
 
A different behavior on the accessibility to urban public parks can be found in 
panels 9 and 10, respectively. In panel 9, it is possible to observe a homogeneous 
effect of housing prices on urban public parks. In terms of supply, urban public 
parks are more equitably distributed between income groups than other local public 
services. However, if we consider only urban public parks with a surface over 5750 
square meters, the behavior of coefficients by quantile follows the same pattern as 
private services (e.g. private schools).26 Therefore, the accessibility to bigger urban 
parks is still determined by housing prices which is higher when housing prices are 
higher as well, reflecting their unequal distribution against the poorest population. 
A possible explanation can be found at the current Chilean regulation of urban areas 
because it does not define a minimum size by a park, but only the obligation of 
using a percentage of urbanized land to this purpose. In this way, developers can 
assign small proportions of land to urban parks because there is not possible to build 
more affordable housing and therefore, small green areas proliferate without to 
consider the population density of locations (Reyes & Figueroa, 2010). 
Consequently, an unequal and insufficient supply of urban parks is provided across 
neighborhoods with few large parks concentrated and closer to high-income groups. 
 
The remaining of local public services such as kindergartens, hospitals, fire and 
police stations, and cultural equipment are following the same U-shape pattern as 
other local public services. The behavior of coefficients is shown in Panels 11 to 
15. In this sense, lower-income and higher-incomes quantiles are still receiving less 
access to kindergartens, hospitals, fire and police stations, respectively. An 
exception is found for culture services that present a fairer distribution between 
income groups. Moreover, we do not find significant coefficients for middle-
income and higher-income groups and reflects that incomes are not affecting the 
access to culture services. Finally, we can conclude that income groups are still 
determinants on the accessibility to local public services and marked differences 
                                               
26 This surface represents the mean of green area size at the Metropolitan Region (MR).  
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are found between them. In this case, middle-income groups are receiving higher 
proportions of local public services than others. This detail converts to residents’ 
location in the MR in a relevant element to shaping the spatial distribution of local 
public services. Notwithstanding, these results cannot reflect if housing prices 
clustering is associated with the provision of local public services.  
 
For overcoming this problem, we use Bi-Variate LISA to determine whether the 
spatial distribution of income groups is also related to the spatial distribution of 
local public services. Figure 15 depicts the main results obtained from this analysis. 
LISA statistic shows that more than 50 percent of communities are highly clustered. 
Moreover, we observe a systematic concentration of higher levels of accessibility 
to local public services in the center and northeast areas of the MR, meanwhile, 
groups with insufficient levels of accessibility are mainly located in the outer areas 
of the MR. For instance, LISA for public schools evidences this behavior (panels 1 
and 2). Higher levels of accessibility are located in the center part and groups with 
lower levels of accessibility are located in the eastern areas and some areas of the 
western part of the MR. Particularly, in the eastern area is possible to identify two 
different groups: lower-housing prices with lower accessibility and higher-housing 
prices with lower accessibility levels. These results confirm the evidence found by 
QRM methodology in which high-income and low-income groups are suffering 
important disparities in terms of accessibility to public schools with both groups 
mainly located in the eastern area of the MR. However, the spatial distribution of 
public schools with better performances in standardized test is still unequal and 
against to poorer communities. High-income groups that are receiving higher levels 
of accessibility to better schools are located in the center and northeast areas of the 
MR, where high-housing prices are located as well. By the contrary, low-income 
groups located in southern areas of the MR are suffering important disparities for 
accessing to high-quality public schools. Obviously, this situation determines that 
lower-income groups are excluded from these services and reduce their 
probabilities to access to better education opportunities than households located in 
the center and northeast areas. By considering that high-income groups are more 
likely to choose the private version of schools, which are characterized by high-
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quality performances as well as, lower physical and financial barriers than the 
poorer, these results confirm that patterns of residential segregation are apparently 
reinforced by low accessibility levels to public schools, excluding to the poorest 
communities of high-quality public services. This situation reveals the urban space 
in the MR is not only segmented by the stratification of communities. Also, the 
unequal distribution of accessibility levels can exacerbate this shape with important 
differences in terms of well-being or capitalizations of public services into housing 
prices.27 
 
A similar spatial distribution also is observed for urban parks. Panel 9 shows that 
high-income groups are receiving higher levels of accessibility to public urban 
parks than lower-income groups located in the southern areas of the MR. This 
situation is exacerbated when bigger parks are taking into account (panel 10). In 
this sense, higher levels of accessibility to urban parks are reserved to high-income 
areas, and lower-income groups located in the northwest and south part of the MR 
are marginalized from this type of urban parks. Finally, LISA maps for other local 
public services such as transportation, kindergartens, healthcare centers, fire 
stations, police stations, and culture infrastructure confirm that lower-income 
groups that are receiving fewer proportions of local public services are located 
mainly in the southern and northwest areas than other income groups in the MR. 
This evidence supports that residents’ location is strongly associated with the 
spatial distribution patterns of local public services, which might have relevant 
consequences in migration decisions exerted by individuals. In this case, residential 
segregation patterns are marked and apparently exacerbated by the unequal 
distribution of local public services across the MR. This implies low access for the 
poorest population by excluding them from enjoying better living standards or 
opportunities in crucial services such as schools, hospitals or transportation. On the 
other hand, these results reveal that local governments could play an important role 
in shaping the spatial distribution of local public services into the MR, where 
                                               
27 Panels 5 and 6 in figure 15 show the bi-variate LISA for private schools. There clearly is observed 
higher levels of residential segregation where high-income groups are receiving more high-quality 
services than low-income groups.  
  99 
apparently still persists high-income local governments providing better services to 
their communities and other local governments with an inefficient supply of local 
public services within poorer communities.   
 
Discussion 
Regardless that MR exerts an important attractiveness force of individuals or social 
and economic activities over other places of the country, the results confirm that 
within is still possible to observe differences in the accessibility levels to basic local 
public services between communities. In particular, the unequal distribution of local 
public services is affecting mainly to lower-income groups, who are suffering 
significant deficits in accessing to critical local public services such as 
transportation, schools or hospitals. This situation reduces dramatically their 
opportunities for finding better living conditions closer to their homes, assuming in 
some cases time and monetary costs for accessing to better local services in other 
communities. In contrast, middle-income and high-income groups are enjoying a 
higher provision of local public services, who are generally located in the central 
area of the MR. This fact constitutes an important advantage for these individuals 
in contrast lower income groups because socioeconomic activities, public and 
private services are located in the core areas of the MR.  These benefits according 
to the spatial position of this groups and gains in terms of accessibility could explain 
some important urban renovation processes such as the gentrification, concept that 
explains why middle-income classes – due to their higher economic power – renew 
the central core of urban areas and excludes lower income groups to periphery 
areas. The low accessibility observed in the poorest groups reflects important losses 
in terms of human development due to their low probability of accessing to better 
opportunities for increasing their quality of life. Despite that the richest residents 
also suffer from the insufficient provision of education, transportation or health care 
services, they still have more advantages to overcome this problem by opting for 
the private version of these services, which are usually characterized by high-
quality performances.  
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Geographically, low accessibility levels are located at the periphery of the MR, 
specifically, in the north-western and southern parts, which also coincide with the 
location of social housing projects implemented by the state during the 1970s. The 
main objective of the Chilean social housing policies was reducing the lack of 
affordable housing and increase the ownership by implementing different subsidies 
which were concentrated on households with incomes below US $400 per month. 
Apparently, these public policies were successful in the sense of reducing housing 
deficits. However, new neighborhoods were located in places with low land prices, 
far from the center and within communities with higher poverty levels and social 
problems such as crime or drug abuse. As Borsdorf et Al (2013) highlighted, this 
“new poverty” emerges due to the absence of a clear spatial dimension of public 
policies to include low-income residents into the urban system, reinforcing social 
segregation patterns and reducing living standards of the poorest population. In 
addition, this situation has important economic implications for hosting 
municipalities of social housing projects: social housing units are exempted from 
the payment of territorial taxes. Considering that these resources correspond to the 
most relevant source of income for municipalities, the presence of social housing 
units automatically reduces their budgets to provide local public services. For a 
better understanding of this fact, figure 16 shows the spatial distribution of 
healthcare and education per-capita expenditures by communes for the year 2016. 
There is possible to observe that higher per-capita expenditures in both services are 
mainly concentrated in the eastern area of the MR and it coincides with high-income 
groups and high levels of accessibility. By the contrary, lower per-capita 
expenditures are located in the southern and northwest areas of the MR where lower 
income groups with insufficient levels of accessibility are located as well. 
Apparently, this outcome is reflecting the fact that richer local governments are 
hosting high-income groups with higher willingness to pay for local public services. 
As a consequence, these local governments should respond to these demands 
providing high-quality local services which are used to attract higher-income 
residents. On the other hand, low expenditures in per-capita terms could reflect two 
situations. First, local governments with higher levels of exempted housing from 
local taxes are facing important income restrictions to provide local public services 
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and then, lower incomes are generated.  Second, important deficits in terms of 
quantity and quality in local public services also could be found in poorer 
municipalities because also face a higher demand from their communities. As local 
infrastructure is not sufficient, households must assume commuting costs or 
overcome budget restrictions for accessing to more and better local public services 
or to the private version of the same local facilities. Therefore, results are reflecting 
in some sense the logic of housing policies which is recognized by the Chilean 
literature as one of the causes of residential segregation (Lambiri & Vargas, 2011), 
and apparently this lack on accessibility to local public services is reinforcing 
residential segregation with diverse consequences on living standards for the 
poorest population.  Even if, we do not draw any conclusion about the causal 
relationship between the spatial distribution of local public services and residential 
segregation, these results provide a better understanding of this stylized fact and its 
consequences. Moreover, the comprehension of this new perspective can have 
important public policy implications, and most especially for local public 
governments because they could play a relevant role to address these problems. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The study of the relationship between the provision of local public services and 
residential segregation takes an important significance when the latter is considered 
such as the social manifestation of spatial income inequality. This means that the 
unequal distribution of income across communities also can be observed on the 
unequal distribution of local public services, which are seen as fundamental rights 
that everyone must receive from central governments. However, this relationship is 
still relatively unexplored by the empirical literature, especially in cases that differ 
from the US context. This paper wants to build a bridge between both concepts by 
analyzing the accessibility to local public services and residential segregation for 
the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile (MR). In particular, this objective is 
addressed by studying how the spatial accessibility to local public services is 
equitably distributed among different social and economic groups, by using 
different measures of accessibility based on physical distances, quantile regression 
methods and local indices of spatial association LISA to understand how housing 
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prices by block – used as a proxy of socioeconomic conditions of people – can 
influence on the accessibility to crucial local public services such as schools, 
transportation, hospitals, parks, fire stations, police stations, and culture 
infrastructure. 
 
Main results suggest the accessibility to local public services has an unequal 
distribution between housing units and economic classes. However, these 
differences are affecting more to lower income groups, who are suffering 
significant deficits on the provision of local public services. Geographically, low 
accessibility levels are concentrated at the periphery of the MR, where poor 
municipalities and housing social projects are located as well. This situation has 
important implications for lower-income residents and local governments. On one 
hand, these neighborhoods are located in places with low land prices and far from 
core areas, assuming several social problems such as crime or drug abuse due to 
their exclusion from urban systems. Therefore, the location of social housing 
projects at the fringe of the MR could increase residential segregation patterns with 
negative consequences for living standards of the poorest population. On the other 
hand, local governments also are suffering severe budget deficits to provide local 
public services due to the high number of housing units exempted from local taxes 
that are concentrated in their communities. Apparently, their budgets are not 
sufficient to satisfy the high demand for local public services, which can be 
observed on the insufficient infrastructure or in the low-quality performances. 
Under this scenario, poor residents are suffering a “double-disadvantage” due to 
their social exclusion from urban centers and their limited accessibility to local 
public services. We found evidence confirming that social housing public policies 
could be considered as one cause of residential segregation in which the latter is 
reinforced by the insufficient accessibility levels that poorest population must 
assume. Even if richer residents also face lower levels of accessibility to social 
public services still keep more advantages with respect to other social groups 
because they can access to the private version of them.  
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Overall, the findings from this study have important public policy implications, 
especially for local governments because they can play an important role in shaping 
the spatial accessibility to local public services. In this vein, important disparities 
in terms of provision of local public services are strongly associated with the 
concentration of municipal incomes across the MR. Moreover, this unequal pattern 
also reduces the opportunities for the poorest population to access to more and 
better local public services which are concentrated in places with higher-income 
residents. These results confirm that higher levels residential stratification by 
housing prices also are strongly associated with the unequal spatial distribution of 
local public services. Therefore, richer local governments have more opportunities 
to attract high-income individuals who are willing to pay more local taxes for 
accessing to high-quality local public services. As a result, these municipalities can 
generate a virtuous circle that permits to obtain more local taxes by reinforcing the 
relationship between public services and housing values. On the contrary, lower-
income groups residing in communities with lower local revenues have fewer 
possibilities to improve their living standards because apparently, they are 
marginalized and excluded from high-quality local public services. Although we do 
not seek to explain the causal relationship between the spatial distribution of local 
public services and patterns of residential segregation, we recognize that local 
governments might play an important role in addressing these problems by reducing 
the severe differences that are still observed in the MR. Further research about how 
local government revenues and how institutional restrictions are affecting local 
response capacity to resolve these problems could be addressed in order to obtain a 
better understating of this stylized fact.  
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Figure 13: Map of Residential Communities by Housing Prices in the 
Metropolitan Region 
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Figure 14: Quantile Regression Coefficient Estimates by Quantile 
Panel 1: Accessibility to Municipal Schools Panel 2: Accessibility to Public Schools (more 250 SIMCE) 
 
 
 
 
Panel 3: Accessibility to Semi-Private Schools Panel 4: Accessibility to Semi-Private Schools (more 250 
SIMCE) 
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Panel 5: Accessibility to Private Schools Panel 6: Accessibility to Private Schools (more 250 SIMCE) 
 
 
 
Panel 7: Access to Public Transportation. Subway Stations Panel 8: Access to Public Transportation. Bus Stations 
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Panel 9: Accessibility to Urban Parks Panel 10: Accessibility to Urban Parks (more than 5750 mt2) 
 
 
 
Panel 11: Accessibility to Public Kindergartens Panel 12: Accessibility to Public Hospitals 
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Panel 13: Accessibility to Fire Stations Panel 14: Accessibility to Police Stations 
 
 
 
Panel 15: Accessibility to Culture Equipment  
 
Quantile Estimates  
95% CI of quantile estimates  
 
OLS estimates 
95% CI of OLS est; upper bound 
95% CI of OLS est; lower bound 
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Figure 15: LISA Maps for bi-variate relation between housing prices and accessibility measures of local public services 
Panel 1: Accessibility to Public Schools Panel 2: Accessibility to Public Schools with 250 SIMCE 
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Panel 3: Accessibility to Semi-Private Schools Panel 4: Accessibility to Semi-Private Schools with 250 
SIMCE 
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Panel 5: Accessibility to Private Schools Panel 6: Accessibility to Private Schools with 250 SIMCE 
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Panel 7: Accessibility to Subway Stations Panel 8: Accessibility to Bus Stations 
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Panel 9: Accessibility to Urban Parks Panel 10: Accessibility to Urban Parks (more than 5750 mt2) 
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Panel 11: Accessibility to Public Kindergartens Panel 12: Accessibility to Public Hospitals 
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Panel 13: Accessibility to Fire Stations Panel 14: Accessibility to Police Stations 
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Panel 15: Accessibility to Culture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The significant level is 5%. 
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Figure 16: Spatial distribution of local government expenditures in education and healthcare by communes 
Panel 1: Local expenditure per-capita in education Panel 2: Local expenditure per-capita in healthcare 
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Table 9: Accessibility Measures. Traditional approaches 
Measurement 
Approach 
Definition Spatial 
Unit 
Used in literature 
Container Number of 
facilities or 
services 
contained within 
a given unit. 
Census 
tracts 
Talen & Anselin (1998) 
Knox (1980) 
Coverage Number of 
households (or 
individuals) 
covered by 
service area 
buffer. 
Household 
locations or 
location of 
facilities. 
Knox (1978) 
Talen (1997) 
Radke & Mu (2000) 
Knox (1980) 
Wei, Cabrera-Barona & 
Blanschke (2016) 
Minimum 
Distances 
Minimum 
distance from the 
origin to the 
nearest local 
public service. In 
this case, more 
accessibility if a 
spatial unit is 
closer to every 
facility (Inverse 
approach) 
Census 
tracts 
(centroids), 
spatial 
location of 
households. 
Lotfi & Koohsari (2009) 
Knox (1980) 
Talen (2002) 
Talen (2003) 
Travel cost Average distance 
between census 
blocks and local 
services 
(Walkable 
distances, car 
distances, etc.) 
Census 
tracts 
Handy & Niemeier (1997) 
Vandenbulcke, 
Steenberghen & Thomas 
(2009) 
Gravity 
Measures 
Gradual decrease 
in accessibility as 
the travel time to 
destinations 
increases.  
Census 
tracts or 
spatial 
location of 
households 
if it is 
available. 
Pacione (1989) 
Truelove (1993) 
Talen & Anselin (1998) 
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Table 10: Accessibility measures. Alternative approaches 
Measurement 
Approach 
Definition 
Infrastructure-
based 
measures 
These measures have the purpose to analyze the observed or 
simulated performed of the transport infrastructure. This 
approach includes the level of congestions of a road network. 
Activity-based 
measures 
This approach includes the analysis of accessibility given the 
range of activities that can be found in a destination. It can 
consider competition effects (based on gravity model 
measures). Finally, this analysis considers the degree of 
impedance or attraction given the quantity and quality of 
activities.  
Person-based 
measures 
This analysis assumes that accessibility applies to an 
individual at a particular time and place. In this sense, 
accessibility measures are used as an attribute of individuals, 
by evaluating how individual’s abilities can affect the 
accessibility to opportunities given their program daily 
activities and spatial-temporal constraints. This approach uses 
different measures of accessibility which consider trip 
purposes, transport nodes, income, gender, age, occupational 
groups and activity types.  
Utility-based 
measures 
These measures compute accessibility at the individual level 
by considering not only user’s characteristics. Also, this 
approach uses modal characteristics of transport system as the 
travel time. It is assumed that people face a cardinal utility and 
then, select the alternative that reports a maximum utility. 
Next, the utility function is represented by the sum of a 
deterministic component and a stochastic component. Finally, 
control variables are included into the function to account for 
attributes of each choice, attractiveness of destinations and 
travel impedance, as well as, socioeconomic characteristics of 
individuals (households), tastes and preferences.  
Based on classification presented by Vandenbulcke, Steenberghen & Thomas 
(2009) 
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Table 11: Summary of information sources of local public services 
Local facility Source Variables 
Transport  Ministry of Transport 
(www.transantiago.cl) 
(www.mtt.gob.cl) 
 
 
Location of bus 
stops and 
subways. 
 
Frequency: 
number of 
stops per day. 
 
(February 
2017) 
Schools Ministry of Education 
(www.mineduc.cl) 
 
 
Location of 
schools 
(incluying 
private and 
semiprivate 
schools). 
 
SIMCE scores 
from 2012-
2015. 
Hospitals Ministry of Health 
(www.minsal.cl) 
 
 
Location of 
hospitals 
Parks Municipal Council of Santiago  
(www.intendenciametropolitana.gov.cl) 
 
Location of 
Parks 
 
Green area 
(surface).  
Kindergartens • National Board of Day-Care Centers; 
Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles 
(JUNJI). 
• INTEGRA Foundation (Fundación 
Integra) 
Location of 
Kindergartens.  
Fire Stations National Board of Fire-fighters of Chile  
(http://www.bomberos.cl) 
 
Location of 
Fire Stations. 
Police Police of Chile (Carabineros de Chile) 
(www.carabineros.cl) 
 
Location of 
Police Stations. 
Culture  IDE – OCUC (Observatory of cities 
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; 
2016). 
 
Location of 
cultural centers, 
museums, 
libraries.  
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Table 12: Buffer areas and attractiveness measure for spatial accessibility index 
Local public service Buffer 
Transportation  • Bus stops: 400 meters. 
 
• Subway stations:4000 meters. 
 
 
Education (Also, it includes semi-
private education and private 
education) 
2000 meters 
Hospitals 2000 meters 
Parks 2000 meters 
Kindergartens  2000 meters.  
Fire Stations 4000 meters 
Police Stations 4000 meters 
Culture  4000 meters 
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Table 13: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Mean of Housing Price by Block 44170 22.700.000 62.100.000 1.300.000 7.190.000.000 
Share of exempted housing 44170 1 0 0 1 
Number of superior quality housing 
by block 44170 0 4 0 263 
Number of medium-superior quality 
housing by block 44170 5 34 0 1.085 
Number of medium quality housing 
by block 44170 17 61 0 1.601 
Number of medium-low quality 
housing by block 44170 29 36 0 1.076 
Number of low quality housing by 
block 44170 4 10 0 695 
Accessibility to private schools 44170 558 1.114 0 8.025 
Accessibility to semi-private schools 44170 6.545 3.650 0 22.946 
Accessibility to public schools 44170 2.077 1.413 0 6.901 
Accessibility to private schools with 
more than 250 SIMCE 44170 334 741 0 5.529 
Accessibility to semi-private schools 
with more than 250 SIMCE 44170 1.984 1.302 0 8.539 
Accessibility to public schools with 
more than 250 SIMCE 44170 281 446 0 3.400 
Accessibility to subway stations 44170 1.345 1.560 0 9.736 
Accessibility to bus stations 44170 1.788 1.125 0 8.024 
Accessibility to parks 44170 15.675 10.585 0 55.210 
Accessibility to parques with more 
than 5750 square meters 44170 1.242 1.146 0 8.095 
Accessibility to public hospitals 44170 511 500 0 4.121 
Accessibility to public kindergartens 44170 2.107 1.507 0 6.919 
Accessibility to fire stations 44170 1.165 733 0 5.916 
Accessibility to police stations 44170 1.033 701 0 4.301 
Accessibility to culture  44170 2.742 4.787 0 44.132 
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Table 14: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Public Schools 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000204** -0.00000296*** -0.00000432*** -0.00000444*** -0.00000141*** 
 (-2.79) (-26.67) (-26.48) (-22.30) (-4.42) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
869.9*** 490.7*** 756.5*** 1202.1*** 1113.3*** 
 (16.58) (23.62) (24.75) (32.25) (18.64) 
      
Number of 
superior 
quality housing 
by block 
-10.10*** 2.441 2.411 -4.284 -16.68** 
 (-3.83) (1.35) (0.91) (-1.32) (-3.21) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior 
quality housing 
by block 
0.0626 -0.898*** -0.627* 0.819* 0.771 
 (0.24) (-4.71) (-2.24) (2.40) (1.41) 
      
Number of 
medium 
quality housing 
by block 
1.380*** 0.313** 1.446*** 1.809*** 1.716*** 
 (10.88) (2.92) (9.18) (9.42) (5.58) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.0115 0.913*** -0.113 -0.868** -0.606 
 (-0.06) (5.12) (-0.43) (-2.71) (-1.18) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
13.55*** 17.61*** 27.08*** 27.13*** 3.148 
 (6.82) (27.82) (29.10) (23.90) (1.73) 
      
Constant 1356.6*** 579.0*** 1226.0*** 1998.7*** 3670.1*** 
 (23.18) (30.24) (43.54) (58.20) (66.69) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.085 0.065 0.058 0.0579 0.019 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 15: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Private Schools 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-7.68e-08 -1.69e-20 0.000000673*** 0.00000129*** 0.00000130*** 
 (-0.47) (-0.00) (11.47) (11.13) (6.69) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-1636.1*** -329.9*** -1117.0*** -2249.8*** -4630.2*** 
 (-63.78) (-71.69) (-101.72) (-103.57) (-127.11) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-14.10*** -3.391*** -12.86*** -22.89*** -22.69*** 
 (-5.55) (-8.46) (-13.44) (-12.10) (-7.15) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
4.028*** 3.088*** 5.759*** 8.938*** 4.201*** 
 (11.27) (73.15) (57.16) (44.85) (12.57) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
2.532*** 0.838*** 2.554*** 3.843*** 4.610*** 
 (18.59) (35.35) (45.14) (34.33) (24.55) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.429*** 1.04e-15 0.0756 0.571** 2.122*** 
 (4.31) (0.00) (0.80) (3.06) (6.79) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-3.306*** -0.0294 -0.275 -3.921*** -4.835*** 
 (-4.98) (-0.21) (-0.82) (-5.93) (-4.36) 
      
Constant 1804.7*** 329.9*** 1123.4*** 2464.0*** 5391.3*** 
 (69.55) (77.80) (111.03) (123.10) (160.63) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.399 0.051 0.182 0.317 0.537 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
125 
Table 16: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Semi-Private Schools 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000581** -0.00000691*** -0.0000138
*** -0.0000130*** -0.00000262* 
 (-2.74) (-23.43) (-43.60) (-29.27) (-2.31) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
2956.4*** 3572.8*** 3160.4*** 2971.1*** -360.9 
 (19.41) (64.69) (53.45) (35.67) (-1.70) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-25.66*** 4.687 17.32*** -12.39 -64.97*** 
 (-3.33) (0.97) (3.36) (-1.71) (-3.51) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-5.795*** -1.967*** -5.965*** -5.089*** -7.551*** 
 (-8.87) (-3.88) (-11.00) (-6.66) (-3.88) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
1.631*** 1.213*** 1.751*** 1.769*** 1.190 
 (5.90) (4.26) (5.74) (4.12) (1.09) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.276 -1.131* -0.832 -1.342 1.179 
 (-0.53) (-2.39) (-1.64) (-1.88) (0.65) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
1.416 4.565** -5.319** -4.758 2.408 
 (0.86) (2.71) (-2.95) (-1.88) (0.37) 
      
Constant 4327.7*** 1556.6*** 3830.0*** 6247.4*** 13477.4*** 
 (25.35) (30.59) (70.30) (81.40) (68.91) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.131 0.162 0.094 0.043 0.005 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 17: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Public Schools with 
scores over 250 in SIMCE 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.000000479* -1.00e-09 -0.000000429*** 
-
0.00000106*** -0.000000118 
 (-2.52) (-0.29) (-11.72) (-13.96) (-0.81) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-247.1*** 0.913 -123.8*** -342.9*** -1111.5*** 
 (-15.63) (1.39) (-18.08) (-24.04) (-40.76) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-5.521*** -0.0961 -1.678** -4.553*** -8.335*** 
 (-5.69) (-1.68) (-2.81) (-3.66) (-3.51) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
0.673*** 0.0165** 0.499*** 1.479*** 0.523* 
 (5.23) (2.74) (7.94) (11.30) (2.09) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
1.191*** 0.182*** 1.408*** 1.708*** 2.036*** 
 (18.72) (53.95) (39.91) (23.23) (14.49) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.0116 -0.000109 -0.0562 -0.126 0.554* 
 (0.20) (-0.02) (-0.96) (-1.03) (2.37) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-3.030*** -0.00428 -1.386*** -6.005*** -4.070*** 
 (-7.09) (-0.21) (-6.65) (-13.82) (-4.90) 
      
Constant 478.1*** -0.897 183.6*** 717.3*** 1978.5*** 
 (27.76) (-1.49) (29.12) (54.58) (78.74) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.098 0.0008 0.029 0.058 0.167 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 18: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Private schools with 
scores over 250 in SIMCE 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
0.000000257* 4.33e-08* 0.000000451*** 0.00000257*** 0.00000211*** 
 (2.36) (2.18) (17.00) (39.83) (12.40) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-1120.4*** -209.9*** -733.6*** -1470.1*** -3073.5*** 
 (-67.11) (-56.36) (-147.83) (-121.47) (-96.67) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-6.946*** 0.209 -4.186*** -13.29*** -15.69*** 
 (-4.54) (0.65) (-9.68) (-12.61) (-5.66) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
2.628*** 1.764*** 4.233*** 6.527*** 3.704*** 
 (10.00) (51.64) (92.98) (58.79) (12.70) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
1.338*** 0.348*** 0.874*** 1.972*** 3.371*** 
 (15.38) (18.14) (34.18) (31.61) (20.57) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.305*** 0.000263 0.000712 0.157 1.657*** 
 (4.36) (0.01) (0.02) (1.51) (6.07) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-1.932*** -0.0271 -0.0132 -0.749* -4.089*** 
 (-5.04) (-0.24) (-0.09) (-2.03) (-4.22) 
      
Constant 1185.7*** 209.3*** 730.8*** 1493.6*** 3492.1*** 
 (70.32) (61.00) (159.85) (133.94) (119.20) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.412 0.044 0.206 0.368 0.531 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 19: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Semi-Private Schools 
with scores over 250 in SIMCE 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000189** -0.00000172*** 
-
0.00000343*** 
-
0.00000492*** -0.00000100
** 
 (-2.72) (-16.06) (-28.02) (-27.80) (-2.86) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
552.8*** 753.7*** 849.3*** 372.5*** -618.3*** 
 (10.81) (37.51) (37.06) (11.25) (-9.46) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-9.560*** 1.280 1.676 -3.402 -23.31*** 
 (-3.69) (0.73) (0.84) (-1.18) (-4.10) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-1.952*** -0.763*** -1.431*** -2.968*** -2.153*** 
 (-7.24) (-4.14) (-6.80) (-9.77) (-3.59) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
1.796*** 1.260*** 1.625*** 2.305*** 3.434*** 
 (14.40) (12.17) (13.76) (13.51) (10.20) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.985*** 0.512** 0.927*** 1.414*** 0.996 
 (5.05) (2.97) (4.71) (4.97) (1.78) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-3.876*** -1.848** -3.144*** -6.744*** -9.387*** 
 (-6.98) (-3.02) (-4.51) (-6.69) (-4.72) 
      
Constant 1552.9*** 474.0*** 1151.0*** 2457.4*** 4853.2*** 
 (27.27) (25.61) (54.50) (80.56) (80.59) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.054 0.075 0.054 0.022 0.016 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 20: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Transportation. Buses 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000138** -0.00000153*** 
-
0.00000291*** 
-
0.00000327*** 
-
0.00000106*** 
 (-3.11) (-12.51) (-24.76) (-24.36) (-4.14) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
644.8*** 631.9*** 575.8*** 605.3*** 852.3*** 
 (19.17) (27.60) (26.17) (24.09) (17.82) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-9.718*** -1.362 -5.103** -5.823** -13.76*** 
 (-4.88) (-0.68) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-3.30) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
0.945*** 0.488* 0.717*** 0.882*** 1.830*** 
 (4.73) (2.32) (3.55) (3.83) (4.17) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
0.369*** 0.297* 0.204 0.199 0.522* 
 (3.69) (2.51) (1.80) (1.54) (2.12) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.0620 0.494* -0.0511 -0.439* -2.005*** 
 (-0.41) (2.52) (-0.27) (-2.03) (-4.88) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.494 -0.483 -1.522* -0.709 -1.172 
 (-0.92) (-0.69) (-2.27) (-0.93) (-0.80) 
      
Constant 1299.9*** 504.1*** 1311.0*** 2063.6*** 3114.1*** 
 (35.25) (23.90) (64.66) (89.13) (70.66) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.058 0.043 0.0359 0.030 0.024 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 21: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Transportation: Subway 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000152* -0.000000683*** 
-
0.00000395*** 
-
0.00000301*** -1.18e-08 
 (-2.06) (-10.58) (-21.41) (-15.74) (-0.02) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-656.1*** -136.8*** -880.0*** -1028.0*** -2278.5*** 
 (-11.59) (-11.31) (-25.49) (-28.70) (-21.00) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-19.10*** -3.204** -8.764** -15.79*** -29.92** 
 (-5.60) (-3.04) (-2.92) (-5.06) (-3.17) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
3.519*** 1.532*** 4.283*** 4.616*** 4.320*** 
 (7.92) (13.80) (13.53) (14.05) (4.34) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
6.418*** 3.989*** 6.908*** 8.290*** 11.09*** 
 (29.45) (64.01) (38.83) (44.91) (19.84) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.816*** 0.722*** 3.197*** 0.962** -1.330 
 (4.22) (6.96) (10.79) (3.13) (-1.43) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-5.657*** -0.00328 -3.628*** -7.032*** -16.57*** 
 (-8.72) (-0.01) (-3.45) (-6.45) (-5.02) 
      
Constant 1779.1*** 139.0*** 1529.5*** 2907.1*** 5885.7*** 
 (28.35) (12.47) (48.09) (88.10) (58.89) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.122 0.015 0.047 0.073 0.073 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 22: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Urban Public Parks 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000526* -0.00000729*** -0.0000105
*** -0.0000146*** -0.00000676* 
 (-2.23) (-9.78) (-9.57) (-9.87) (-2.36) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
1164.7*** -400.7** -465.2* 1407.7*** 6200.4*** 
 (5.23) (-2.87) (-2.26) (5.10) (11.58) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-71.00*** -27.64* -44.86* -64.36** -64.52 
 (-5.41) (-2.27) (-2.50) (-2.68) (-1.38) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-9.014*** 3.670** -6.019** -12.41*** -20.92*** 
 (-9.64) (2.87) (-3.18) (-4.90) (-4.26) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
-2.654*** 2.985*** -2.420* -8.821*** -19.40*** 
 (-4.69) (4.15) (-2.28) (-6.20) (-7.03) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.852 -2.360* 1.990 1.901 -10.29* 
 (-0.57) (-1.97) (1.12) (0.80) (-2.24) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-140.3*** -48.28*** -119.1*** -202.2*** -271.6*** 
 (-9.38) (-11.36) (-18.97) (-24.06) (-16.65) 
      
Constant 15531.6*** 8552.7*** 14303.8*** 21701.9*** 33849.8*** 
 (68.81) (66.52) (75.29) (85.34) (68.59) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.022 0.024 0.050 0.068 0.140 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 23: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Urban Public Parks with 
more than 5750 mts2 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-9.56e-08 -0.000000317*** 3.69e-08 0.000000377
** 0.000000446 
 (-0.62) (-4.06) (0.34) (2.65) (1.46) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-751.5*** -380.5*** -709.4*** -811.1*** -1925.8*** 
 (-31.58) (-26.06) (-34.50) (-30.53) (-33.62) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-6.882** -6.518*** -11.27*** -6.556** -3.754 
 (-3.21) (-5.13) (-6.29) (-2.83) (-0.75) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
1.979*** 2.443*** 2.732*** 2.879*** 1.317* 
 (8.22) (18.25) (14.48) (11.81) (2.51) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
2.460*** 1.538*** 2.338*** 3.237*** 5.973*** 
 (18.34) (20.45) (22.06) (23.65) (20.23) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-0.704*** -0.295* -0.830*** -0.986*** -1.096* 
 (-5.00) (-2.35) (-4.70) (-4.32) (-2.23) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
-3.991*** -0.647 -4.062*** -5.917*** -7.883*** 
 (-7.70) (-1.45) (-6.49) (-7.31) (-4.52) 
      
Constant 1829.3*** 724.5*** 1578.8*** 2386.5*** 4777.0*** 
 (77.85) (53.87) (83.32) (97.50) (90.50) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.112 0.024 0.050 0.068 0.140 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 24: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Public Healthcare 
centers 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-
0.000000453** -3.70e-09 
-
0.000000470*** 
-
0.000000920*** 
-
0.000000478** 
 (-2.59) (-0.10) (-9.30) (-13.87) (-2.68) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
175.5*** 123.5*** 264.8*** 311.5*** -51.40 
 (12.24) (18.25) (27.98) (25.10) (-1.54) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-2.082** 0.00323 0.170 -1.088 -4.691 
 (-3.17) (0.01) (0.21) (-1.01) (-1.62) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-0.0770 0.000774 -0.0774 0.172 -0.546 
 (-1.05) (0.01) (-0.89) (1.51) (-1.79) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
0.503*** -0.00113 0.328*** 0.631*** 1.586*** 
 (9.36) (-0.03) (6.71) (9.86) (9.23) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.0219 0.0221 0.318*** 0.114 0.00427 
 (0.30) (0.38) (3.91) (1.07) (0.01) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
6.606*** 8.404*** 9.129*** 11.08*** 15.04*** 
 (7.45) (40.79) (31.67) (29.31) (14.82) 
      
Constant 347.4*** 0.416 145.3*** 463.5*** 1446.9*** 
 (22.55) (0.07) (16.66) (40.53) (47.12) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.046 0.047 0.053 0.038 0.022 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 25: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Kindergartens 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000167** -0.000000275* -0.00000154*** 
-
0.00000313*** 
-
0.00000171*** 
 (-3.03) (-2.27) (-9.70) (-19.14) (-5.82) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
1672.6*** 1153.2*** 1957.9*** 2204.4*** 2411.1*** 
 (41.33) (50.76) (65.75) (72.10) (43.79) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-1.857 0.318 3.293 1.239 -8.795 
 (-1.05) (0.16) (1.27) (0.47) (-1.83) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-0.723*** -0.0441 -0.755** -0.851** -1.352** 
 (-4.92) (-0.21) (-2.76) (-3.03) (-2.68) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
-0.989*** -0.313** -0.794*** -0.789*** -0.515 
 (-8.81) (-2.67) (-5.17) (-5.01) (-1.81) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.439* 1.295*** 0.883*** -0.251 0.478 
 (2.32) (6.64) (3.46) (-0.95) (1.01) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
11.82*** 20.32*** 17.99*** 10.77*** 6.185*** 
 (6.58) (29.38) (19.84) (11.57) (3.69) 
      
Constant 773.9*** 36.65 387.0*** 1242.1*** 2588.5*** 
 (17.39) (1.75) (14.10) (44.09) (51.03) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.222 0.151 0.158 0.133 0.104 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 26: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Fire Stations 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000110** -0.00000194*** 
-
0.00000214*** 
-
0.00000250*** -0.000000146 
 (-2.58) (-33.19) (-30.24) (-29.37) (-0.80) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
33.10 159.4*** 177.2*** -104.3*** -1375.6*** 
 (1.04) (14.54) (13.35) (-6.54) (-40.04) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-11.11*** -0.264 -2.908* -6.821*** -15.93*** 
 (-5.47) (-0.28) (-2.52) (-4.91) (-5.32) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
1.666*** 0.370*** 0.710*** 2.415*** 3.058*** 
 (5.92) (3.68) (5.83) (16.52) (9.70) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
3.274*** 1.054*** 2.578*** 4.419*** 7.182*** 
 (25.72) (18.66) (37.71) (53.82) (40.57) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.00118 -0.0865 -0.186 0.0417 0.908** 
 (0.01) (-0.92) (-1.63) (0.31) (3.08) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
1.402*** 2.138*** 4.177*** 7.432*** -0.459 
 (3.44) (6.40) (10.34) (15.32) (-0.44) 
      
Constant 1097.1*** 605.3*** 916.4*** 1561.9*** 3217.8*** 
 (30.74) (59.93) (74.96) (106.39) (101.66) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.089 0.0354 0.027 0.042 0.226 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 27: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Police Stations 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-
0.000000800** 
-
0.00000132*** 
-
0.00000178*** 
-
0.00000164*** -0.000000416 
 (-2.65) (-22.63) (-28.52) (-22.11) (-1.29) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
206.0*** 197.3*** 176.3*** 128.0*** 222.0*** 
 (9.04) (18.02) (15.08) (9.19) (3.68) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-5.606*** 0.344 -0.311 -3.602** -9.321 
 (-4.44) (0.36) (-0.31) (-2.97) (-1.77) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-0.277 -0.665*** -0.912*** -0.499*** 0.957 
 (-1.59) (-6.62) (-8.50) (-3.90) (1.73) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
1.282*** 0.657*** 1.053*** 1.603*** 1.976*** 
 (17.84) (11.64) (17.48) (22.34) (6.35) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
0.739*** 0.441*** 0.541*** 0.794*** 1.760*** 
 (7.32) (4.69) (5.40) (6.64) (3.40) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
3.957*** 4.490*** 3.707*** 4.418*** 10.78*** 
 (5.83) (13.46) (10.41) (10.42) (5.87) 
      
Constant 831.2*** 397.5*** 776.3*** 1212.8*** 2197.1*** 
 (33.12) (39.39) (72.07) (94.51) (39.52) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.038 0.043 0.028 0.019 0.015 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 28: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates for Culture Equipment 
 OLS Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) Q(.95) 
Mean of 
Housing Price 
by Block 
-0.00000197* -0.000000969*** 
-
0.00000213*** -0.000000197 -0.000000677 
 (-2.11) (-8.35) (-10.60) (-0.57) (-0.31) 
      
Share of 
exempted 
housing from 
property taxes 
by block 
-1881.0*** -139.1*** -882.9*** -1081.8*** -14762.7*** 
 (-15.71) (-6.41) (-23.47) (-16.56) (-36.12) 
      
Number of 
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
-38.22*** -11.52*** -26.22*** -12.97* -98.24** 
 (-4.67) (-6.09) (-8.00) (-2.28) (-2.76) 
      
Number of 
medium-
superior quality 
housing by 
block 
15.89*** 6.909*** 14.60*** 29.63*** 21.51*** 
 (8.46) (34.68) (42.32) (49.44) (5.74) 
      
Number of 
medium quality 
housing by 
block 
24.15*** 3.014*** 11.01*** 35.47*** 66.31*** 
 (24.78) (26.93) (56.80) (105.36) (31.48) 
      
Number of 
medium-low 
quality housing 
by block 
-2.569*** 0.846*** 0.222 -0.365 -0.441 
 (-4.82) (4.54) (0.69) (-0.65) (-0.13) 
      
Number of low 
quality housing 
by block 
7.940*** 16.22*** 23.78*** 22.00*** 52.82*** 
 (5.07) (24.52) (20.76) (11.06) (4.24) 
      
Constant 3852.2*** 650.6*** 2042.4*** 3358.2*** 20208.5*** 
 (30.99) (32.52) (58.92) (55.79) (53.66) 
Observations 44170 44170 44170 44170 44170 
R2 0.170 0.012 0.038 0.094 0.270 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Chapter 3 
 
Capitalization of urban amenities into housing prices. Estimating the spatial 
relationships between urban amenities and property values for the 
Metropolitan Area of Santiago, Chile. 
 
Yasna Cortés28 
Victor Iturra29 
 
Abstract 
Urban amenities have received a great attention by the scientific literature because 
their spatial distribution can explain why some cities are more attractive than others. 
On the other hand, this stylized fact has important consequences on regional 
economic growth, urban population, as well as, labor and housing markets. In this 
paper, we explore the relationship between housing prices and urban amenities 
through a hedonic pricing model and 27 urban amenities for the main Chilean urban 
agglomeration, the Metropolitan Region of Santiago (MR). By doing so, we 
recognize that the capitalization of urban amenities into housing prices is spatially 
heterogeneous distributed and then, we study this relationship by using 
geographically weighted regression (GWR). Main results suggest that urban 
amenities play an important role in determining housing prices with a significant 
spatial heterogeneity on their capitalizations. However, clear differences between 
public and private local services are found. Particularly, private services such as 
schools, shopping centers, healthcare centers or restaurants have positive 
capitalizations on housing prices. By the contrary public schools, public hospitals 
or public kindergartens have negative valuations in housing prices, evidencing that 
living closer to these services is not advantageous for residents. Possible 
explanations for these results can be related to several administrative and financial 
restrictions that local governments face providing local public services. Finally, a 
                                               
28 PhD. Candidate in Economics. University of Verona, Italy. 
29 Researcher. Catholic University of the North, Antofagasta, Chile. Ph.D. in Agricultural, 
Environment and Development Economics, The Ohio State University, USA. 
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correct land management is required for an optimal use of these amenities, 
especially in the poorest communities with higher demands for local public 
services.  
 
Key words: Urban amenities, hedonic models, housing values, local governments.  
 
JEL-CODES: H42, R23 
 
1. Introduction 
The reasons why some cities are more attractive than others have been extensively 
documented by urban economists and geographers (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 
2006) (Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2000). Traditionally, internal and external 
economies of scale in the production process are used to explain why cities differ 
in terms of their size and economic structure (Garretsen & Marlet, 2017). However, 
more recent empirical studies in urban economics suggest that the reasons behind 
the attractiveness of cities go beyond the agglomeration benefits and intra-industry 
spillovers. Urban amenities, defined as location-specific goods and services that 
make some locations more attractive, are also relevant to explain why some cities 
attract more people and businesses than others (Nilsson, 2014). In this vein, when 
explaining urban growth and local development patterns, a large empirical body of 
research emphasizes that the spatial distribution of amenities matters, because they 
might stimulate regional economic growth, urban population, employment and the 
creative class (Li, Wei, Yu, & Tian, 2016). Recognizing that amenities affect 
household migration decisions is equivalent to state that both labor and housing 
markets depend on such people movements, which configures the stylized fact that 
wages and housing prices are heterogeneous across cities (Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 
2000) (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2006) 
 
Since housing is a composite good, its final price is not only determined by its 
structural characteristics, but also, by its neighborhood attributes such as the 
accessibility to transportation, labor markets, fire stations, local public services, 
cultural structure and other amenities (Li, Wei, Yu, & Tian, 2016). In this context, 
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a more attractive city due to its high-quality amenities implies an increased demand 
for housing, that is, amenities are capitalized into housing values (Roback, 1982, 
1988). Consequently, individuals that consider site characteristics when making 
their location decisions might be willing to pay higher housing values to live in 
more attractive environments. This reasoning is also supported by the public choice 
theory which suggests that individuals are willing to pay more for living in 
communities with high-quality local public services provided by local governments 
(Tiebout, 1956). Accordingly, high-quality services can act as attracting forces of 
people willing to pay higher housing prices, which creates a virtuous circle for local 
governments by increasing their revenues to provide better services  (Li H. , Wang, 
Shi, Deng, & Wang, 2017).  
 
The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between urban amenities and 
housing prices in the main Chilean urban agglomeration, the Metropolitan Region 
of Santiago (MR). The MR is a conurbation that contains 37 communes and 
concentrates the most important public institutions, businesses, culture structure, 
and financial institutions. The case is selected mainly for two reasons. First, the MR 
agglomerates more than 40 percent of the Chilean population, becoming in the 
densest region of the country (National Institute of Statistics, 2017). Moreover, the 
MR concentrates more than 50 percent of high-skilled workers (Aroca & Atienza, 
2011) (SUBDERE, 2012). Second, although it is well known the power that MR 
exerts over other regions to attract more talented people and firms, this scenario 
contrasts with marked differences in living standard measures within the MR. 
According to the results of the Quality Life Scores, only 20.5 percent of inhabitants 
are living in communities that provide high-quality amenities, meanwhile 79.5 of 
the MR population located in places that offer medium and lower quality amenities 
(Instituto de Estudios Urbanos y Territoriales, 2016). These characteristics make 
the MR an interesting scenario to analyze how a heterogeneous set of urban 
amenities are capitalized into housing prices.  
 
To meet our objective, we recognize that the capitalization of urban amenities into 
housing prices is likely to be spatially heterogeneous across the MR. This is because 
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household location decisions, among other things, depends on their preferences to 
amenities, which in turn are strongly conditioned by their personal traits such as 
age, schooling, and marital status. For instance, while married people with children 
would locate in a commune because it offers a high variety of restaurants and 
recreational activities, meanwhile single individuals might prefer to be located near 
shopping centers. Consequently, an average estimated parameter will hide a 
potential heterogeneity between housing prices and the above-mentioned amenities. 
In doing so, this paper contributes to the growing literature in at least two aspects. 
First, a better understanding of the housing market is achieved by taking into 
account its local-spatial character. Second, this paper helps to interpret correctly the 
behavior of housing markets and urban amenities into developing country contexts. 
This is critical because public policies, urban regulations, institutional frameworks 
as well as urban services in developing countries differ from those in developed 
economies, and consequently, we contribute by enlarging the empirical evidence 
that provides valuable elements to both policymakers and scholars about the 
behavior of housing markets in less developed economies characterized by a higher 
urban primacy.  
 
We use the geographically weighted regression (GWR) (Fotheringhan, Brunsdon, 
& Charlton, 2002) to test the relationship between average housing values by block 
in the MR and 27 urban amenities provided by official data sources and 
geographical information systems (GIS). Among our main findings, we observe 
that urban amenities play an important role in determining housing prices. 
Moreover, we confirm that the capitalization of urban amenities on housing prices 
is spatially heterogeneous across the MR. However, modern amenities show mixed 
results and make a clear distinction between public and private services. In this 
sense, private services have positive capitalizations into housing prices, meanwhile, 
public services have a negative valuation in housing prices. A possible explanation 
for these results can be found on the several administrative and financial restrictions 
that local governments face for providing local public services. Consequently, the 
spatial distribution of local public services could not be sufficient to satisfy all 
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resident’s demand, as well as, a possible mismatch between local public supply and 
residential needs could be found in the MR context.   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the existing 
literature and highlights the key elements to consider into the analysis. The third 
section devotes to explain the case of study and the fundamentals of GWR 
methodology. The four section discusses the main results along with their policy 
implications. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
2. Framework 
Urban amenities are receiving a growing interest in the scientific research due to its 
important role in urban growth and urban developing patterns. A large empirical 
literature suggests that urban amenities can also help to explain why some cities are 
more attractive for workers and firms (Garretsen & Marlet, 2017). Urban amenities 
are defined as location-specific goods and services that make cities more attractive 
and are associated with positive externalities from agglomeration and intra-industry 
spillovers (Nilsson, 2014). In this way, the recognition of urban amenities as critical 
factors on urban development has started to change the conventional definition of 
cities. Traditionally, cities have been viewed as production centers and their growth 
is associated with agglomeration effects where internal and external economies of 
scale have a relevant participation in explaining why cities differ. An extensive 
body of literature starting by the seminal work proposed by Henderson (1974) 
explained how the exploitation of different economies of scale and production 
specialization in different traded goods can determine the city size and economic 
growth. Due to the recognition of the important role of amenities in urban growth, 
cities now can be viewed as consumer cities and their attractiveness depends also 
on urban amenities influencing directly on location decisions, lifestyle choices or 
quality of life (Roback, 1982) (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2006) (Rappaport, 2008). 
Indeed, Roback (1988) and extending her previous work, studied the influence of 
local-specific amenities on wages and housing prices using the hedonic price model 
proposed by Rosen (1974). Main results suggest that wage differentials are 
produced by differences in amenities across regions which are exacerbated by the 
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inclusion of the cost of living. On the other hand, Gottlieb (1995) went far beyond 
by arguing that amenities also have impacts on the location decisions of firms and 
then, amenities not only attract people, also can attract firms given the concentration 
of workforce. Since these seminal studies, other empirical works explore different 
arguments to conclude that the spatial distribution of amenities affects urban 
growth, regional development, as well as, housing and labor markets. 
 
Particularly, numerous papers have paid special attention to effects of urban 
amenities on housing markets. This crucial market is directly affected by urban 
growth, especially because the elasticity of housing supply could determine how 
productivity increments may create bigger cities or increment wages and housing 
prices (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2006). The impact of urban amenities on housing 
prices has been extensively studied using the hedonic pricing model proposed by 
Rosen (1974) in which utility of composite goods, like housing, are valued 
according to their attributes or characteristics. First studies demonstrated how 
housing values are determined by structural characteristics of houses such as 
materials, age, surface, property’s ownership, number of bedrooms and others. 
Over time, numerous studies have demonstrated how housing prices also are 
affected by the characteristics of neighborhoods. Under this logic, individuals could 
be willing to pay more for living in locations that provide better amenities around 
houses. If these amenities exist, residents can enjoy a favorable trade-off between 
amenities and commuting costs (Li, Wei, Yu, & Tian, 2016). According to 
empirical studies, urban amenities can be categorized into three different groups: 
natural, historical and modern amenities (Brueckner, Thisse, & Zenou, 1999). 
Natural amenities are referred to topological and climate characteristics of the area 
where a house is located. This set of amenities includes exogenous variables such 
as temperature, precipitation, proximity to rivers, cultivated landscapes, water 
resources, open spaces and other elements. Moreover, this group can contain dis-
amenities that can affect inversely housing prices such as high levels of pollution 
or nuisance. Studies about the effect of natural amenities on housing prices show 
mixed evidence about the effect of these characteristics on housing prices. For 
instance, Spacescape (2011) show for Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen that access 
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to open spaces is highly valued by residents. In addition, access to forest or water 
areas also has a positive effect on the capitalization of housing prices (Nilsson, 
2014) (Shultz & King, 2001) (Yoo & Wagner, 2016). In fact, studies suggest that 
forests have a positive effect on the willingness to pay of residents. However, their 
negative valuations were associated with the management of that area (Tyrväinen, 
2001). With respect to air quality, studies performed for Jakarta, Indonesia and 
many cities on the United States reported a negative relationship between housing 
prices and pollution, and consequently negative elasticities (Brasington & Hite) 
(Kim, Phipps, & Anselin, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, historical amenities are composed of architectural amenities 
such as monuments, cultural infrastructure, parks or any other well-preserved 
building past centuries. Brueckner et Al. (1999) proved that historical amenities 
played an important role in attractiveness differences across European Cities. As a 
result, centers have a strong advantage in comparison with outer areas due to their 
better access to historical (exogenous) amenities where their valuations increase 
with household’s incomes. One key to understanding this result is provided by 
government investments in city-center infrastructure which is used to maintain 
historical amenities given their rapid depreciation. Thus, a signal to understand why 
high-income individuals seek to relocate outside of cities is because historical 
amenities could be suffering maintenance lacks (Brueckner, Thisse, & Zenou, 
1999). Finally, modern amenities are referred to man-constructed amenities like 
local public services such as schools, transportation, fire and police stations, 
hospitals and so on. Moreover, private urban amenities also can be included in the 
list: private schools and hospitals, shopping centers, banks, restaurants, and others. 
In general, these urban amenities are endogenous because partially can reflect the 
current economic state of cities and these are associated with high-income areas. 
Mainly, empirical research in modern amenities has been concentrated on 
determining the impact of public schools and transportation on location decisions. 
For instance, studies have found a significant positive relationship between public 
school quality and housing prices. Providing a comprehensive survey, Nguyen-
Hoang and Yinger (2011) determined that housing values rise by 1-4 percent for a 
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one-standard deviation increase in student test scores. Also, other results evidence 
that school-capitalization also can help to understand residential sorting by 
permitting that individuals locate across jurisdictions given their willingness to pay 
for school quality. On the other hand, accessibility to transportation also has a 
positive valuation on housing prices because constitutes a key factor for accessing 
to labor markets, education infrastructure, etc. Mulley et Al (2016) showed for 
Brisbane, Australia that being closer to Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) increases housing 
prices by about 0.14 percent for every hundred meters. However, this urban amenity 
could be associated with negative effects on quality of life due to its high 
concentration of pollution or noise associated with the delivery of this service.  
 
Other Important challenges that empirical studies on urban amenities should face 
are associated with the inherent spatial character that housing markets exhibit. This 
feature violates the assumption that housing prices are spatially independent. 
Previous studies found that housing markets can be affected by two problems: 
spatial autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Housing prices are spatially auto-
correlated because are affected by land regulations and other building restrictions 
and therefore, housing units can share similar structural characteristics. Moreover, 
the inclusion of urban amenities also contributes to increasing spatial 
autocorrelation because houses are sharing location-amenities and neighborhood 
effects also can be similar into communities (Basu & Thomas G., 1998) (Dubin, 
1992). On the other hand, housing prices could be heterogeneously distributed 
across space. The most relevant consequence associated to this issue is related with 
the surge of multiple submarkets across cities (Basu & Thomas G., 1998) and 
therefore, differences in neighborhood characteristics across communities could 
generate different valuations of urban amenities. In this sense, demand for houses 
may impact on the spatial distribution of urban amenities and their associated 
premium could be not homogeneous across space.  Not to consider these issues can 
lead inefficient coefficients on the estimates of hedonic pricing models. In this 
paper, we address these problems by using spatial econometric methods which are 
presented in the next section.   
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3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1. Case of Study and Data 
The Metropolitan Area of Santiago (MR) is the main Chilean agglomeration. The 
MR is a conurbation of 37 communes which concentrates more than 40 percent of 
the Chilean population and the most important public institutions, businesses, 
culture structure, and financial institutions are located there. These characteristics 
make the MR in an attractive pole for Chilean population for accessing to better 
services. For instance, the MR concentrates more than 50 percent of high-skilled 
workers (Aroca & Atienza, 2011) (SUBDERE, 2012). Moreover, 15 of the best 
universities are located on the MR and this situation motivates to talented students 
to move to the MR to access to universities with more prestige and international 
recognition. As a result, 47 percent of Chilean students are enrolled in universities 
of the MR (National Education Council, 2017). However, although it is well known 
the power that MR exerts over other regions to attract more people and firms, this 
scenario contrast with disparities in living standards that still persist within the MR. 
Particularly, only 8 communes located in the MR have indices of quality of life 
higher than the national average. This implies that 20.5 percent of inhabitants are 
living in communities that provide high-quality amenities. By contrast, 79.5 percent 
of the population are living in communities with medium and lower quality 
amenities (Instituto de Estudios Urbanos y Territoriales, 2016). These results 
determine that 64.6 percent of inhabitants reside in places with low mobility and 
connectivity, as well as, 43.6 percent of inhabitants live in communities with low 
housing quality. This scenario makes the MR in an interesting case to explore how 
a heterogeneous set of urban amenities are capitalized into housing prices.  
 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between housing prices and urban 
amenities using property fiscal values for the year 2017. This data was obtained 
from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (SII; Servicio de Impuestos Internos). 
These values are computed by considering some structural characteristics of houses 
such as property land, build area, construction materials, age and use. In addition, 
this information is used to compute the territorial tax as a percentage of property 
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fiscal value. In absence of home sales data, we use property fiscal values as a proxy 
for housing prices. From this dataset, we extract the mean of property values by 
block which is the finer geographical scale georeferenced by SII. Once all 
information is processed, a dataset with housing prices and structural characteristics 
such as quality, age, surface and the proportion of exempted housing from local 
taxes was obtained for 43,843 blocks of all MR. Also, we include on this dataset 
the location of each block on the space whose is crucial to obtain neighborhood 
characteristics of houses. More details about these variables are shown in table 29.  
 
On the other hand, a dataset of urban amenities was created from different official 
sources that provide georeferenced data of services delivered by local governments 
and privates. Also, the data was complemented with information obtained from 
open sources such as Open Street Maps (OSM) and Geographically Information 
Systems (GIS). The set of urban amenities is shown in table 30 and it is composed 
of natural amenities (Nuisance), historical amenities such as monuments, cultural 
equipment, parks and typical areas; and modern amenities such as schools (public, 
semi-private and private), transportation (bus stops and subway stations), public 
kindergartens, healthcare centers (public and private), universities and bicycle 
circuits. On the other hand, a set of crucial private services are included in this 
typical set. We consider the proximity to shopping centers, pharmacies, fast food 
restaurants, restaurants and banks have a positive valuation for residents and 
eventually can increase housing values. Finally, a set of indicators such as 
accidents, nuisance, housing camps and crime (housing burglary) are included like 
dis-amenities. These variables represent the regular congestion problems that 
biggest cities face every day. Except for housing camps, dis-amenities variables 
were constructed using spatial interpolation techniques by identifying information 
from monitoring stations about the number of accidents, number of housing 
burglary and nuisance levels located into the MR. Using inverse distance weighting 
method of interpolation, the average level of these dis-amenities is assigned to each 
spatial unit.  
 
3.2. Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) 
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With the purpose of studying the relationship between housing prices and attributes, 
usually, global statistics are performed. For example, hedonic pricing models 
historically have been estimated via Ordinary Least Square (OLS), however, this 
method omits an important detail about the behavior of housing markets: housing 
prices are spatially auto-correlated. As Basu & Thomas G. (1998) explain, housing 
prices are spatially auto-correlated mainly for two reasons. First, neighborhoods 
have similar structure characteristics because these tend to be developed at the same 
period of time. Second, neighborhoods are sharing amenities due to their location, 
and then individuals are closer to the same schools, hospitals, green areas, etc. 
Considering this scenario, analyses performed via OLS present two disadvantages 
that reduce the possibilities of obtaining accurate parameters when we suspect that 
relationships between housing prices and amenities vary over space. On one hand, 
if errors are spatially auto-correlated, parameters are inefficient and will produce 
incorrect intervals for estimated parameters. On the other hand, global statistics 
such as OLS hides important characteristics about the local behavior of parameters, 
assuming that average values are equal in every place of the study region 
(Fotheringhan, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002). In particular, average values assume 
the capitalization of amenities on housing prices does not present differentials 
across the space. The last statement is crucial to understand that OLS under spatial 
autocorrelation is not adequate to represent local variations and therefore, the 
production of local statistics can generate a better representation of housing markets 
providing much more information of spatial relationships, and finally, a better 
understanding of the capitalization of amenities into housing prices. 
 
An explicit local modeling approach that permits that parameters vary over the 
space is Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR). This method extends OLS 
regression by allowing that parameters vary locally rather globally. Under GWR, 
the local parameters can be modeled as, 
 !" = $%('", )") +,$-('", )")."- + /"-  
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Where ('", )") denotes the coordinates of the ith point in the space, meanwhile $-('", )") is the realization of the continuous function $-(', )) in every point 0. In 
this setup, the model allows that observations near to location 0 have more influence 
in the estimation of $-('", )") rather than data located farther from 0 (Bitter, 
Mulligan, & Dall' erba, 2007). In doing so, GWR weights an observation according 
to its proximity to location 0 and then, observations closer to location 0 are weighted 
more than other data observations located in other farther places. In matrix notation, 
parameters of the GWR model are computed such as,  
 12(34,54) = (678('", )")6)9:678('", )"); 
 
where 8('", )") is a spatial weighting matrix. This matrix denotes an < by < matrix 
that on the off-diagonal elements are zero meanwhile diagonal elements denote the 
geographical weighting of each < observation for regression point 0. In contrast to 
weighted least square regression, GWR weights vary according to the location of 
point 0 rather than a constant weighted matrix by allowing that points in closer 
proximity have more weight into the computation of model parameters for location 0 (Fotheringhan, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002).  The spatial weighted matrix 8('", )") that captures the relationship between regression points and data points 
is represented by a Gaussian function such as: 
 8('", )") = exp @−12DE"FG HIJ 
 
where E"F is the Euclidean distance between points 0	and L, and G is the spatial 
bandwidth. The choice of G is crucial for GWR’s results for two reasons. First, as a 
weighting procedure that specifies a wide bandwidth and allows a minimal distance 
decay can produce results like a global model. Second, if the bandwidth selected is 
narrow only near points will be considered, which will produce high variances in 
the estimators (Bitter, Mulligan, & Dall' erba, 2007).  In this approach, we use 
adaptive spatial kernel because permits that the bandwidth varies according to the 
density of housing prices by assuming that some data points are sparsely distributed 
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across space. Moreover, this procedure ensures that an equal number of 
observations will receive a non-zero weighting at all regression points. Finally, the 
cross-validation approach is selected to optimize the bandwidth selection.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
4.1. Estimation Strategy 
The computation of spatial econometric models is a high-demand computational 
task. For instance, invert a W matrix of 43,843 by 43,843 dimension is not 
supported by many operation systems or/and computational hardware. In this paper, 
we overcome this problem by designing a methodology strategy that permits to 
capture the spatial variability of housing prices without losing our objective. 
Particularly, we split the analysis into two stages. In the first stage, we compute the 
hedonic pricing model via OLS, where the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the mean of housing prices by block. In this stage, explanatory 
variables are the structural characteristics of houses whose are shown in table 29. 
Assuming the existence of spatial autocorrelation in residuals, we include fixed 
effects by census districts into a second regression which have the purpose of 
capturing all the spatial variability that housing prices exhibit. A census district is 
a geographic unit greater than a block that divides one commune for census 
purposes. Here, we decrease dramatically the computational demand by reducing 
our sample from 43,843 blocks to 1,651 census districts. In this case, the system 
perfectly can invert a W matrix of 1,651 by 1,651, as well as fixed effects can 
summarize all the spatial autocorrelation contained in housing prices by block. In 
the second stage, fixed effect coefficients by census district are used in the hedonic 
housing model as, 
 
!" = $%('", )") +,$-('", )")."- + /"IM-N:  
 
 where !" is the fixed effect parameter by census district computed in the first stage, 
and ."- represents the matrix of urban-amenities variables measured at the census 
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district level. Summary statistics of variables used at first and second stage are 
displayed on tables 31 and 32, respectively.  
 
 
4.2. Results  
The results of the global model performed at stage 1 are depicted in table 33. Both 
models show the hedonic pricing model considering only structural characteristics 
of houses by block. Model 1 represents the OLS regression without fixed effects 
meanwhile, model 2 shows coefficients for structural characteristics plus fixed 
effects by census district. All variables are significant at 1 percent and show the 
expected sign in both models. Global model 1 has a reasonable adjust by explaining 
76 percent of the variability of housing prices at MR, with a standard error of 0.42. 
However, the inclusion of fixed effects by census district increases notably the 
explanation power of model 1 by capturing 93 percent of the housing price 
variability. Moreover, all fixed effects by census districts are significant at 5 percent 
level. As housing prices are apparently spatially auto-correlated, residuals of both 
models are mapped and tested using Moran’s Index to determine the existence of 
spatial clustering of errors. Results are presented in figures 17 and 18, respectively. 
Results for model 1 confirm the presence of spatial autocorrelation:  residuals are 
apparently clustered in the space, as well as Moran’s index exceeds from 0.6. The 
inclusion of fixed effects by census district reduces largely the spatial 
autocorrelation of model 1 by about 70 percent and reflects that fixed effects are 
capturing the spatial autocorrelation of model 1.  Figure 19 shows the spatial 
distribution of housing prices by block, as well as the spatial distribution of fixed 
effects by census district. 
 
The results of stage 2 are depicted in table 34. In this stage, the dependent variable 
is the fixed effects by census district computed in stage 1 meanwhile, explanatory 
variables are urban-amenities. The first column of table 34 presents the average 
marginal effects using OLS which represents the traditional estimation of hedonic 
pricing models. The other columns display the same specification using GWR 
where estimates are described by the median, minimum and maximum values, as 
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well as their interquartile range. In comparison with the previous model, GWR 
specification shows a notable improvement in the explanatory power of the model, 
with a R-Square of over 88 percent. This result demonstrates that apparently 
housing prices are influenced by spatial effects localized inside the MR and 
consequently, geographical-based submarkets could emerge. The last column of 
table  shows the p-values from randomization test to check for the significant spatial 
variability of GWR’s coefficients. In this sense, we can determine that at least 20 
urban amenities are significant at the 0.05 level. This result evidences that 
capitalization of these urban amenities on housing prices is not homogeneous and 
varies spatially across the MR. The exceptions are found on urban amenities such 
as public schools, parks of 5750 meters or more, bus stops, pharmacies, fire stations 
and accidents by census districts. In these cases, results could affirm that marginal 
prices are constant across the MR, but also can reflect that census districts are not 
the most suitable administrative level to reflect the relationship between these 
urban-amenities and housing prices. At least for cases such as public schools, parks 
of 5750 meters or more, and bus stops their coefficients of the global model are 
significant at 0.01 level. Finally, we cannot determine that these urban amenities do 
not have any influence on housing prices, neither the absence of spatial variability. 
 
With respect to significant urban amenities, it is possible to observe clear 
differences between natural, historical and modern amenities. The set of natural 
amenities that includes the mean of nuisance by census districts – a dis-amenity – 
has a positive and significant effect on housing prices. A possible explanation for 
this counterintuitive result is related to the location of expensive houses in the MR. 
This kind of housing is found in northeast and central areas, closer to the core of 
the MR where Santiago – the country’s capital – is located. As this core community 
concentrates a relevant number of public bodies, businesses, financial institutions, 
and other important services, generally, receives many commuters from their 
residences to place of works. Naturally, this process could generate congestion 
problems such as high levels of noise that, apparently, are not able to reduce 
housing prices. On the other hand, historical amenities such as monuments, and 
typical areas have a negative and significant effect on housing prices. 
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Consequently, houses located close to these amenities are positively capitalized on 
housing prices as theory predicts. However, we do not find the same effect for 
parks. An explanation is related to structural characteristics of parks, and especially, 
with their sizes. In this sense, individuals might be indifferent to small parks closer 
to their homes and the presence of this urban-amenity is not crucial in their location 
decisions. However, if parks are larger, households could positively valorize them 
on housing prices. Partially, this idea can be confirmed by the proximity of parks 
of 5750 meters or more, whose coefficient has the expected sign and a significant 
effect on housing prices in the global hedonic regression.  
 
The set of modern amenities that includes schools, kindergartens, universities, 
healthcare centers, transportation, bicycle lines, shopping centers, pharmacies, 
restaurants, banks, fire and police stations, and housing camps shows mixed 
evidence about its influence on housing prices. In this case, we should do a clear 
distinction between public and private services. For instance, proximity to private 
or semi-private schools has a negative and significant effect on housing prices. 
However, proximity to public kindergartens or public healthcare centers has not a 
positive capitalization on housing prices. Therefore, living closer to these key 
services might not be advantageous for residents. Similar results are found for 
universities, bicycle circuits, bus stops and police stations that apparently have 
negative capitalizations on housing prices. On the contrary, proximity to private 
services such as healthcare centers, shopping centers, restaurants, and banks have 
negative and significant effects on housing prices. In this scenario, we can conclude 
that private services are more valued than public services and individuals could be 
willing to pay more for living in places with a large presence of private services. 
But also, these results can reflect the restrictions that local governments face to 
create more local public services and then, are not able to respond to community’s 
demands. These implications are counterintuitive in comparison to other empirical 
evidence for developed countries. Finally, dis-amenities such as housing burglary 
or proximity to housing camps have a negative influence on housing prices as we 
expected.  
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An important advantage of GWR is that coefficients can be easily mapped and 
visualized. Figure 4 shows the spatial patterns of parameters for urban-amenities 
which confirm previous results. For natural amenities as nuisance, positive 
coefficients are located closer to central areas of MR confirming the previous 
argument to justify its counterintuitive behavior. In addition, historical amenities 
such as monuments have a positive capitalization on houses located in the central 
part of the MR and cultural equipment has positive valuations concentrated in the 
northeast of the MR. Both places coincide with the location of higher housing prices 
determining that these services are more appreciated by high-income groups. 
Interesting results are found for modern amenities, especially, for the distinction 
between public and private services. For instance, private and semi-private schools 
have positive valuations on housing prices mainly in the south part of the MR where 
lower housing prices are concentrated. In fact, it is the coefficient behavior that we 
expect for public schools or public kindergartens whose negative valuations are 
found in almost all the entire MR. An exception to this behavior is found in public 
schools that present positive housing valuations in central and northwest areas of 
MR. An explanation for this spatial distribution is because at the center are located 
public schools with better SAT results and therefore, public schools can have a 
positive valuation on housing prices. However, this special distribution is not 
reproduced in other communities. Finally, remarkable results are found for private 
services such as shopping centers and banks with positive capitalizations in higher 
and lower housing prices, respectively. In this sense, private services are highly 
valued by residents and consequently, these urban amenities can play a crucial role 
in location decisions of residents for living in certain places than others. Apparently, 
the public equipment is not an important variable for residents and put a lower 
weighting in their valuations motivated by quality’s perceptions or by the low 
accessibility levels to these services. 
 
5. Conclusions 
A large empirical research supports that the spatial distribution of urban amenities 
matters for urban growth and local development patterns due to its influence on 
migration decisions exerted by households. As a consequence, wages and housing 
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prices are heterogeneous across cities because labor and housing markets are 
determined by such movements. In this paper, we explore the relationship between 
urban amenities and housing prices for the Metropolitan Area of Santiago (MR), 
Chile. By doing so, we recognize that the capitalization of urban amenities into 
housing prices is not constant across the MR and therefore, we use a geographically 
weighted regression (GWR) to explore this heterogeneity and information of 27 
urban amenities provided by official data sources and Geographically Information 
System (GIS).  
 
Main results suggest that urban amenities play an important role in determining 
housing prices as previous studies found. Individuals are not only interested in 
structural characteristics of houses, but also neighborhood effects are driving 
households’ location decisions. Moreover, GWR’s results confirm a significant 
spatial heterogeneity on the capitalization of urban amenities in housing prices. 
However, counterintuitive evidence is found in comparison with studies performed 
for developed countries. For instance, modern amenities show mixed results about 
their capitalizations on housing prices with a clear distinction between public and 
private services. In this case, proximity to local public services such as schools, 
kindergartens or healthcare centers has a negative and significant capitalization on 
housing prices. As a result, living closer to these key services apparently is not 
advantageous for residents. By contrast, private services such as schools, healthcare 
centers, shopping centers, restaurants, and banks have positive and significant 
valuations on housing prices. This means that individuals are willing to pay more 
for living in places with a large presence of these services and could be determinants 
on location decisions rather than public equipment which have not important 
weighting in resident’s valuations.  
 
These findings have a strong influence on public policy implementations, especially 
at local level. Results could reflect the restrictions that local governments have for 
providing local public services. On one hand, despite that local governments are the 
main providers of local services, their supply is determined by central government 
decision’s. On the other hand, local government also face several financial 
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restrictions to provide local public services. Therefore, the supply of services could 
be not sufficient to cover all resident’s demand. Also, the spatial distribution of 
local public services could be inefficient to match correctly the supply of local 
public services with its respective demand. In this sense, a correct land management 
is required for an optimal use of these amenities especially in poorer communities 
whose are facing a high demand for local public services. A local government is 
one of the nearest institutions to communities and easily can identify community 
needs due to this proximity, however, administrative and financial restrictions could 
undermine this comparative advantage. By contrast, developers with fewer 
restrictions to provide private services can generate efficiently more and better 
services by detecting the willingness to pay of residents. Thus, an important 
challenge for local governments consists in improving the provision of local public 
services in terms of quantity and quality to make their communities more attractive 
to live. Finally, resident’s perceptions about quality of public and private services 
also can be crucial determinants in location decisions. Further research can help to 
detect the reasons why local public services have lower valuations on housing 
prices, as well as how urban amenities could be used efficiently to increment 
housing prices. 
  
 
157 
Figure 17: Residuals Stage 1 
Model 1: Without Fixed Effects Model 2: With Fixed Effects 
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Figure 18: Moran's Test Residuals Stage 1 
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Figure 19: Spatial distribution of housing prices and fixed effects by census districts 
Housing Prices Fixed Effects by census districts 
 
 
 
  
  
 
160 
Figure 20: Spatial coefficient patterns of GWR by census districts 
  
Proximity to Private Schools Proximity to Semi-Private Schools 
 
 
Proximity to Public Schools Proximity to Kindergartens 
  
 
161 
  
Proximity to Universities Proximity to Culture Equipment 
  
Proximity to Monuments Proximity to Typical Areas 
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Proximity to Private Healthcare centers Proximity to Public Healthcare centers 
 
 
 
Proximity to Parks Proximity to Parks over 5750 meters 
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Proximity to Bus stops Proximity to Subways 
  
Proximity to Bicycle lines Proximity to Shopping Centers 
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Proximity to Pharmacies Proximity to Fast food Restaurants 
  
Proximity to Restaurants Proximity to Banks 
  
 
165 
  
Proximity to Fire Stations Proximity to Police Stations 
  
Proximity to CBD Mean of Accidents by Census District 
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Mean of Nuisance by Census District Mean of Housing Burglary by Census District 
 
 
Proximity to Housing Camps  
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Table 29: Housing Attributes Variables 
Variable Definition 
Housing Values Average of property values by block  
Quality Housing Number of housing by block with: 
 
• Superior quality 
• medium-superior quality 
• medium quality  
• medium-low quality 
• low quality.  
 
This classification is provided by SII. 
Housing Size Average of housing size by block. This measure only considers 
the constructed area. 
Housing Age Average of housing age by block. 
Exempted housing from taxes Proportion of housing that are exempted from housing taxation. 
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Table 30: Urban Amenities 
Amenity Measurement Source 
Schools (Public, 
Semi-Private, 
Private) 
Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest school. 
Ministry of Education (2017). 
Kindergartens 
(INTEGRA y JUNJI) 
Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest kindergarten. 
• Junta Nacional de Auxilio y 
Becas (2013). 
• Fundación Integra (2016) 
Universities Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest university. 
Ministry of Education (2017) 
Culture Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest cinema, theater, cultural 
center, art gallery, museums, 
concert halls and libraries. 
IDE – OCUC (Observatory of cities 
Pontifical Catholic University of 
Chile; 2016). 
Historic Monuments Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest monument.  
National Monument Council 
(Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales; 
2014). 
Typical Areas Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest typical areas. 
National Monument Council 
(Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales; 
2014). 
Health Care Centers 
(Public and Private) 
Proximity in kilometers to 
health care centers. 
Public healthcare centers: Ministry of 
Healthcare (2017). 
 
Private healthcare centers: IDE – 
OCUC (Observatory of cities 
Pontifical Catholic University of 
Chile; 2016). 
Parks  Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest park. 
Ministry of Housing (2015). 
Bus stops and 
Subways 
Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest station of buses or 
subway. 
Ministry of Transport (2016). 
Bicycle lines Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest bicycle route. 
Metropolitan Government of Santiago 
(2016). 
Shopping Centers Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest shopping center. 
Representatives of shopping centers 
(2017).  
Pharmacies Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest pharmacy.  
Ministry of Healthcare (2017). 
Fast Food 
Restaurants 
Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest fast food restaurants. 
Open Street Maps (OSM; 2017). 
Restaurants Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest restaurant. 
Open Street Maps (OSM; 2017) 
Banks Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest bank. 
Superintendence of Banks (2013). 
Proximity to CBD Proximity in kilometers to the 
capital of Metropolitan Region 
(Santiago of Chile). 
Open Street Maps (OSM; 2017). 
Accidents Average of accidents by spatial 
unit using critical points of 
accidents (interpolation 
techniques). 
National Transit Security Council 
(2016). 
Nuisance Average of nuisance by spatial 
unit using monitoring stations 
(interpolation techniques).  
Ministry of Environment (2011). 
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Crime Average of housing burglary by 
spatial unit using critical points 
of housing burglary 
(interpolation techniques) 
IDE OCUC (Observatory of cities 
Pontifical Catholic University of 
Chile; 2016). 
Housing camps Proximity in kilometers to the 
nearest housing camps. 
Ministry of Housing (2016). 
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Table 31: Descriptive Statistics Variables First Stage 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mean of Housing Price by Block (Logarithm) 43.843 16,39208 0,8487138 14,07978 22,6959 
Number of superior quality housing by block 43.843 0,185959 3,546786 0 263 
Number of medium-superior quality housing by 
block 43.843 4,80161 34,30477 0 1085 
Number of medium quality housing by block 43.843 16,94387 61,21488 0 1601 
Number of medium-low quality housing by 
block 43.843 28,96433 35,98318 0 1076 
Number of low quality housing by block 43.843 3,833839 9,810599 0 695 
Mean of housing size by block 43.843 52,20041 33,33943 6 2575,667 
Share of exempted housing from property tax by 
block 43.843 0,7998525 0,3600474 0 1 
Mean of housing age by block 43.843 33,07619 14,7774 1 111,6667 
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Table 32: Descriptive Statistics Variables Second Stage 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Proximity to private schools 1651 1.56 1.33 0.01 17.85 
Proximity to semi-private schools 1651 0.45 0.79 0.01 17.16 
Proximity to public schools 1651 0.63 0.85 0.01 19.39 
Proximity to public kindergartens 1651 0.82 1.06 0.00 19.51 
Proximity to universities 1651 4.29 3.59 0.01 20.88 
Proximity to culture centers 1651 1.56 1.56 0.02 20.18 
Proximity to monuments 1651 2.26 1.82 0.02 20.41 
Proximity to typical areas 1651 5.10 3.85 0.01 21.55 
Proximity to private healthcare centers 1651 4.75 3.68 0.06 22.88 
Proximity to public healthcare centers 1651 1.14 1.03 0.01 20.04 
Proximity to parks 1651 0.33 0.81 0.00 17.49 
Proximity to parks over 5750 square mts 1651 0.83 0.94 0.00 17.49 
Proximity to buses stations 1651 0.24 0.77 0.00 19.04 
Proximity to subway stations 1651 2.35 2.36 0.13 24.95 
Proximity to bicycle lines 1651 0.88 1.18 0.00 20.17 
Mean of accidentes by census district 1651 8.82 1.33 0.00 18.73 
Mean of noise by census district 1651 64.34 4.28 0.00 74.11 
Mean of home burglary by census district 1651 139.86 54.74 28.20 411.91 
Proximity to housing camps 1651 2.26 1.56 0.08 20.16 
Proximity to shopping center 1651 2.10 1.55 0.06 19.86 
Proximity to pharmacies 1651 0.51 0.80 0.01 19.19 
Proximity to fast food restaurants 1651 0.90 0.74 0.01 11.69 
Proximity to restaurants 1651 0.61 0.59 0.00 9.70 
Proximity to banks 1651 1.07 1.11 0.00 20.17 
Proximity to CBD 1651 10.12 5.44 0.21 35.27 
Proximity to fire stations 1651 1.22 1.04 0.01 21.03 
Proximity to police stations 1651 1.35 0.91 0.02 9.96 
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Table 33: Results of Global Models (OLS) Stage 1 
  
 Dependent variable:   
 Mean of Housing Values by Block 
 (1) (2)  
Number of superior high-quality units by block 0.012*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.0004)    
Number of medium-superior quality units by block 0.001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.00004)    
Number of medium quality units by block 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.00003) (0.00003)    
Number of medium-low quality units by block -0.0003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.00004)    
Number of low quality units by block -0.004*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001)    
Mean of housing size by block 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.00005)    
Mean of housing age by block -0.0003** 0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002)    
Proportion of exempted property tax units by block -1.648*** -0.979*** 
 (0.007) (0.008)    
Constant 17.421*** 17.676*** 
 (0.009) (0.095)     
Fixed effects by census district No Yes 
Observations 43,843 43,843 
R2 0.760 0.929 
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.926 
Residual Std. Error 0.416 0.231 
F Statistic 17,355.530*** 331.795***  
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
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Table 34: Results of Global Models (OLS) and Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) Stage 2 
 
Dependent variable: Fixed Effect by Census District  
 OLS  Geographically Weighted Regression 
 Coeff (Std. Error)  Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max. p-value . 
Proximity to private schools -0.090***(0.009)  -0,27453 -0,06481 -0,03051 0,00899 0,10060 0,000 
Proximity to semi-private schools -0.114***(0.023)  -0,72690 -0,25148 -0,08549 -0,00893 0,21280 0,000 
Proximity to public schools 0.100***(0.019)  -0,20678 0,01624 0,10066 0,14644 0,25820 0,140 
Proximity to kindergartens 0.122***(0.015)  -0,07101 0,07958 0,15675 0,21235 0,42030 0,000 
Proximity to universities -0.001(0.006)  -0,27500 -0,02753 0,02009 0,07632 0,71930 0,000 
Proximity to culture 0.036***(0.010)  -0,23808 -0,05010 -0,00925 0,03639 0,19410 0,000 
Proximity to monuments -0.022***(0.007)  -0,13033 -0,02342 0,02180 0,07268 0,26090 0,000 
Proximity to typical areas -0.054***(0.005)  -0,26893 -0,05063 -0,01567 0,02902 0,83930 0,000 
Proximity to private healthcare centers -0.046***(0.007)  -0,81446 -0,05138 -0,00037 0,04023 1,06840 0,000 
Proximity to public healthcare centers 0.060***(0.012)  -0,18104 0,01813 0,05308 0,08126 0,26330 0,004 
Proximity to parks 0.019(0.029)  -0,38697 -0,01836 0,09457 0,20237 0,59890 0,032 
Proximity to parks over 5750 mts2 -0.062***(0.017)  -0,20876 -0,05605 -0,00852 0,03504 0,15000 0,163 
Proximity to bus stops 0.054**(0.026)  -0,37462 -0,05580 0,10892 0,22600 0,58510 0,169 
Proximity to subway stations 0.012*(0.006)  -0,46844 -0,09128 -0,04383 0,01328 0,30330 0,000 
Proximity to bicycle lines 0.088***(0.012)  -0,11750 -0,00103 0,04262 0,08411 0,34920 0,004 
Proximity to shopping centers -0.048***(0.009)  -0,24387 -0,08661 -0,05372 0,01678 0,16040 0,000 
Proximity to pharmacies -0.003(0.023)  -0,21148 -0,03942 0,03740 0,09780 0,24440 0,649 
Proximity to fast food restaurants 0.056***(0.013)  -0,23474 -0,05065 0,03213 0,09296 0,23730 0,000 
Proximity to restaurants 0.023(0.017)  -0,29153 -0,09299 -0,01620 0,04199 0,40390 0,002 
Proximity to banks -0.085***(0.014)  -0,23410 -0,11675 -0,05643 0,02732 0,23970 0,000 
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Proximity to Fire stations -0.021(0.014)  -0,16558 -0,03304 -0,00637 0,02727 0,12160 0,356 
Proximity to police stations 0.058***(0.011)  -0,08048 0,02732 0,05945 0,10144 0,20560 0,038 
Proximity to CBD 0.049***(0.004)  -1,16402 -0,06990 -0,00617 0,02379 0,26660 0,000 
Accidents by census districts -0.008(0.006)  -0,04610 -0,01018 0,00194 0,01322 0,04590 0,671 
Nuisance by census districts 0.007***(0.002)  -0,03163 -0,00006 0,00846 0,01791 0,06350 0,005 
Housing burglary by census district -0.0005***(0.0002)  -0,00311 -0,00046 0,00010 0,00084 0,00300 0,000 
Proximity to housing camps 0.028***(0.007)  -0,08205 0,01029 0,03534 0,06392 0,17890 0,000 
Constant -1.075***(0.175)  -5,52219 -1,69471 -1,15960 -0,54643 3,19560 0,000 
Observations 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
Residual Std. Error 
F Statistic 
1,651 
0.666 
0.661  
0.271 
120.077*** 
    1651 
   0.877 
   0.820 
     
Note: *p**p***p<0.01        
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